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Abstract 
 
This thesis excavates Antonio Negri's theorization of the distinction between 'the 
material and formal constitution' (one which I distinguish throughout by way of 
capitalization as 'the material constitution' and 'the formal Constitution' or, in the 
shorthand contraction, 'c/Constitution'). In the first half of the thesis this is undertaken 
by way of a theoretical line of inquiry (Chapter I-III) and in the second as a series of 
concretized case studies drawn from contemporary Canadian constitutional 
historiography (Chapters IV-VI). 
 
The first chapter of this thesis (Chapter I) presents the October 1970 Front de libération 
de Québec (FLQ) Crisis as an event which contains within itself, not unlike similar 
events surrounding the kidnap and murder of Aldo Moro by the Brigate Rosse (BR) in 
1978 Italy, the contours of a Negri-inspired entry into the subject matter. Chapter II 
offers a more situated analysis of some of Negri's key texts on the c/Constitution from 
the sixties, seventies, eighties and nineties to further ground the conceptual experiment 
underlying the thesis.  Chapter III examines how Negri's thought is developed and 
brought up to date in his English language collaboration with Michael Hardt. Here, a 
significant detour will be taken through the critical literature responsive to Empire 
(2000).  This is done first in a contemporary Canadian analysis of the form of 
sovereignty corresponding to 'Empire' (Chapter IV); second in a Canadian inquiry into 
the form of collective subjectivity understood by the concept of 'the multitude' (Chapter 
V); and, third in an Indigenous Canadian consideration of possible alternatives to the 
Constitution of the State in the 'constitution of the common' (Chapter VI). 
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PART I 
Chapter I - Introduction 
 
I do not believe that either Quebec or Canada can be sovereign and 
independent today or in the future in the same way as was thought 
possible in 1970. 
 
W. Tetley, The October Crisis, 1970 (2010)
1
 
The crisis of sovereignty is today serious and profound. The king 
really has no clothes. Sovereignty tends to become simply useless 
domination. 
 
M. Hardt & A. Negri,  in Reflections on Empire (2008)
2
 
During the raids on homes of suspects after the War Measures Act 
had been imposed, one cop seized a book on Cubism, convinced he 
held a Cuban revolutionary tract in his hot hands. 
 
M. Richler, Oh Canada! Oh Quebec! (1992)
3
  
 
This thesis begins with a broad form of comparison between the Canadian and the 
Italian historical situation in the sixties and seventies to open up the possibility that 
neither Canada, nor Italy, is as unique as might be supposed. The aim is explicitly not, 
however, to offer up a scientific (re)construction of Canadian and Italian history in that 
or any other period. To do so would be well beyond the purview of this thesis and the 
expertise of its author. Instead, this chapter seeks more modestly to introduce a 
plausible ‗Negri-inspired‘ constitutional theory which it will develop and defend in 
subsequent chapters in a more and more specified Canadian context.   
 
In the broadest sense thesis is aimed at a Canadian reader interested in constitutional 
theory who might be less than expert, or even unfamiliar with Negri‘s long intellectual 
development prior to his English language collaboration with American Italianist and 
critical theorist, Michael Hardt, in Empire.4 To engage a Canadian readership, it 
therefore begins with a well-known event in contemporary Canadian history, the 
‗October Crisis‘, shorthand for the October 1970 kidnap murder of Quebec Minister of 
Labour, Pierre Laporte, by the Front de libération de Québec (FLQ). An event which 
can be brought into conversation with the similarly infamous and equally grizzly one in 
contemporary Italian history, one which is linked, however erroneously quite lastingly, 
                                               
1
 W. Tetley, The October Crisis, 1970 (Montreal: Queens-McGill Press, 2010) xxxv. 
2
 M. Hardt & A. Negri, ‘Sovereignty’ in A. Negri, Reflections on Empire (London: Polity, 2008) 57. 
3
 M. Richler, Oh Canada! Oh Quebec! (Toronto: Penguin, 1992) 134.  
4
 M. Hardt & A. Negri, Empire (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000).  
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to the name of Antonio Negri himself. Namely, the 1978 kidnap murder of former Italian 
Prime Minister and Christian Democrat leader, Aldo Moro, by the Brigate Rosse (BR). 
 
Even outside of Italy it is well known that Antonio Negri was among 22 Italian ‗extra-
parliamentary‘ left intellectuals and activists rounded up in a dragnet and arrested by 
Italian authorities in April of 1979 in connection with the BR terrorist events of the prior 
year. After retelling the basic story surrounding this event and what is offered as its 
Canadian point of comparison in the October Crisis, this chapter  
lays down the basic thesis that it is possible to coherently expound a ‗Negri-inspired‘ 
constitutional thought and praxis and propose a Canadian instantiation of it, something 
which has not yet, to my knowledge, been attempted.  
 
I begin with the question of terrorist violence, for it is the lingering taint of the 
accusation, trial and conviction of Negri in connection with the kidnap and killing of 
Aldo Moro by the BR which makes him controversial for so many people. Not only for 
those who harbour suspicions that Negri might indeed have been guilty of being the 
terrorist mastermind that his accusers alleged, but for those who wonder if he was not 
at least guilty of being the favoured theorist of the BR. It is a given that these are two 
entirely different lines of inquiry, both of which may or may not be relevant to judging 
Negri‘s philosophical texts; and, both which are interesting questions which can only be 
meaningfully researched by a non-Italian speaker to a limited extent. However, it is 
worth noting that, at least on the basis of trial transcripts available in reliable English 
language translation, neither suspicion would seem, in any way to be borne out by the 
‗evidence‘. Nevertheless, it is not necessary for this thesis to get bogged down in such 
an immensely difficult question, one which would be well beyond the scope of anyone 
to resolve. Instead I will simply assert plainly my own reading, which is fallible like any, 
and move on: Negri‘s disagreement not only with the BR‘s tactics, but with its ideology, 
is quite plain and speaks for itself.5 This point is in the end itself relatively minor insofar 
as the arguments made in this doctorate do not turn on autobiographical details of 
Negri‘s life but rather in the interstices of a highly specified and very narrow tranche of 
his thought.  
                                               
5
 For a useful translation of some of Negri’s key exchanges with his accusers at trial see generally S. 
Lontringer & C. Marazzi (eds), Autonomia (Lost Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007) 188-194. In response to 
interrogation, Negri summarizes the distinction between autonomia as a decentralized social movement 
and the BR as a terrorist paramilitary organization along two axes: (1) ‘The BR has an extremely 
centralized idea of organization (the party), which is presented as the fundamental and exclusive 
weapon and the determining factor in the clash with the State...’; and, ‘ “Autonomia Operaia,” on the 
contrary – on the basis of the tradition of Italian revolutionary Marxism – considers organization as mass 
organization of social production...’. In other words, ‘For the BR, the concept of insurrection is 
connected to the issues of taking over State power. For ‘Autonomia,’ take-over is a meaningless 
objective. 
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A. Social movements and terrorist violence: Italy and Canada of the 
sixties and seventies 
When Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau invoked the War Measures Act6 at 
4:00 a.m. on October 16, 1970, resulting in the deployment of 7,500 Canadian Forces 
troops to Montreal (and still more further afield in Ottawa and elsewhere), over 450 
arrests, many in the middle of the night, on suspicion of collusion with, or belonging to, 
the FLQ,7 it was clear that Canada was in no way insulated from the tendency of 
western governments in the seventies to react to terrorist militancy with overwhelming 
power and the suspension of legal norms. For most ordinary Italians living in and 
around the urban violence of the seventies there was very likely much sympathy for 
just such an approach. The senseless violence carried out by the BR throughout the 
seventies and early eighties was deeply unpopular. In this sense, the response of the 
                                               
6
 The War Measures Act, 1914 RSC. 1970 c. W-2 was originally promulgated by Prime Minister Robert 
Borden’s (Liberal-Conservative) World War I ‘Unity Government’ to feed the Imperial Parliament’s need 
for dominion men to fight. It primary use was to combat anti-conscription riots in Quebec. The Act was 
once again declared in force in World War II under similar circumstances. It was later amended in 1960 
to specify that its provisions were not bound by the new Canadian Bill of Rights. The Canadian Bill of 
Rights, SC 1960 c. 44, s. 6, was a legislative precursor to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
Constitution Act 1982 (Sched B to Canada Act 1982 (UK), c. 11) (enacting the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (the “Charter”). The War Measures Act was enacted by Parliament pursuant to their s. 91 
of the Constitution Act, 1867 jurisdiction to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of 
Canada.” Canadian constitutionalists know it as ‘the p.o.g.g. power’. The Act itself was triggered on 
occasions “war, invasion, or insurrection, real or apprehended”, like all emergency powers or marshal 
laws, it permitted the State to carry out acts which would be illegal in peacetime even with special 
statutory authority see generally P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Thomson, 2006) 
453 fn1, 475, fn128-129. Six years after the adoption of the Charter, the War Measures Act would be 
repealed and substantially overhauled by the Emergencies Act, SC 1988, c. 29. The new Emergency Act 
however was not proclaimed into force until 2003, nearly two decades after it was originally passed by 
Parliament, and a full two years after the events of 9/11 and the global War on Terror had begun. There 
is an immense literature detailing the expansion of emergency powers in this period, its convergences 
and divergences from other jurisdictions, the US and the UK in particular see eg K. Roach, ‘Did 
September 11 Change Everything – Struggling to Preserve Canadian value in the Face of Terrorism’ 
(2002) 47 McGill Law Journal 4, 893;  D. Jenkins, ‘In Support of Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act: A 
Comparison of Canadian, British and American Anti-Terrorism Law’ (2003) 66 Saskatchewan Law Review 
419; K.L. Scheppele, ‘North American Emergencies: the Use of Emergence Power in Canada and the 
United States’ (2006) 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law 2, 213-243; R. Whitaker, ‘Keeping Up 
with the Neighbours – Canadian Responses to 9/11 in Historical Comparative Context (2007) 41 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 2/3, 381-414. For a more critical and hard hitting view of the Canadian 
situation specifically, rather than a comparative or social scientific study of statutory schemes in the US, 
UK and Canada see W. Pue, ‘The War on Terror: Constitutional Governance in a State of Permanent 
Warfare?’ (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 267. For a more purely theoretical outlay of the problem 
with examples from the Canadian situation see D. Dyzenhaus, ‘Puzzle of Martial Law’ 59 University of 
Toronto Law Journal 1-64. 
7
 For a defence of the Trudeau government’s proclamation of a ‘state of apprehended insurrection’ and 
the special regulations implemented by order-in-council of the Federal Government see generally n 1 
above at 82-83.  For a more critical treatment see G. Bouthillier & E. Cloutier (eds), Trudeau’s Darkest 
Hour (Montreal: Baraka Books, 2010) 15. For the text of the Public Order Regulation, 1970 authorizing 
arrest, detention and imprisonment of up to five years for any member of the FLQ or similarly aimed 
organizations see http://www.mcgill.ca/maritimelaw.  
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Italian state to the BR, whose kidnapping and murder of Christian Democratic Party 
(CD) leader Aldo Moro in 1978 was however extreme, not unlike the response of the 
Canadian Government to the FLQ‘s kidnapping and Quebec Minister of Labour Pierre 
Laporte nearly a decade earlier, largely in tune with public sentiment. Both cases 
involved acts of extraordinary violence by a marginal extreme left group against a high 
profile centre right political leader at the peak of a period of intensifying terrorist 
attacks.8  
 
On April 7, 1979 the Italian police rounded up 22 prominent intellectuals and activists, 
Antonio Negri among them, on charges of being complicit in, even masterminding the 
BR. A reliable English language translation of the charges against Negri is not 
available. What is plain however is that in the years which followed, the Italian 
prosecution services would not as easily release detained innocents or acknowledge 
its errors in the same way as their Canadian brethren9 (Negri himself would of course 
famously spend well over two decades in prison and exile on account of the refusal of 
authorities to acknowledge the illegitimacy of its arrest, trial and conviction10). But the 
                                               
8
 In 1977 the BR began its ‘strategy of annihilation’ in which terrorist activities were directed 
indiscriminately at various personages and symbols of public or state power, its primary target was CD 
officials and appointees, but it also targeted the PCI for its willingness to collaborate with the CD. In 
1976 the RB and affiliated groups killed eight and wounded 16, in 1977 they killed seven and wounded 
40. In 1978, the numbers of dead, Moro among them, spiked to 29. Things continued apace in 1979 and 
reached a high point of 30 deaths in 1980. P. Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy (London: 
Palgrave, 2003) 383-385. Exact comparison between the BR and the FLQ in terms of body count would 
be meaningless. However, there can be little doubt that FLQ was comparatively weaker and killed fewer 
people. Nevertheless, it had also killed and terrorized with zeal before its dramatic kidnap and murder 
of Quebec Minister of Labour, Pierre Laporte n 1 above at xxviii, xxxvii-xxxviii, 18, 26 (describing the 
FLQ’s culpability between 1963 and 1970 in over 200 bombings as well as robberies and kidnappings 
resulting in at least “six violent deaths” prior to Laporte’s, one in 1963, two in 1964, two in 1966 and 
two in 1970 inclusive of one at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa and Laporte). The basic 
argument is not that the BR and the FLQ were roughly the same in size or capacity for violence, but 
simply that their most high profile acts took on a similar national profile.  
9
 Shortly after the War Measures Act was put into effect on October 16, 1970, the Federal Government 
established the Committee to Aid Persons Arrested under the War Measures Act.  Of the 497 arrested 
under the act, 435 were released without charge, 62 charged and only 32 held without bail. Less than a 
year later in March of 1971 the Government of Quebec agreed to provide compensation of up to 
$30,000 for each person unjustly arrested, by July of the same year Quebec’s ombudsmen 
recommended compensation for 103 of the 238 complaints arising from arrests and detention during 
the October Crisis. Four men, Bernard Lortie, Paul Rose, Jacques Rose and Francis Simard were 
eventually arrested, tried and convicted for the kidnap and murder of Laporte. n 1 above at xxv-xxvi, xl- 
xliii. After his release in 1982 Simard wrote a book in which he acknowledged participating in Laporte’s 
murder but refused to name which among the co-defendants had actually slain Laporte see F. Simard, 
Pour en finir avec octobre (Montreal: Stanké, 1982). For a complete list of the convictions and sentences 
of FLQ members see n 1, Appendix 4 at 234-235. 
10
 Negri was arrested in April of 1979 in a dragnet alongside other prominent Italian intellectuals and 
activists on suspicion of terrorist ties. He remained under conditions of imprisonment or exile until April 
25, 2003. During these 25 years, 11 were spent in prison and 14 in exile. A. Negri, Empire and Beyond 
(London: Polity, 2008) vii. 
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initial Italian response to the BR kidnap murder of Moro as much as the Canadian one 
to the FLQ kidnap murder of Laporte was similar.   
 
What is immediately clear in the reaction of the Canadian and the Italian authorities to 
the kidnap and murder of one of its members is a survival instinct (which is, of course, 
to be expected). From the martial response of the Government in Canada, inclusive of 
its invocation of war powers, to the anti-intellectual dragnet targeting left thinkers and 
activists by the Republic in Italy, the same reactionary tendency of sovereign power is 
on display. Let us further examine the analogies. 
 
First rule: No negotiation. ‗We do not negotiate with terrorists‘ is the only permissible 
phrase in respectable government circles during a terrorist crisis in both the Italian and 
the Canadian situation.  Second rule: The usual rules are suspended. In both the 
Canadian and Italian cases, there is a similar cycle of activism and terrorism leading to 
some dramatic suspension of ‗the Rule of Law‘.  In both cases this is triggered by a 
terrorist attack on the political institutions of the State or persons representing those 
institutions.  
 
In the Canadian case, the FLQ‘s kidnap and murder of the Pierre Laporte triggers the 
activation of the War Measures Act. The Act is a draconian piece of legislation which, 
while suspending certain basic civil liberties and rights of due process characteristic of 
the Rule of Law, permits the deployment of military forces within Canada for the 
purpose of the keeping of public order, quelling imminent insurrection and preserving 
the State from existential threats to its survival.11 In the Italian case, the arrest, trial and 
imprisonment of leading intellectuals and activists like Negri contains elements of the 
same tendency, a similar break, albeit this time unspoken, with the Rule of Law and a 
similar assertion of the Political in its place (and by extension, its autonomy from legal 
or other forms of constraint). How is this convergence to be explained? 
 
Certainly, in the postwar period Italy was poised on the razor‘s edge between an 
ascendant, expansionist American style liberal capitalism to the West and increasingly 
intransigent Stalinist totalitarianism to the East. In this sense it was very different from 
postwar Canada which, having been separated from Europe and Asia by immense 
oceans was spared from attacks on its cities and countryside. It therefore emerged, 
perhaps even despite having lost a part of a generation on European soil,12 in some 
                                               
11
 n 5 above. 
12
 Canada had 22, 910 casualties in World War II including 13, 134 confirmed fatal battle wounds. 
http://www65.statcan.gc.ca/acyb02/1947/acyb02_19471126002-eng.htm. Leading Canadian historian 
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material senses strengthened in the post-war years, not only in terms of its industrial 
output, national infrastructure and military might, but also in terms of its political 
influence abroad and independence at home.13 The situation for Italy, in which the loss 
of human life and the destruction of property was greater, was worse. Not only had its 
government been complicit in the fascist experiment, its people and land was 
exhausted from war and privation.14 Without much choice in the matter, Italy entered 
into a period of quasi-imperialist tutelage under the occupation of the allied powers, led 
by the US. Nevertheless, by the sixties and seventies Italy would begin to catch up, 
particularly in its industrial north, to Canada in terms of economic production and global 
influence.15  
 
By 1975, Italy‘s ‗economic miracle‘ made it a sufficiently powerful actor to be a 
founding member of the Group of Six (G-6) leading industrial democracies and one of 
the leading institutions of what Hardt and Negri term ‗the formal Constitution of 
                                                                                                                                         
Desmond Morton offers a significantly larger figure of war dead at 43,000. D. Morton, A Brief History of 
Canada (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 6
th
 ed., 2006) 246. 
13
 Canada’s Gross National Product (GNP) more than doubled between 1939 and 1945. 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-516-x/pdf/5500096-eng.pdf. Perhaps surprisingly, even its consumer 
spending rose in the same period. This fact alone offset a quadrupled national debt incurred fighting in 
Europe and Asia. D. Morton n 12 above at 246. See also 236-237 in same, describing wartime prosperity 
as tangible: “wages were frozen but they were certain...By European standards the hardships and 
sacrifices were slight, and many Canadians found the war years a bright contrast with the grim 
Depression...Boring jobs or military routine had at least lifted people from pre-war status”. By war’s 
end, Canada’s air force was the fourth largest in the world, its navy the third largest and its standing 
army of over 730,000 proven as a major force in the European land offensive including the role of its 1
st
 
Infantry Division which joined the Sicily landing of July 1943 and partook in fighting on the Italian 
peninsula, much of which was a bloody rehearsal for its expanded military role in the D-Day assault and 
the final grim offensives of the war, including the one which liberated the Netherlands immediately 
prior to Germany’s surrender on May 6, 1945. Canada’s postwar boom was also facilitated by its role as 
a major lender to the destroyed European economies, Britain in particular. Its postwar move away from 
colonial ties to a new military and economic ‘partnership’ with the vastly more powerful US would 
follow. In the latter half of the twentieth century Canada’s powerful new position in the global hierarchy 
was nevertheless self-consciously offset by its ‘moralizing and self-important’ role as a leading ‘middle 
power’ in emergent trans, inter and supranational forums like the United Nations (UN), the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Commonwealth see 251-256 in same. 
14
 The Italian Resistance had 100,000 fighting members, some of whom were also Communist militants 
and factory workers, at least 35,000 died. Many were mutilated or deported to Germany for torture and 
execution by the SS. In the immediate aftermath of the liberation of northern Italy there were also a 
series of settlings of scores in which up to 15, 000 suspected and confirmed fascists were killed. By late 
in the war, living conditions deteriorated radically with lack of winter heating and major food shortages 
compounded by Allied bombing raids. In 1945 Italian industrial production was a third of what it had 
been in 1938. P. Ginsborg n 8 above at 63-64, 68, 70, 93.  
15
 P. Ginsborg n 8 above at 157-159, 212-225. The precursors to the ‘economic miracle’ of the fifties and 
sixties lay in postwar Italy’s entry into the European Economic Community, the American sphere of 
influence and the key institutions of transatlantic security including NATO. See also 233- 239 in same 
describing the dynamism of Italian capital and the unmanaged, even spontaneous quality of postwar 
economic growth in the central and northern part of the country. 
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Empire‘.16  Canada was accommodated by an expanded G-7 a short year later.17  
Italy‘s postwar economic miracle, albeit much less miraculous than their old axis allies 
in West Germany and Japan, did bring it back into upper echelons of global capital. 
This was no doubt in large part due to a variety of factors ranging from the immense 
capital infusion afforded by the US Marshall Plan, the investment of public funds into 
domestic industry and Italy‘s integration into an emerging European project.18 All of 
which meant, at least in its northern industrial heartland, Italy was by the sixties at least 
finally experiencing the growth of the same type of which had been felt in the other 
major liberal capitalist states of the West (inclusive of Japan).   
 
An early transition to Empire 
 
For Canada, not unlike Italy, the postwar epoch was one in which it would move more 
closely into the US orbit, as the global power of Europe and Britain in particular began 
to wane. For this reason alone, Canada and Italy both, like many other countries 
around the globe, albeit always in localized and specific ways, began a broader 
transition, both domestically and geopolitically in the latter half of the twentieth century. 
At least this is one of the (Hardt and) Negri-inspired theses which I consider in this 
doctorate. The suggestion is, of course, not that Italy and Canada are the same or 
convergent in any specific way, but rather that they are part of a tendency which was 
not exclusive to any country. To make sense of this it might be useful to begin with 
something more Italian, or at least particular to its southern Mediterranean and Adriatic 
neighbourhood at mid-century: Namely, the spectre of fascism and civil war.   
 
In postwar Italy, the entire political class, whether on the centre right or on the centre 
left, were interested in avoiding civil war or a return to fascism more than anything else. 
Certainly in this sense, there can be no question of comparing it with postwar Canada‘s 
                                               
16
 n 4 above at 314-320. The Constitution of Empire is characterized more by an ancient/ Polybian 
constitutional model (based on an imagined power sharing between monarchical, aristocratic and 
democratic bodies) than it is the modern/liberal/unitary model (inclusive of its imagined 
Montesquieuian division between the executive, legislative and judicial forms). Like the ancient 
constitution, the Constitution of Empire is characterized by “a functional equilibrium” between: (1) “the 
monarchic unity of power and its global monopoly of force *the US, NATO, etc.+”; (2) “aristocratic 
articulations through transnational corporations and nation-states”; and, (3) “democratic-
representational comitia, presented again in the form of nation-states along with the various kinds of 
NGOs, media organizations, and other ‘popular’ organisms.”  
17
 Italy and Canada were cofounders of NATO in 1949. Italy was a founding member of the Group of Six 
(G-6) in 1975 a year prior to Canada’s accession, which made it the Group of Seven (G-7) in 1976. The 
next round of expansion came with Russia’s accession in 1997 which made it the G-8. In 1999 Canadian 
Finance Minister (and later Liberal Prime Minister) Paul Martin, would successfully lobby for an at least 
partial widening of the group to a G-20 outer circle including ‘emerging’, ‘developing’ or ‘transitional’ 
economies (thereby extending a second tier, partial or transitional membership, to South Africa, 
Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, China, South Korea, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Australia).  
18
 P. Ginsborg n 8 above 213. 
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comparatively tame political situation. The threat, real or imagined, of a fascist coup did 
not factor into the Canadian equation during this period. In fact, the only effect of 
European fascism in Canada was the extent that the country had been emboldened 
domestically and internationally as a result of its participation in fascism‘s military 
defeat overseas. As to the question of communism, or perhaps more specifically 
Communist Party politics, Stalin‘s ugliness was quite rapidly conflated with the 
communist name in Canada.  So much so, that the various Communist and Marxist 
Leninist Parties which cropped up in Canada over the twentieth century and continue 
to exist in the twenty-first, never amounted to a significant political factor. Canadians 
also succumbed, at least to some (much lesser) degree, to a sort of tamer 
McCarthyism, for a while, fleshing out home grown communists as ‗the next big 
threat‘.19  
 
During the FLQ Crisis, and alternatively at various points over the last 40 years, 
Quebec nationalism has occupied this negative imaginative and symbolic space in the 
Canadian national psyche. First Nations people in Canada also find themselves 
interposed on the same terrain, particularly where they make themselves heard by way 
of militant actions which disrupt or otherwise intervene with the day to day function of 
capital and the state. No doubt similar spaces continue to exist in the Italian national 
psyche in which the radical other is occupied by Romani caravans, the Arab or African 
asylum seeker escaping the confines of the refugee camps on Lampedusa island, or 
even still a full century and half after Risorgimento, the Sardinian, Sicilian and 
Calabrian countrymen who remain perennially ‗Other‘ on the southern half of the 
peninsula (the Northern League‘s own separatist rumblings reflect the usual centrifugal 
aspirations in the opposite direction). Any extended or wider historical consideration of 
this sort is outside the reach of this thesis. Nevertheless, the fact that as many 
compelling and very obvious analogs exist between Italy and Canada, as much 
perhaps as between any two such similarly located ‗democratic‘ or ‗western‘ states 
generically, cannot be ignored or lost sight of. 
 
To avoid doing just this, the simple departure point in this chapter has been that both 
Italy and Canada are crosscut by immense difference and subalternity. Both contain as 
much antagonism as can be imagined in any political arrangement. Both are relatively 
young states.20 Both are loose multi-ethnic, multilingual and utterly non-homogeneous 
                                               
19
 D. Morton n 12 above at 258-259. 
20
 Canada is a ‘parliamentary democracy’ or a ‘constitutional monarchy’. It retains the British Monarch 
as sovereign. It is also a federal state. It was peacefully founded on July 1, 1867 in the union of Upper 
and Lower Canada, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia (with Upper Canada becoming Ontario and Lower 
Canada becoming Quebec). In subsequent years it expanded to include three federal territories in the 
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entities. It is also quite plain that a reasonable argument can be made that both the 
Italian and Canadian states contain multiple nations within themselves. Even that 
despite their relative contemporary stability, both Italy and Canada have been 
periodically brought to the precipice of crisis in the latter half of the twentieth century 
(again, in this chapter we focus in particular on the shared question of terrorist 
violence). 
 
Again, it is possible to say many other states share these very same qualities and that 
they are the mark of no particular congruence or commensurability between Canada 
and Italy. This would be right. However, I am still not inclined to think that the generality 
of their similarities hopelessly weakens the case for their intellectual joiner. Already, in 
very obvious ways, by the sixties and seventies, both the Italian and Canadian states 
were swept up in broader patterns of global capital well beyond their capacity to control 
unilaterally or even in concert with likeminded partners. Both were cogs, at best 
privileged, but still junior players, in an immense post-war economic growth cycle which 
continued into the sixties and ended in widespread recession, unemployment and 
stagnation in the seventies. No doubt this served as a basis for a shared sense of 
experimentalism among youth in Canada, Italy and further afield.21 It is by no means 
controversial to say that the youth-led counter-culture of the sixties and seventies 
produced effects globally not only in Italy and Canada, not only in the West, but 
beyond. This meant new forms of cultural and social pressure and new forms of 
political desire which overflowed the representative institutions of the State (its 
parliamentary politics and its basic imagining of the social contract) and the monetary 
form of value (its insistence on the translation of labour into the work and the time of 
the wage, ‗wage work‘). Negri makes this argument powerfully in the context of his 
native Italy in the sixties and seventies and more generally across the global terrain 
                                                                                                                                         
north and a series of other former British colonies as provinces equal in status with the original four 
with the final addition of Newfoundland and Labrador in 1949.  Canada is today comprised of ten 
provinces and three territories. Italy is, like Canada, a parliamentary democracy however it is a unitary 
republic rather than a constitutional monarchy and a federation. It was founded on March 17, 1861 
following the immense tumult of the Risorgimento. The città irredente did not join the Kingdom of Italy 
(1861-1946) until the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye in 1919 placed Trentino, South Tyrol, Trieste, 
Istria and a spattering of Dalmatian islands under Italian sovereignty.  The Italian Republic succeeded 
the Kingdom of Italy on June 2, 1946 after a popular referendum breaking with the monarchy and 
establishing a new constitutional order in the same year. Italy is today comprised of 20 regions, five of 
which have a special autonomous status. It is also further subdivided 110 administrative provinces and 
thousands of municipalities, all of which enjoy varying degrees of jurisdiction subordinate to that of the 
Republic.  
21
 I have found three books about this era in particular to be instructive. Relative to Italy, Lontringer & C. 
Marazzi (eds) n 5 above. Relative to Canada and Montreal in particular, S. Mills, The Empire Within 
(Montreal: McGill Queens University Press, 2010). Relative to the US as a broader point of comparison 
and a point of reference for both Italy and Canada see  T.H. Anderson, The Movement and the Sixties 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).  
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with Hardt in Empire. Empire is a global phenomenon presaged by many earlier 
instantiations of globalization but it is also a specifically autonomist, or ‗post-
autonomist‘ idea which, before it can be traced out in a potential Canadian iteration, 
must still first be properly situated in its Italian context.  
 
The specificity of the Italian situation 
 
To find the specificity of autonomist thought, Negri‘s in particular, on the question of 
constitution, we might look to Potere Operaio (PO), a group which, despite its short life 
span, from its co-founding by Negri and other autonomist intellectuals in 1970 to its 
dissolution in 1973, single-mindedly obsessed the Italian Republic‘s case against Negri 
and the other 21 intellectual and activists arrested alongside him.22 It was an 
organization which Negri‘s interrogators and accusers could not comprehend (or were 
not prepared to accept) was not led by a single personality or personalities, but was 
simply one current within a variety of overlapping and competing social movements, to 
which Negri refers collectively as ‗the Movement‘ in the transcript of his examination at 
trial in Padua. 23 
 
In the transcript of Negri‘s examination at trial in Padua, it is quite clear that the 
prosecutor and the judge have a limited knowledge of the loosely ‗extra-parliamentary 
left‘ politics they were impugning as terrorist. Certainly, beyond sharing some form of 
neo-Marxist proclivity, they nevertheless were internally differentiated in extraordinary 
ways.24 This is of course not to say that within the variously denominated strains of 
extra-Parliamentary left thought in Italy during the late sixties and early seventies 
                                               
22
 A portion of the trial transcript recorded on May 19, 1979 is translated and included in the English 
language anthology of autonomist writings, Lotringer & Marazzi (eds) n 5 above at 188-194. It is 
contextualized by way of a very brief but pointed preamble indicating that Judge Palombarini and Chief 
Prosecutor Calogero’s interrogation of Negri at trial in Padua on May 18, 1979 was one in which Negri 
agreed to participate (to the extent consent was possible under conditions of pre-trial imprisonment) in 
a way which other similarly situated autonomist intellectuals, such as Oreste Scalzone in particular, did 
not. The editors tell us that Scalzone and others may have wished to avoid playing into the Republic’s 
strategy of impugning autonomist intellectuals with their theoretical writings. Negri however, the 
editors suggest, thought it advisable to answer to his accusers even where they could not be assumed to 
be in good faith.   
23
 Ibid. 
24
Lotringer and Marazzi’s English language anthology provides an unparalleled glimpse into this turbid 
intellectual milieu. A milieu from which autonomia arises subsequent to a major break in the Italian 
extra-parliamentary left after the dissolution of Potere Operaio (Worker’s Power) in 1973, a break which 
arose in large part over factional disagreement about the use of terrorist violence as a revolutionary 
strategy. What autonomia carries over from Potere Operaio however, Lontringer and Marazzi suggest, is 
a basic insistence the autonomy of labour as an engine of social and immaterial as much as industrial 
and material productivity. Lontringer & Marazzi n 4 above at v-xvi, 188-194.  
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(building toward the ‗hot autumn‘ of 196925 and culminating in the restless decade to 
follow) there were no important commonalities. Indeed there were many, but one thing 
which was widely disagreed upon was the role of violence or the use of terrorist tactics.  
 
What various strains of extra-parliamentary left thought do not share is the specifically 
autonomist insistence that it is not only the old, centralized and hierarchical 
formulations of the Communist Party (the PCI) and particularly its collaboration with the 
bourgeois State in coalition (or endless negotiation directed at coalition or Historic 
Compromise) with the Christian Democrats, that is to be eschewed, but any form of 
centralization or hierarchy whatsoever, including any dictatorship of the proletariat or 
vanguard. Many of the loosely autonomist groups, including PO, drew on a deep 
materialist tradition, one which is given its own variation in the Italian peninsula and 
perhaps cannot be fully or even meaningfully accessed by a non-Italian speaker, but 
which is nevertheless steeped in the fertile mixture of Catholic worker‘s liberation 
theology and German metaphysics. This intellectual background informs Negri‘s 
thought in a way which is largely out of sight for this thesis and it is acknowledged to be 
a limitation. One which I acknowledge but defend insofar as that what I am proposing is 
a self-consciously Negri-inspired theory of constitution. Not, a work of textual 
hermeneutics. Instead, the first half of this thesis (Part I: Chapters I-III) is proposed as 
a form of experimental theory which mobilizes some of the conceptual modalities and 
arguments developed in Negri‘s key texts on the constitution available in reliable 
English language translation. Three texts in particular are developed at some length: 
‗Toward a Critique of the Material Constitution‘ (1977);26 The Savage Anomaly 
(1981);27 and Insurgencies (1991).28  
 
                                               
25
 The autonno caldo or ‘hot autumn of 1969’ had really begun in 1968 in smaller factories among non-
unionized labour and students. Potere Operaio, with which Negri and so many leading autonomists are 
associated, was only one of the groups which sprung up during this period. Along with other similarly 
revolutionary, albeit differently accented neo-Marxist groups, it corresponded to an intensification of 
student and worker militancy. In the fall of 1969 specifically, a loose agglomeration of student activists 
and intellectuals worked alongside trade unions, both nominally secular and aligned with the PCI as 
much as nominally Catholic and aligned with the CD, to shirk their bosses and political masters better 
judgment and engage in unauthorized work stoppages and strikes. Much of the action began in the 
metalwork factories of central and northern Italy in the fall of 1969 and spread in the early seventies to 
the petro-chemical, automobile, railway and even white collar sectors. For a brief history of this period 
see generally P. Ginsborg n 8 above at 309-320.  
26
 A. Negri, ‘Toward a critique of the material constitution’ in A. Negri, Books for Burning (London: Verso, 
2005) 180-230. 
27
 A. Negri, Savage Anomaly (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981).  
28
 A. Negri, Insurgencies (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991). 
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The specificity of the Canadian situation 
 
In the Canadian context, Sean Mill‘s recent The Empire Within (2010),29 presents a ten 
year study of social movements in Montreal from 1963 to 1973. In so doing, it offers a 
rare glimpse at certain potentially convergent vectors flowing beneath the Canadian as 
much as Italian social terrain in the sixties and seventies. By the seventies especially, 
in Canada as much as Italy, it is quite clear that the desire for revolution, particularly 
among the young, had the potential to exceed the bounds of ‗civil disobedience‘ and 
‗non-violent protest‘ set in the prior decade. If in the Canadian context we can look at 
recent scholarship such as Mills‘ to understand this period, in the Italian context we can 
look to Christian Marazzi and Silvère Lotringer‘s edited anthology, Autonomia.30 If Mills‘ 
research is presented in a sociological and historical register, Marazzi and Lotringer‘s 
anthology of first-hand accounts of participants and observers is a combination of 
polemical and theoretical texts, many both. In both anthologies it is very clear that 
much of what changed historically in this epoch was at the level of the family as much 
as at the level of the broader forms of social production which existed in the economy. 
So much so, that the old relationship between civil society and the State, which had 
been taking shape with an almost unstopped forward trajectory since the Treaty of 
Westphalia,31 was becoming, at the outermost limits of the twentieth century social 
welfare model, an anachronistic and hidebound one in much the same way as the old 
structure of the bourgeois family.32  
 
Recall also that by the seventies yet another twentieth century global boom bust 
economic cycle had come full circle; here the post-war baby boom generation felt the 
effects of recession, war and inflation with greater intensity than they could recall 
(albeit at a less intense level of depravation than their depression era parents). 
Certainly, if there is any common thread running between May of 1968 in France and 
the American civil rights movements of the same epoch, as much as the Canadian and 
                                               
29
 Mills n 21 above. 
30
 n 5 above. 
31
 For an at least partially Negri-inspired critique thereof see my book review of T. Jacobsen, C. 
Sampford & R. Thakur (eds) Re-Envisioning Sovereignty: The End of Westphalia (London: Ashgate, 2008) 
in 27 Australian Yearbook of International Law 281-293. 
32
 The traditional family’s hegemonies and modes of production began to change in Italy of the sixties 
and seventies as much as did those associated with the public sphere of the state and the private sphere 
of exchange (both of which are tied together heuristically in the social contract). An idea to which Hardt 
and Negri would return in the third volume of the trilogy, see A. Negri & M. Hardt, Commonwealth 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Belknap Press, 2009) 159-163. Just as the imagined family is the baseline 
rationality of social organization at the level of biological life, fecundity and sexuality, the imagined 
social contract is baseline rationality of social organization at the level of political life, sovereignty and 
the (re)production of society. This basic idea is where feminist and queer theory inform, albeit only 
rarely explicitly, Hardt and Negri’s unique reading of Foucaultian biopolitics see eg n 4 above at 40, 140-
141, 196-201, 274-275, 405-406; Multitude (London: Penguin, 2005) 199-200, 224. 
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Italian situations, it is this. The post-war generation stumbled into a major roadblock in 
the seventies. In many cases, I argue, in a way which develops Negri‘s thought, but is 
nevertheless particular to my own impressions, that this crucial transition between the 
sixties and seventies opens up an impulse to question the inherited social contractual 
imagining of the state, which, by the sixties and seventies could no longer bear the 
demands being placed upon it. I choose the October Crisis of 1970, in connection with 
the FLQ kidnap and murder of Quebec Minister of Labour Pierre Laporte in Canada, 
like the 1978 BR kidnap and murder of CD party leader, Aldo Moro, in Italy, as a way of 
opening up this thematic in a meaningful way for an Italian as much as a Canadian or 
other English language reader. 
 
I proceed on the assumption that if we are to understand Negri, not only about the 
specificity of his native Italy, but more generally about the formulation of a 
constitutional theory, we must first contextualize Negri himself relative to his 
contemporaries and comrades in the events leading to his arrest in 1979. Even more 
ambitiously for the purposes of this thesis, however, we must also meaningfully link this 
analysis to the Canadian experience in the same period. This is something which I 
begin to do in this chapter and have taken up in earnest, in the latter half of the thesis 
in the form of three distinct case studies (Part II). First in Chapter IV, the 1997 Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation Economic Community (‗APEC‘) Summit in Vancouver; 
second, in Chapter V, the era of Canadian ‗mega-constitutional politics‘ (1982-1998); 
third in Chapter VI, in the emerging distinction between ‗Aboriginal Law‘ and 
‗Indigenous ontology‘.  
 
B. Toward a possible convergence in the Italian and Canadian examples 
For the moment, however, I have begun by suggesting that Italy is not unique insofar 
as it, like Canada, is at once crosscut by pre and postmodern modes of production and 
political subjectivity. It is for example well known that in the south many Italians lived in 
the mid twentieth century as they had for thousands of years.33 Primitive family bonds 
trumped any solidarity within a broader civil society. The Italian Republican and State 
apparatus, to the extent it penetrated the consciousness of southerners was as a basic 
form of police and local bureaucracy. Both of which were steeped in clientism and 
corruption. 34  In the south of Italy, many still lived without access to electricity, running 
water, basic educational or medical services at the time of the fascist takeover.35 Many 
                                               
33
 Ginsborg n 8 above at 28-36, 122, 210-212. 
34
 Ibid. 181,286-290. 
35
 Ibid. 28-29. 
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First Nations people in Canada continue to live in similar conditions today.36 
Developmental trajectories and material conditions vary greatly, not only internal to the 
global horizon of Empire, but internal to states, which are today themselves only an 
internal category of Empire.  Italy and Canada are no exceptions. This is admittedly an 
assertion that neither be proven nor established as false. But I believe it to be the basis 
of a sound argument and one worth exploring at least in a preliminary sense here.  
 
In Empire, Hardt and Negri go some distance toward making this argument possible 
insofar as they pose Empire as a smooth global surface in which the first and third 
world interpenetrate, coexist and comingle across territorial as much as temporal 
space.37 Here, the old social contract and its imagining of a rights bearing citizenry, a 
model which is, in the formal sense, always present, but which is, in a material sense, 
less or more borne out by the facts, is presented in an altogether different and more 
critical light. The result, there may be a greater or lesser degree of convergence 
between the formal apparatus of the Constitution and what Negri calls ‗the material 
constitution‘.38 Anglo-American normative political philosophy, typically in the 
                                               
36
 A disproportionate number of First Nations peoples are without access to clean safe drinking water 
and living in cramped quarters. A fact which demonstrates in the most basic material sense, the degree 
to which the first and third world overlap in Canada see eg National Aboriginal Health Organization, 
‘Drinking Water Safety in Aboriginal Communities in Canada’ (May, 2002). 
http://www.naho.ca/documents/naho/english/publications/ReB_water_safety.pdf; 
http://www.cbc.ca/slowboil/; ‘Safe Drinking Water in Aboriginal Communities’ (Background Paper, 
Library of Parliament, Publication no. 08-43-E, Revised May 28, 2010). 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/researchpublications/prb0843-e.pdf; 
http://www.vancouversun.com/story_print.html?id=4702680&sponsor. For a comprehensive longer 
term assessment of endemic poverty and substantive inequality according to virtually all statistical 
indices from 1981-2001 see M. Cooke, D. Beavon, McHardy ‘Measuring the well-being of Aboriginal 
Peoples: An Application of the United Nations Human Development Index to Registered Indians in 
Canada’ (Strategic Research and Analysis Directorate Department of Northern and Indian Affairs 
Canada, 2004). http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/R2-345-2001E.pdf. 
37 On question of the ‘the constitution of time’ as a broader subset of the question of ‘ontological 
constitutionalism’ see generally, A. Negri, The Constitution of Time (1981) in A. Negri, A Time for 
Revolution (London: Continuum, 2005) 20-135, at 84 defining the closure of ‘juridical time’ in which “the 
law affirms ‘its continuing validity and therefore its universality by superimposing the fixity of an eternal 
present over the fluidity of time and therefore, explicating its axiological validity through formal 
validity’...”. See also, Insurgencies n 27 above at 315: “Constitutions can come one after the other – 
each time or, rather, each historical period, has its own constitution – but time must always be 
constitutionalized. And different times must be reduced to zero. The machination of this reduction is 
temporal and the constitution is a temporal machine. The formal constitution is superimposed over (and 
at the same time proceeds) a material constitution. In other words, it is an interweaving of power and 
interests, limits and conditions, the establishment of norms of participation and exclusion, temporally 
and historically defined. [citation omitted] The temporal machine is closed, the measure of time is that 
of command, and the normative value is that of exchange in its relative autonomy... Even the rules of 
representation are themselves brought back to this dialectical schema and subjected to the concrete 
temporality of the norm of reproduction of the system or the rule of enterprise. When constituent 
power is absorbed in the system, it is with respect to its dynamic capacities and on the condition of its 
constant dialectical neutralization.” 
38
 A concept which is recurring in Negri’s texts over half a century and which this thesis traces with 
particular intensity to the 1977 ‘Toward a Critique of the Material Constitution’ n 26 above and the 2000 
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hegemonic liberal register, describes this as the distinction between formal and 
substantive equality.39  
 
The Indigenous question 
 
The best example of this strange combination of social engineering and rights-based 
politics lies in the Canadian situation lies with the contemporary experience of  
Indigenous, First Nations or Aboriginal peoples who, particularly ‗status Indians‘ whose 
administration under the Indian Act40 is as intensive a race-based administrative 
intervention as any.41 In Italy we might also think of the treatment of refugee 
claimants42 and Romani populations, both of which are treated as ‗the Other‘ which 
resides persistently in the space of the state.43  It is well beyond my expertise to 
comment on this. In Canada, however no analysis of the contemporary situation is 
possible without the Indian Act. It is a species of formal Constitution which produces 
and reproduces a hyper-administered population in which certain very material 
outcomes result. It is a species of biocolonialism which shapes the material constitution 
                                                                                                                                         
Empire n 4 above. For its most basic formulation see n 26 above at 180: “The Constitution is no longer 
the law of all laws: laws proceed by themselves, following the pace and coherence of the constitution of 
a new structure of political power. A new regime is taking shape day by day and a new material 
constitution is arising.” See also n 4 above at xiv: “by ‘constitution’ we mean both the formal 
constitution, the written document along with its various amendments and legal apparatuses, and the 
material constitution, that is, the continuous formation and re-formation of the composition of social 
forces.” Although the use of capitalizations to distinguish between the two forms of c/Constitution 
(material and formal) are dropped in Empire, their conceptual usefulness remains. For more expansive 
treatment see Chapter II to follow. 
39
 Sometimes this distinction is formulated in the language of liberal normative constitutional 
philosophy as between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’, ‘formal’ and ‘substantive’ equality. For an explanatory gloss see 
P. Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Notions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework’ (1997) Public 
Law 467-487. 
40
 The Indian Act, RSC 1985, c. I-5. 
41
 Hogg n 6 above at 617 (addressing the historical origins of the Indian Acts and their classificatory 
schemata, which, although significantly revised, remain active in their basic structure): the term ‘Indian’ 
is term of art which has been subject to an unending series of Supreme Court decisions arising from 
Parliament’s s.  91(24) jurisdiction over “Indians and lands reserved for the Indians.”  
42
 A phenomenon which is increasingly tied to a penal and security model in Italy and elsewhere across 
the globe see eg M. Welch & L. Schuster ‘Detention of Asylum Seekers in the US, UK, France, Germany 
and Italy: A Critical View of the Globalizing Culture of Control’ (2005) 5 Criminology & Criminal Justice 4, 
331-355. In Canada see F. Crépeau & D. Nakache, ‘Controlling Irregular Migration in Canada – 
Reconciling Security Concerns with Human Rights Protection’ (2006) 12 IRPP Choices 1. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1516626.  See generally M. J. Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
43
 The question of indigeneity quietly slides into the question of (im)migration for Italy, particularly 
relative to the Roma, Ashkali and Sinti Peoples (collectively Romani) see Y. Matras, ‘Romani Migrations 
in the Post-Communist Era’(2000)  13 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 2, 32-50; N. Sigona, 
‘Locating “the Gypsy Problem”. The Roma in Italy, Stereotyping, Labelling and “Nomad Camps”’ (2005) 
31 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 4, 741-756; P. Colacicchi, ‘Ethnic Profiling and Discrimination 
Against Roman in Italy: New Developments in a Deep Rooted Tradition’ 2 Roma Rights Journal (2002)  
http://www.errc.org/cms/upload/media/03/B8/m000003B8.pdf.  
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of reality for those who are formally denominated as ‗Indians‘ as much as those who 
are not.44  
Today, as in the sixties and seventies, material inequalities inclusive of significant, 
perhaps slowly closing, variations in rates of infant mortality and life expectancy, within 
Canada and Italy themselves, as much as throughout the globe, exist in a variety of 
ways which overlap with various forms of subalternarity and indigeneity. Many of which 
are not difficult to uncover in widely available statistics.45 It is therefore perhaps worth 
noting, even if only in passing, that many of the available statistics and research on the 
life of Canada‘s Indigenous peoples and Italy‘s Romani and Sinti populations converge, 
particularly on markers of poverty, exclusion and disadvantage.46  
 
The movement of bodies: (im)migration 
 
This thesis is not a quantitative one, rather it is exclusively qualitative. It asks after the 
movement of human bodies themselves, not as a question of statistical analysis but 
rather as a tendency increasingly integral to the global form of capitalist production. 
This idea is signalled in Empire, but has a much earlier genesis in the Italian 
experience of the post-war epoch, an epoch in which the so called ‗economic miracle‘ 
of the sixties in northern and central Italy emerged, at least in part, on the backs of the 
                                               
44 Pursuant to the Indian Act n 40 above at s. 32 above qualifying Indians are registered with the Federal 
Government and the Department of Indian Affairs.  There are approximately 500,000 “status Indians” in 
Canada.  There are at least as many “non-status Indians.” Only status Indians are eligible for the 
privileges, protections, entitlements and distribution of resources afforded by the federal legislation: 
‘“Indian” means a person who pursuant to this Act is registered as an Indian or is entitled to be 
registered as an Indian.” 
45 In Canada see Statistics Canada,  Aboriginal Peoples Survey 2001: Well-being of the non-reserve 
Aboriginal population (http:.//www.statcan.ca/Daily/English/030924/d030924.htm) (reflecting gross 
inequalities in health, education and poverty rates among Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples living 
off reserve); National Council of Welfare, Aboriginal Peoples and Inequality (http://www.wuf3 
fum3.ca/networking_events/events_doc/NCW_Inequality_100081.pdf) (documenting: (1) off-reserve 
urban poverty rate of Aboriginal peoples as “more than double (2.2 times) the rate for non-Aboriginal 
people in the same cities”; (2) lower rates of home ownership among off-reserve Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal peoples; (3) gross inequality of incarceration rates; (4) gross inequality of life expectancy and 
suicide rates among both on and off-reserve Aboriginal peoples, etc.). See also n 36 above. In Italy, 
statistics of a similar sort are slightly less available. Nevertheless, there is significant evidence from 
media and reliable non-governmental sources that matters are as bad or worse for Roma and Sinti 
peoples in Italy see eg D. Storia, ‘EU Values and the Roma Migration Challenge’ available online at 
http://www.osservazione.org/documenti/ITALY%20REPORT_Daria%20Storia.pdf (documenting a life 
expectancy of 40-45 years and endemic rates of poverty and ghettoization). There is also recognition at 
the EU level of the degree to which ‘gypsies have long been "objects" rather than active "subjects" in 
attempts to deal with issues affecting them’ (no doubt, the same language could be used to describe the 
position of Aboriginal peoples in Canada under Indian Act, see n 40 above) see generally Final Text 
Report to the European Committee on Migration on ‘The Situation of Gypsies (Roman and Sinti) in 
Europe’ (Strasbourg, May 22, 1995) Part VII, s. 85. available online at 
https://wcd.coe.int/wcd/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetI
mage=535912&SecMode=1&DocId=521630&Usage=2. 
46
 Ibid. 
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local proletariat as bosses began sourcing labour cheaply from the south. This is itself 
a sort of internal colonialism driven by migrating unskilled labourers from south to north 
and rural to urban, coming to work, often as contractors or scabs, outside of the union, 
as inexpensive substitutes for the workers of the highly proletarianized central and 
northern regions.47 This created a pattern of migration internal to Italy which was 
reproduced at the international level as waves of (particularly southern) Italian 
immigrants fanned out across the globe (first just over the border in Switzerland, 
France and Germany and soon as far afield of North and South America).48  
 
Perhaps Italy‘s pattern of domestic migration and increasingly international 
immigration, particularly by landless southern labourers, operated as sort of 
premonition or foreshadowing of what Empire would later describe taking shape on a 
global level in the final decades of the twentieth century. Namely, the deterritorializion 
of labour and the emergence of a nomadic multitude,49 which, in post-war Italy, was 
driven by the northward migration of peasants and their transformation into an urban 
proletariat in the massive automobile, steel and petrochemical plants ringing Milan, 
Turin and the Veneto. 50 In Canada, during this very same period, the country was 
changed by a massive influx of immigrants from post-war Europe, Asia, Africa and 
Latin America, particularly into its cities and urban areas. 51  
 
The crisis of public and private rationalities 
 
The importance of the association between the deterritorialization of capital flows and 
the migratory patterns of living labour would become a hallmark of Hardt and Negri‘s 
theorization of globalization in Empire.52 So too would what they understand to be the 
expansion of the social state in the twentieth century. Even in his own native Italy, in 
which the ‗centre right‘ CD denominated the government of the post-war epoch (briefly 
in a coalition with the Italian Socialists (PSI) and Communists (PCI), 1945-1947), an 
expansive public sphere prevailed. Much of the Italian economy was run by the State 
or least in large part owned by it.53 In practical terms, the levers of Capitalist and State 
Power in the sixties and seventies split between CD functionaries in collaboration with 
local oligarchies and speculative capital at all levels of the economy.  There could be 
                                               
47
 Ginsborg n 8 above at 223. 
48
 Ibid. 211. 
49
 n 4 above at 212-214. See also ‘A Conversation about Empire’ in Reflections on Empire n 2 above at 
30-31. 
50
 Ginsborg n 8 above at 212, 217-22, 233- 239, Statistical Appendix at 435-439. 
51
 Morton n 12 above at 262-263, 337. 
52
 See eg n 4 above at xii, 52, 61, 123-124, 206-207, 213.  
53
 Ginsborg n 8 above at 214. 
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no doubt that the CD had integrated itself at the levels of civil society to propose a 
public Power, of a distinctly corporatist variety, as the solution to ‗the problem‘ of 
material inequality (or, in the more Anglo-American liberal formulation, substantive 
inequality).54  
 
In Canada during this period, there were elements of a similar structural confusion 
between the public and the private as the welfare state grew.55 In both countries, the 
result was an exponential increase in public sector deficits at the hands of centre left 
and centre right governments of the seventies and eighties alike,56 followed by a period 
of austerity during which the social welfare state was consolidated and a combination 
of public and private rationalities continued to blur in response to a succession of 
economic crises operating on an increasingly transnational or global level.57 In Italy, 
which had to contend with Paris and Bonn as much as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), all of which demanded significant ‗structural reforms‘ in exchange for a seat at 
the high table of post-war Europe, things were perhaps more complex than they were 
for Canada.58 A country which Trudeau famously described as ‗a mouse at the foot of 
the elephant‘,59  eluding to the fact that the dominance of the US in the Canadian 
geopolitical space. In Italy, we can think not only of US occupation and the Marshall 
Plan, but of the emerging supranational structure of Europe in the form of the 
European Economic Community (the EEC), the European Union‘s (EU‘s) predecessor 
– a sort of ‗new old‘ Europe which integrated Italy at its transcendental heartland, but at 
a price: a material distinction between it and (what remained of) its old axis partner in 
West Germany (which did not begin to close in earnest, and even then, only in the 
                                               
54
 Ibid., 153. In fact, the CD’s electoral strategy and form of structural hegemony was partially 
guaranteed by augmentations of the Welfare State as well as intensification of State ownership and 
control of industry. Italy is not alone in this regard. The social democratic parties of the west were often 
outdone by their centrist peers elsewhere as in Canada where the Liberal Party, like Italy’s CD, was so 
dominant in the post-war epoch as to be termed a ‘natural governing party’.  
55
 Morton n 12 above at 30. 
56
 In Italy see Ginsborg n 8 above at 420, 446 (Statistical Appendix). During this time, the PCI slipped into 
third place behind the Socialists (PSI) because it was unable to contend with centrist consensus on 
reducing rather than developing the social welfare state. After that the PSI were able to position 
themselves as fiscally conservative and humanitarian alternatives to the centre right CD as much as ‘the 
hard left’ PCI. In many ways, this transitional ‘third way’ was required to mark the passage between the 
public and private State, or better their totalizing interpenetration. To some extent this was driven by 
structural deficits which threatened, at least according to bourgeois economists, to eclipse the 
creditworthiness of national central banks. In Canada see Morton n 12 above at 364 addressing the 
1993 election of a Liberal Government which dismantled vast swaths of the welfare state and privatized 
public sector corporations.  
57
 In Italy see Ginsborg n 8 above 246-247, 352-354. In Canada see Morton n 12 above at 272-275. 
58
 Ginsborg n 8 above at 246-247, 352-354. 
59
 In remarks before the Washington Press Club addressing Canada-US relations on March 15, 1969. 
http://archives.cbc.ca/politics/prime_ministers/clips/13249/. 
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north, until the so called ‗economic miracle‘ had begun to take root in the early 
sixties).60  
 
What I am suggesting here is less than a remarkable convergence between Italy and a 
variety of other states, including Canada, all of which are broiling with critique and 
revolutionary thought and praxis in the sixties and seventies, than an actual sense in 
which for many countries, in this case Canada as much as Italy, a new theoretical and 
conceptual apparatuses becomes increasingly necessary at this point, namely the 
point of passage between the modern and the postmodern.  
 
The emergence of the global metropolis 
 
Mills‘ The Empire Within presents a ten year study of social movements in Montreal 
from 1963 to 1973 and documents the complex crosscurrents of radical thought among 
Francophone, Anglophone and Allophone workers, youth, people of colour, women, 
Aboriginals and left intellectuals in Montreal during this epoch. The portrait of political 
struggle and activism, as well as cultural and artistic consciousness raising and social 
experimentation presented in the book, glimpses the Canadian metropolis perhaps 
most profoundly influenced by the events of May ‘68 in France and the intensification of 
the civil rights movement in the US, Montreal.  
 
Montreal, like other global metropolises (including the Italian ones), was in the sixties 
and seventies capable of generating its own unique and autonomous forms of struggle. 
Something which Mills presents in both the self-described ‗anti-colonial‘ strategies of 
white Catholic Quebecois nationalist militants, some of whom went so far as to style 
themselves ‗les Nègres blancs‘ of North America,61  and the more diverse anti-racist, 
feminist and labourite struggles of students, activists and youth, all of whom began, in 
the sixties and seventies, to propose what Mills calls a ―constantly metamorphosing 
counter-hegemonic challenge to Empire‖ across the social terrain. 62  
 
Despite his lack of citations to Negri, other than the one obliquely contained in the title 
of his book itself, the imagining of constitution which Mills finds presented in Montreal‘s 
urban social movements of the sixties and seventies is intensely Negrian: ―Along the 
way, an increasing number of people came to believe that society, rather than being 
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 Ginsborg n 8 above at 246-247, 352-354. 
61
 An incendiary, and extraordinarily inaccurate, coinage attributable to Pierre Vallières book of the 
same name. See P. Vallières, White Niggers of America (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971).  
62
 Mills n 20 above at 11. 
                   28 of 242 
the natural or inevitable result of history, was an active project of creation.‖63 This 
statement at least has the Dionysian spark, which, I argue, is among the hallmarks of 
Negri‘s autonomism. It also has the same joyful and never cynical tonality in which 
Hardt and Negri so famously write. Rather than treating the transition from the sixties to 
the seventies in terms of terrorism and death as grasped in the events of October 1970 
(as they are most often presented in Canadian historical retrospectives, whether 
federalist or nationalist64), Mills offers an account of the period teeming with life, one 
which does not revolve around the police violence of the State any more than the 
militant reaction to it (or vice versa). His argument is that despite outbreaks of terrorist 
violence in the period, the intense revolutionary spirit which broke forth in the bodies 
and minds of the metropolis, particularly amidst the young and creative, was a new 
form of subjectivity, non-nationalist, heterogeneous, extra-parliamentary, and in the 
standard gloss of the period, too often forgotten.   
 
Crucially, Mills presents the complex way in which global, sub, supra and transnational 
events coincide with the civil rights struggle of subaltern peoples in Montreal, which 
was, like many of Italy‘s central and northern cities at the time, a hotbed of social 
experimentation at least as much, or more, than one of terrorist violence.65  
Nevertheless, terrorist violence did explode in spectacular fashion in the seventies in 
Italy, Canada and elsewhere. And wherever it did, it raised the question of complicity 
between social movements and violence. In Italy we know the story well, and Negri is a 
central character. 
 
In Canada there was no similar dragnet of intellectuals.66 However, the kidnap murder 
of Pierre Laporte led to an even more extraordinary jettisoning of the rule of law, the 
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 Ibid. 8.  
64
 For a leading federalist formulation see n 1 above at 18-19: “The October Crisis was not merely a 
series of events that took place from October to December 1970. It was rather one episode in an 
accumulation of revolutionary, clandestine, and terrorist activities from 1963 to 1973...” Nationalists 
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at least in Quebec and particularly among sovereigntists.”  
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Relative to the Italian situation, Lotringer and Marazzi’s anthology contains a variety of writings by and 
about autonomist forms of social experimentation, collective life, performative politics and feminist 
intervention see eg  E. Cherki & M. Wieviorka, ‘Autoreduction Movements in Turin’ Lotringer & Marazzi 
n 5  above at 72-79; M. Torealta ‘Painted Politics’ in same at 102-106; J. Malina, ‘Nonviolence in 
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 The role of Quebec nationalist ‘intellectuals’ in the October Crisis generally flows from the initiative of 
16 self-described ‘eminent personalities’, all of whom drafted and signed an open letter on October 14, 
1970 urging the Quebec Government to release jailed FLQ members whom they described as ‘political 
prisoners’ in exchange for Cross and Laporte. None of these eminent personalities were arrested or 
detained and those who remain alive today continue to be public personalities in Quebec and Canada 
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suspension of the normal legal order and a declaration of a real or apprehended 
insurrection under the War Measures Act.67 Speaking of that moment in history, Mills 
writes, ―[w]hile the political violence of the FLQ, which was both morally and politically 
destructive, needs to be understood, there is a serious danger of allowing that single 
group to represent the periods‘ activism.‖68  Negri made the same point about the 
relationship between the various social movements of the sixties and seventies and the 
RB in response to his interrogators at trial.69 There can be little doubt however that 
spectacular shows of violence tend to make a historical impression which overshadows 
millions of more mundane but nevertheless equally meaning laden acts.  
 
The legacy of violence 
 
Although Canada did not emerge from the same historical experience of fascism and 
total war as Italy, both countries were faced in the post-war epoch with the 
remembrance of some fairly grievous wrongs perpetrated by the State during wartime. 
In both cases, this meant a certain recollection of violence and state excess which 
remained fresh. Grievous wrongs had occurred at the hands of Mussolini‘s fascist 
dictatorship. They also occurred in Canada, albeit at times in a less dramatic sense, in 
the hands of its democratically elected wartime government. Guy Bouthillier and 
Edouard Cloutier, two Quebec commentators, connect this epoch in which there was 
much suspension of dissent and marginalization of anti-conscription Quebeckers, as 
carrying over into the events of October 1970. In their preface to their fortieth 
anniversary edited anthology retrospective on the October Crisis, Trudeau’s Dilemma, 
they recall a chain of early twentieth century occasions upon which the Federal 
Government evoked the War Measures Act, thereby permitting it wide ranging 
emergency powers including the suspension of basic civil liberties of all sorts.70 All of 
                                                                                                                                         
(despite having been described by Prime Minister Trudeau, his chief of staff, Marc Lalonde, top 
ministers in the federal cabinet, Montreal Mayor Jean Drapeau and federalist news outlets, as 
conspiring to form a ‘provisional government’ in Quebec. For a critique of this over-stated and unproven 
allegation see P.C. Newman, ‘A Meticulously concocted lie’ in Trudeau’s Darkest Hour n 6 above at 95-
110). The 16 signatories included René Lévesque, then leader of the opposition Parti Québécois (PQ) 
(who would become Premier and lead the province in its first failed referendum in 1980) Claude Ryan 
the editor of Le Devoir, Jacques Parizeau, president of the Executive Council of the PQ (who would also 
later become Premier and lead the Quebec’s another failed referendum on sovereignty in 1995) and a 
variety of university professors and union bosses. See n 1 above at 50-58 for a scathing critique of the 
petition which Tetley describes as riddled with factual errors and “written in polemical and disputatious 
language.” For a full text copy of the petition and a list of all signatories see n 1 above at Appendix 3, 
232-233. 
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 n 5 above. 
68
 Mills n 20 above at 8-9.  
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Professor) William Tetley, offer up in defence of the Provincial Liberal Government in Quebec City and 
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which occurred a generation before the FLQ had begun its terrorist campaign in the 
sixties and Trudeau‘s government had been provoked into cracking down on it. These 
included in Quebec specifically, the conscription crises of 1914 and 1940 in which the 
draft led to widespread outrage among Francophones unwilling to spill blood in 
‗Europe‘ or ‗Britain‘s War‘. 71  It also occurred across Canada more generally in the 
persecution and internment of suspected fascists, communists, Jehovah‘s Witness 
conscientious objectors and Canadians of Japanese, German and Italian descent for 
‗security‘ and ‗counter-espionage‘ reasons which reached fairly high degrees of 
excess.72 All of which ultimately add to the shameful Canadian record at home while its 
men fought to vanquish fascism overseas, a strange little irony (and one shared by its 
neighbour to the south). None of these historical events of course in any way compare 
with colonial conquest itself, which wiped out the mass of Indigenous people from the 
continent in prior generations. However, they are more recent. They also explain, at 
least in part, why up until the very end of the twentieth century and perhaps still in 
some quarters today, a significant portion of Francophone Quebecois to view English 
Canada with unbridled suspicion.  
 
The objective thus far has only been to lay the groundwork for this thesis which draws, 
particularly in its more concretized second half, on events or narrative trajectories in 
the eighties and nineties which had their precursors in the earlier decades of the post-
war period. In the context of the October Crisis, when the War Measures Act73 was 
invoked on October 16, 1970 it would still not be the first time in living memory for the 
older generation. For many, particularly in Francophone Quebec, the conscription crisis 
of the early forties had been the defining moment of their youth.  Some had lost fathers 
in ‗the great war‘ and recalled struggles between police and young people bitterly.74 
They were in many ways the sympathetic multitude of deserters which Hardt and Negri 
                                                                                                                                         
the Federal Liberal Government in Ottawa see eg n 1 above at xxiv: “...it is often said that it was Prime 
Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau who was responsible for the imposition of the War Measures Act, not 
[Quebec Premier Robert] Bourassa or the city of Montreal. This is wrong. Montreal called for the 
application of the act...It is also generally believed that the War Measures Act Regulations of 16 October 
1970 took away all civil rights. Again, this is quite wrong...” At the other end of the spectrum see 
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the threat of violence...That act was invoked in the middle of the night on October 16, 1970, at 4 a.m. to 
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 n 71 above.  
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so valorize in Empire.75 While the Italian youth were fleeing the front in droves the 
Quebecois youths refused conscription, same war, opposite sides, same basic instinct 
or desired line of flight.  
 
C. Canadian liberalism, the rule of law and rethinking the legacy of 
Trudeau: what can Negri contribute?  
In their analysis of Canada in 1970, Bouthillier and Cloutier in particular suggest that 
the actual uniqueness of the historical moment was tied less to the anomaly of resort to 
emergency powers, something which was already well established, if not normalized, 
in twentieth century Quebec.76 But rather, to a more central contradiction in the legacy 
of Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Canada‘s immensely charismatic and long serving Liberal 
Prime Minister.77 Someone who, a decade after his death, has been assimilated into 
the great man theory of history in Canada without further ado, someone whose basic 
form of liberal multiculturalism, its hybridization of the rights and the social state, 
remains utterly hegemonic in Canada only to be debated in universities and highbrow 
editorial pages wherever the basic tension between the autonomy of the political and 
‗the Rule of Law‘ come into contact, usually in some violent sense.  
 
If the conscription crisis was the parents‘ subjectivizing moment, the October crisis was 
their children‘s. In it, Trudeau, like all politicians or statesmen, was willing, where 
necessary, to accent the political autonomy over the rule of law. That is, where it is 
necessary to defeat a threat to the state or an existential crisis for sovereignty itself. 
Usually Trudeau is himself the central protagonist or antagonist, depending on which 
side of the federalist-nationalist debate one is on. Although Negri does not write on 
Trudeau or Canada, both of which would likely be a fairly far removed or even marginal 
to his own life experience, he can be said to offer certain important potential critique of 
the form of constitutionalism understood to be Trudeau‘s primary legacy. A legacy 
which is bookended by two events: the 1970 FLQ Crisis and the 1982 patriation of the 
Charter. In this introductory chapter I have emphasized the first as a fault line which 
opens up around the question of whether Trudeau is to be credited for staring down the 
FLQ terrorists and securing the peace or conversely, of suspending civil liberties in a 
massively overblown way which betrayed a shallow commitment to the rule of law and 
more fundamental impulse toward the assertion of sovereign power. Again, depending 
on your ideological proclivities, things tend in Canada to be read one way or the other.  
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For Negri, however, the dilemma or choice between the assertion of political autonomy 
and its curtailment in the rule of law, is a false dialectic. As is, this thesis suggests the 
entire terrain of the social contract upon which these types of formulations rely for their 
meaning, particularly insofar as they interpose themselves as species of de-ontological 
normative science. It is therefore impossible for him to turn toward the types of liberal 
ideological coordinates put in play in Trudeau‘s thought and praxis and to rely on them 
uncritically. This is not only what distinguishes Negri from many who are, and were, 
much closer to him than the liberal and at times mildly social democratic Trudeau.  It is 
more than anything an insistence on social, rather than political autonomy, of an 
attention to material rather than only formal constitution. To explain what might be 
meant by this in a more concretized sense, it is necessary to defer the reader to the 
second case study on Canada‘s epoch of mega-constitutional politics (Chapter V).  
 
For the moment, however, what is necessary to reiterate and explain is the basic and 
relatively non-controversial baseline of this thesis:  Trudeau‘s civic nationalism, 
federalism and bilingualism, combined with his multiculturalism in a way which would 
theoretically prevail over resurgent nationalism in Quebec by promoting a plurality of 
diverse constituencies, all of which are, in one way or another, recognized beyond the 
old ‗two nations‘ theory of confederation.78  This basic Trudeauian project has not only 
been exported across the world to a variety of ‗emerging‘ or ‗transitional‘ federal 
states,79 it became so deeply entrenched, even hegemonic in Canada itself. Its 
coordinates were inscribed in the Charter and subsequently expounded by more and 
more emboldened and ‗activist‘ courts, some of whose justices were appointed by 
Trudeau and others by his Conservative successor, Brian Mulroney. The result is a 
distinctly different judicial theory of interpretation north and south of the border. I add 
this comparative note only insofar as it is usually fairly taken for granted that judicial 
appointment process in Canada is more insulated from political ideology than it is in the 
US. 80 The analysis of which is well outside the scope of this thesis but nevertheless 
worth bearing in mind.  
                                               
78
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It is certainly in no way controversial to suggest that Canada‘s Supreme Court has 
been decidedly more and more purposive and more and more expansive in its 
interpretation of the Constitution, to say that it shares very little in terms of judicial 
philosophy or culture with their strict constructionist counterparts on the dominant right 
flank of the US Supreme Court is to state a fact.81 This is an interesting question of 
comparative jurisprudence and ideological analysis which I will leave to others. In 
Canada it is necessary to emphasize at the outset, the Supreme Court often leads 
Parliament and even the Canadian population on questions on touchstones of 
progressive politics in the west, like abortion82 and ‗gay rights‘,83 all of which were 
things about which Trudeau took a progressive position, and prevailed, at least in a 
formal if not always in a material sense.  For this, he is fairly, and I think at least 
instinctively, regarded as a man of the left and a principled liberal by friends and foes 
alike. However, if one examines the events of October 1970 in particular and thinks 
about them more generally in terms of seventies as an epoch in the west, things look 
potentially quite different.  
 
Much of the literature on Trudeau in fact begins at the basic question of the October 
1970 evocation of the War Measures Act, at his suspension of the rule of law in the 
face of terrorism, at his fundamental assertion of the autonomy of the political, at his 
Schmittian move. How could this be the same Trudeau of May 1982 who triumphantly 
signed the Charter into law? Perhaps 1970 and 1982 can be proposed, in the 
Canadian case, as basic dialectical counterpoints.  Not only in the historical and 
biographical scholarship on Trudeau, but in the Supreme Court jurisprudence of the 
era.  
 
Ultimately, the only thing which unites 1970 and 1982 theoretically for Trudeau, and his 
Liberal Party successors, is their tie to the basic representational frame of the social 
contractual relation between the many and the one, constituent and sovereign power, 84 
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a very different appointment process, recent empirical research has found that there is a much weaker 
connection between how justices vote on divisive cases and the Prime Minister who appointed them. 
Generally, Canadian Supreme Court justices appear to agree more often than the justices do in the US 
and, when they disagree, the lines of disagreement are less predictable than in the US..” 
81
 Ibid. 
82
 R. v. Morgentaler [1988] 1 SCR 30.  
83
 Vriend v. Alberta [1998] 1 SCR 493.  
84
 See eg n 78 above at 46: “While understanding as well as anyone else the limits of government and 
the law, the liberal knows that both are powerful forces for good and does not hesitate to use them”; 
66: “The problems of organizing society are really problems of getting men and women to agree to the 
social contract, which really means getting them to accept the basic premises on which the society is 
founded...” 
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one which Negri is determined to treat by way of immanent critique and conceptual 
innovation rather than by way of uncritical reception. However, Negri did not write 
about Trudeau or the Canadian situation and very likely knew little of it. I must 
therefore further explain why and how it is that I believe Trudeau is a necessary 
departure point for this Negri-inspired thesis.  
 
For the better half of the last century, and even after his death in 2000, Trudeau 
remains a figure as much reviled as he is lionized.  Unlike many historical Prime 
Ministers before and after him, he is rarely the subject of casual disinterest or 
ignorance among Canadians.  It is in this sense not surprising that his historical 
personality would be one onto which a variety of peculiarly Canadian anxieties are 
projected. Some of which are distilled in the central contradiction between Trudeau‘s 
assertion of the autonomy of the political as a material response to the terrorist 
violence of nationalist militants in 1970, which Bouthillier and Cloutier describe as 
―Trudeau‘s darkest hour‖ in their book of the same name,85 and his assertion of the rule 
of law as a formal response to the same underlying federalist/nationalist tension in the 
1982 patriation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.86  
 
How is it, virtually every historical commentator seems to suggest, that the very same 
figure who evoked the War Measures Act and sent the army into the streets of 
Montreal, could a short 12 years later be celebrated as a democratic innovator? It is in 
part to answer this difficult question that commentators and participants, like Tetley, 
insist Trudeau acted ‗at the request of‘ (the equally federalist) Quebec Premier Robert 
Bourassa‘s (equally Liberal) Government in Quebec City,87 as if such a distinction were 
pivotal to determining the ‗legality‘ as much as the morality and democratic bona fides 
of Trudeau and of the federalist ‗side‘ more generally. 
 
Twelve years after the October Crisis, still as Prime Minister, an older, wiser Trudeau 
masterminded ‗patriation‘, Canada‘s adoption of a new, wide ranging constitutionally 
entrenched Charter of Rights and Freedoms (‗the Charter‘).88 This is the central 
                                               
85
 n 6 above.  
86
 See generally P.W. Hogg n 6 above at 55-62, describing ‘patriation’ as a uniquely Canadian coinage 
which refers to the (1)“autochtony” of the constitutional order or the requirement that “a constitution 
be indigenous, deriving its authority solely from events within Canada…”; (2) “termination of imperial 
authority”; and, (3) “autonomy” of amendment power within the legislative competencies of the 
provincial and federal governments (in other words, the removal of any role for the British Parliament in 
constitutional amendment).  
87
 n 1 above at xiii-xiv. 
88
 “The Constitution of Canada” is a term of art which refers to the list of instruments contained in the 
schedule to the Constitution Act. Two legislative instruments were required to separate the provisions 
relating to the UK parliament (in the Canada Act) from those relating to the Canadian Parliament and 
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contradiction of his life and legacy and it is a good a preliminary historical and 
contextual departure point for this thesis. Why? Because in the 40 years since the FLQ 
crisis, as much as the 29 since patriation of the Charter, the central question remains: 
How could the Liberal Prime Minister who went on to become the father of Canada‘s 
contemporary constitutional order have the taint, earlier in his career, of having 
suspended the very legal order, which he sought not only to improve, but to surpass at 
its end? It may be impossible to answer these types of questions in any definitive 
sense. Certainly Trudeau‘s better biographers have tried.89 Yet, it is still worth 
considering how all of this might be said to be opened up as part of a broader period of 
tension between the State and terrorist violence in the seventies, which was by no 
means specific to Canada or its leaders.   
 
D. Conclusion 
Recall in Italy, where, in the aftermath of the kidnapping of Aldo Moro, the PCI would 
find itself in a similar position to Trudeau‘s Liberal government. Both offered the public 
some preliminary version of the George W. Bush alternatives to their populace: ‗You 
are either with us or against us‘. Predictably the answer is always the same: ‗With us.‘ 
In fact, all members of the political class in Italy and Canada, left and right, joined with 
their parliamentary rivals to support the government‘s refusal to negotiate for the 
release of hostages at the moment of high national crisis in the seventies.90 The 
immediate results in both countries could not have been grizzlier. Both Laporte and 
Moro were murdered in violent and spectacular fashion.91   
                                                                                                                                         
Provincial Legislatures (in the Constitution Act) see generally n 6 above. Section 52(1) of the Constitution 
Act provides: “The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force and 
effect.”  This provision is crucial because it generates a new myth of origins by terminating 
Parliamentary supremacy and transferring the locus of sovereignty from Parliament to the Constitution 
itself. 
89
 See eg S. Clarkson & C. McCall Trudeau and Our Times: Vol. I: The Magnificent Obsession (Toronto: 
McClelland & Stewart, 1991) who make one of the more interesting attempts to explain this 
contradiction: “Though he anguished in private as a democrat about suppressing civil liberties in favour 
of military action, Trudeau—the student of Carl Friedrich, the offspring of the Weimar Republic, which 
had succumbed to Hitler’s terrorism for lack of adequate emergency powers – invoked the War 
Measures Act to deal with the crisis and then talked to reporters as though he were playing yet another 
‘I’m superior to you guys’ game. ‘Just watch me,’ he shot back provocatively when asked how far he 
would go in seeking to put down terrorism.”  
90
 In Canada both the provincial government in Quebec City led by Robert Bourassa’s Liberal Party and 
the federal government in Ottawa led by Pierre Trudeau’s Liberal Party refused to negotiate for Cross or 
Laporte’s release (although the separatist PQ opposition in Quebec took the opposite view and in 
Ottawa both the major opposition parties also had reservations).  Negotiation would have meant 
freeing jailed members of the FLQ n 1 above at 38-49.  In Italy the PCI joined with the governing CD in 
the refusal to negotiate for Moro’s release (however the socialist PSI urged a more moderate stance). 
Ginsborg n 8 above at 383-385. 
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 Laporte’s strangled body was found on October 17, 1970. His kidnappers, Francis Simard, Paul Rose, 
Jacques Rose and Bernard Lortie were captured, tried and convicted. When released Simard published a 
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Nothing here is especially new. The outcome of terrorist violence is always the same: 
State, police and military counter-violence. Perhaps there is no alternative to this cycle. 
What would we have the State do? Offer tea and biscuits to those who seek to destroy 
it, formally if not materially, by striking at the life and limb of the multitude? This is not 
what I am suggesting here. But I do very much see, like most who are progressive in 
the most basic sense, that there is something positively undemocratic about the 
balance the State achieves when it intervenes directly against its ‗enemies‘, particularly 
those which are ‗internal‘ to it, or in its midst. I can also see that the term ‗terrorism‘ is 
not unlike its inverse, ‗security‘, an extraordinarily empty and perhaps even 
irredeemably empty signifier. This is not to suggest, as some do, that any form of state 
action against terrorism is ‗State sponsored terrorism‘. This type of formulation 
obscures more than it illuminates insofar as the two types of violence imagined and 
their claims to moral or legal legitimacy are rarely equivalent. Not necessary better or 
worse, but quantitatively and qualitatively different.  
 
Even the usual civil liberties tact of critiquing as much as combating state excesses in 
response to terrorism has its limits insofar as it does not reach toward new concepts or 
ways of thinking about sociality beyond those of citizenship or human right. It is, in 
other words, a form of discourse which is neutralized or suspended, without a hint of 
irony, by legal right itself (in Canada pursuant to the War Measures Act, itself a 
statutory instrument). Not only is all of this a highly tautological legal illegality, but the 
meaning of violence, by or against terrorists, and its political import, as well as its 
relation to a broader social bond can vary radically from one situation to the next.  As 
can the definition of terrorism itself. So much so, that it is almost impossible to make 
any sort of definitive statement on the phenomena, let alone offer up a Negri-inspired 
one.  
 
Nevertheless, the question of terrorism and in particular any possibility of its relation to 
a ‗legitimate‘ constituent power is one which Negri takes very seriously and continues 
to grapple with today. Most poetically and pithily he has recently taken it up in three 
short plays: ‗Swarm‘ (2004), ‗The Bent Man‘ (2005) and ‗Cithaeron‘ (2006).  Each of 
which explores, in a different context, the tragic boundary between resistance and 
                                                                                                                                         
book in which he admitted to participating in the murder however he did not identify who whose hand, 
among his co-defendants, took Laporte’s life see generally n 9 above. Aldo Moro was killed on May 9, 
1978 and his body dumped, in a show of grizzly symbolism, on Via Caetani in Rome equidistant from 
both the DC and PCI headquarters. Although Antonio Savasta, a leading member of the RB and 
confessed killer was very likely responsible for Moro’s murder, 22 activists and intellectuals arrested on 
April 7, 1979 were tried and convicted by Judge Pietro Calogero in Padua (who was himself closely tied 
to the PCI). This is a miscarriage of justice which is now largely admitted by even bourgeois historians 
see eg Ginsborg n 8 above at 386-387.   
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death. Each time treating the act of self-destruction or suicide as a radically 
individualizing and essentially negative act which can, nevertheless, take on different 
forms of being, from the martyrdom of the solitary suicide bomber whose act is 
motivated by frustration and desperation, to the rebellion of the resister or anti-fascist 
partisan whose death is as part of an act of strategic subversion. And finally, to the 
more complex death which comes not from ―direct and/or dialectical opposition of 
forces‖ but instead from a more collective ―oblique or diagonal stance‖, a line of flight or 
an interruption of it. 92  
 
For Negri, the question of revolutionary as much as terrorist violence is always played 
out somewhere on this complex terrain. For the moment, however, it is the task of the 
literature review chapter to follow to flesh out precisely what it might mean to say that I 
am proposing, in this thesis, what I call a ‗Negri-inspired‘ theory of constitutionalism. 
Once again, this will mean a return to the sixties and seventies. This time, rather than 
focusing on Canadian or Italian legal or political events, I look to Negri‘s key texts 
written at the time, particularly insofar as they are required to ground a more sustained 
presentation of Negri‘s English language collaboration with Hardt in Chapter III and a 
more concretized reading drawn against the backdrop of Canada‘s post-Charter epoch 
in the second half of the thesis (Part II: Chapters IV-VI).  
                                               
92
 T.S. Murphy, ‘Translators Introduction’ n 26 above at xiv-iv. 
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Chapter II - Literature Review: Unearthing a „Negri-inspired‟ 
theory of c/Constitution 
 
Paradoxically, in the last fifteen years [since the 1948 postwar Italian 
Constitution], the Constitution has become so firmly embedded in the 
consciousness of Italians, juridicists and politicians alike, that today we 
consider as solid bases what yesterday were most suspect: its 
ideological and political foundations. If ever they believed there were a 
need to go beyond the Constitution, they would do so in the service of 
those foundations! 
A. Negri, ‘Labour in the Constitution’ (1964)1 
The old Constitution was founded on the hypothesis of regulating civil 
society and its conflicts. As the Constitution confronts the intrusiveness 
of social capital and the virtual withering of civil society (in the real 
subsumption of social labour under capital), its obsolescence is the 
qualitative outcome of the accumulation of contradictions that 
completely unsettles the terrain of constitutional expectations...the old 
Constitution – presents a surface full of malfunctions and asymmetries, 
the analysis ought to move on the deeper contradictions that underlie 
these superficial aspects. 
 
A. Negri, ‘Toward a Critique of the Material Constitution’ (1977)2 
 
Spinoza uses the social contract (in the first phase only, however) as a 
scheme of a constitutive process, rather than as a motor for the transfer 
of Power (potestas)...He poses potentia [power] against potestas 
[Power]. [citation omitted]. It is no coincidence that Spinoza‘s thought 
would appear ‗acosmic‘ to the eyes of Hegel, that great functionary of 
the bourgeoisie!...Spinoza is the clear and luminous side of Modern 
philosophy. He is the negation of bourgeois mediation and of all the 
logical, metaphysical, and juridical fictions that organize its 
expansion....His contemporaries, preoccupied with debating the 
definition of bourgeois mediation of development, could not conceive of 
this but as anomalous and savage. 
 
A. Negri, The Savage Anomaly (1981)
3 
 
                                               
1
 A. Negri, ‘Labour in the Constitution’ in M. Hardt & A. Negri, Labour of Dionysus (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1994) 56. 
2
 A. Negri, ‘Toward a Critique of the Material Constitution’ in A. Negri, Books for Burning (London: Verso, 
2005) 207. 
3
 A. Negri, The Savage Anomaly (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981) 140,142-143. 
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[C]onstituent power is the definition of any possible paradigm of the 
political. The political has no definition unless it takes its point of 
departure from the concept of constituent power. Thus, far from being 
an extraordinary apparition or clandestine essence caught in the net of 
constituted power, constituent power is the totalizing matrix of the 
political. Both the traditional metaphysical definition of the political 
command over the community or the irrational definition that imagine 
the political as the realm of more or less legitimate d violence haplessly 
fall away in front of what the political actually is: the ontological strength 
of a multitude of cooperating singularities... 
 
A. Negri, Insurgencies (1991)
4 
 
A. Introduction 
Antonio Negri‘s constitutional theory in the sixties and seventies is introduced in this 
chapter primarily through two key essays: ‗Labour in the Constitution‘ (1964)5 and 
‗Toward a Critique of the Material Constitution‘ (1977).6  Both rely on a distinction 
between the ‗material constitution‘ and the ‗formal Constitution‘ which I refer to by way 
of the shorthand contraction, ‗c/Constitution‘. These essays are prerequisites to a more 
expanded examination of Negri‘s critique of the social contract in the eighties and 
nineties in two monographs: The Savage Anomaly (1981)7 and Insurgencies (1991).8 
In this chapter I present these four texts, alongside a variety of other texts authored by 
Negri and like-minded autonomist thinkers, as a basis for the next chapter‘s (Chapter 
III) consideration of the more recent English language collaboration between Negri and 
his co-author, Michael Hardt. A collaboration which takes shape in three volumes, 
Empire (2000),9 Multitude (2005)10 and Commonwealth (2009),11 each of which 
grounds one of the Canadian case studies in the latter half of the thesis (Part II: 
Chapters IV-VI).   
 
B. The material and the formal c/Constitution 
Although the crucial distinction between the material and formal c/Constitution is not 
consistently formulated by way of capitalization in (Hardt and) Negri‘s texts over five 
decades, the basic distinction is apparent already in Negri‘s early ‗Labour in the 
Constitution‘ (1964), an essay in which he recasts the ―problem central to constitutional 
science‖ as the ―problem of the relationship between the material foundation and 
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 A. Negri, Insurgencies (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991) 333. 
5
 n 1 above. 
6
 n 2 above. 
7
 n 3 above. 
8
 n 4 above. 
9
 M. Hardt & A. Negri, Empire (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000). 
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 M. Hardt & A. Negri, Multitude (London: Penguin, 2005). 
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 M. Hardt & A. Negri, Commonwealth (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard Belknap Press, 2009). 
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formal constitution of order‖12 .  The same concept is developed explicitly by way of 
capitalization over a decade later in ‗Toward a Critique of the Material Constitution‘ 
(1977): 
The Constitution is no longer the law of all laws: laws proceed by 
themselves, following the pace and coherence of the constitution of a 
new structure of political power. A new regime is taking shape day by 
day and a new material constitution is arising.13  
Having prophesied the arrival of a new material constitution, Negri develops a critique 
of ‗bourgeois constitutional science‘. Here, his attack is aimed at all those on the 
(centre) left or right, who continue to assume the representational apparatus of ‗the 
[formal] Constitution‘ as their privileged object of study. Or perhaps more specifically, it 
is aimed at reformists who continue to uncritically presuppose the instrumental 
relationship between the formal Constitution and the material constitution and in so 
doing, wrongly assume that the former is driven exclusively by the latter in a top down 
relationship:     
We can now begin to appreciate the extent to which bourgeois 
constitutional ‗science‘ flails about in the confusion of an exhausted 
task (the realization of the Constitution) and a vaguely perceived need 
for the (the modifications in the material constitution). We have begun 
to catch sight of some of the characteristics of the new era of class 
struggle – those that impose an adequate modification of the material 
constitution from the view point both of the dimension of struggle and 
the quality and incisiveness of behaviours.14 
Clearly, the organizational distinction between the two forms of constitution (material 
and formal or c/Constitution) did not emerge suddenly or without warning in Empire 
(Hardt and Negri‘s most widely read, published and translated monograph). It has 
deeper roots in Negri‘s earlier texts in the sixties and seventies. Nevertheless, it is 
important enough, and perhaps less familiar to their expanded English language 
readership, for Hardt and Negri to remind readers of its centrality and to offer a 
simplified definition of it immediately in the preface to Empire: ―by ‗constitution‘ we 
mean both the formal constitution, the written document along with its various 
amendments and legal apparatuses, and the material constitution, that is, the 
continuous formation and re-formation of the composition of social forces.‖15 Although 
this formulation does not employ capitalization to distinguish between the two types of 
constitution in the same way as Negri‘s earlier texts on the c/Constitution in the sixties 
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 n 1 above at 53-135, 63. See also n 2 above at 180, 188, 208; n 3 above at 188; n 4 above at 199, 292-
293.  
13
 n 2 above at 180. 
14
 Ibid 189. 
15
 n 9 above at xiv. 
                   41 of 242 
and seventies, it does sharpen and update a theoretical application which may be 
useful for Anglo-American and specifically Canadian critical constitutionalists.  
The starting point here is conceptual and I use the term ‗conceptual‘ advisedly. I realize 
it implies that (Hardt and) Negri engage, more than anything else, in a species of 
conceptual philosophy. Something which, despite Negri‘s recent suggestions to the 
contrary,16 I believe they do.17  I am thinking here of a recently published book length 
interview with Cesare Casarino, in which Negri attempts to differentiate his own form of 
thought, less by distinguishing it from the definition of philosophy developed by 
Deleuze and Guatarri‘s in their final book, What is Philosophy? , as ―the production of 
concepts‖, which he likes, as a departure point, but rather by pressing ahead to the 
process of material constitution itself:  
[I]t is not exactly the case that their [Deleuze and Guattari‘s] definition 
of philosophy as production of concepts is incorrect or misguided: this 
definition does capture an important element of philosophical activity – 
and yet it is still inadequate. Neither is it the case, of course, that 
concepts are unnecessary or unimportant—on the contrary. What is 
crucial, however, is not to mistake the definition of a concept – which 
at most constitutes a propaedeutic instrument – for a real 
transformation in history, which is what the concept should help us 
analyze and understand.18  
For Negri then, conceptual philosophy is a crucial component of the philosophical 
project, however it does not and cannot exhaust the material praxis which underlies it. 
For a concept to become useful, Negri suggests, it must be converted into a material 
act of constitution, an actual praxis, something which is not purely a species of 
representation.  It is the productive quality of concepts and the antagonism which they 
contain, in other words, which interests Negri:  
[T]he construction of concepts is not only an epistemological operation 
but equally an ontological project. Constructing concepts and what 
they call ‗common names‘ is really an activity that combines the 
intelligence and the action of the multitude, making them work 
together.19 
In this sense we can say the depth of Negri‘s reading of the concept in Deleuze and 
Guattari‘s A Thousand Plateaus (1980) in which the authors give a very similar  
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 See A Negri & C. Casarino, In praise of the common (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2008) 
35-36, 185. 
17
 See eg n 9 above at xiv, fn2 at 415 describing Empire “not as a metaphor” but “as a concept, which 
calls primarily for a theoretical approach *citing ‘Le concept d’empire,’ in Maurice Duverjer, ed., Le 
concept d’empire (Paris: PUF, 1980)+”. 
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 n 17 at 185. 
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 n 9 above at 302. 
                   42 of 242 
definition of concepts and the task of philosophy toward it: ―[w]ords are concepts‖ and: 
Nowhere do we claim for our concepts the title of a science. We are no 
more familiar with scientificity that we are with ideology; all we know 
are assemblages.20 
Nearly two decades before Deleuze and Guattari had written these words, which would 
along with the book in which they were written, be significant for both Hardt and Negri‘s 
intellectual trajectory, a much younger Negri wrote ‗Labour in the Constitution‘ (1964). 
A formative essay, in which he introduced the basic thesis, taken up in this doctorate, 
that ―the relationship between the material foundation [of capitalist production] and the 
formal constitution of [the political] order [emphasis my own]‖ is the ―problem central to 
[modern] constitutional science‖. 21 This relationship is one which Negri suggests even 
by the early sixties reaches a point of crisis in advanced capitalism where the Marxian 
notion of the real (and no longer simply formal) subsumption of labour to Capital 
realizes itself in such a way as to cause ―the distinction between economic [material] 
constitution and political [formal] constitution to ‗drop out‘‖.22  
In the 1964 ‗Labour in the Constitution‘, Negri polemicizes, rather than celebrates, the 
recognition of labour as a constituency at the head of Italy‘s 1948 Constitution. Treating 
it as a reformist trick of capital and sovereign power; by the time he would write 
‗Toward a Critique of the Material Constitution‘ in 1977, he had radicalized even 
further. In that essay Negri makes explicit that the space between the formal and 
material C/constitution has continued, over the 13 years between the texts, to make an 
impact in more and more obvious ways. Speaking of the demise of the modern 
constitutional form (the formal Constitution), or at least its declining effectiveness in 
determining or shaping the real constitution of labour and of the social (the material 
constitution), Negri is clear:  
This is not news: we all know that Constitutions are transient and sticky 
institutions, and the formal continuity of the Constitution of 1948 will 
hardly be put into question; but liturgical ceremonies and visits to the 
temple are probably going to continue, even more often as faith in them 
fades. However, ‗Germany is no longer a State,‘ [citation omitted] that is, 
the (Hegelian) state required by those leaders and administrators who 
demand the correspondence, in principle, between the formal and the 
material character of the constitutional process, as required by the 
system of ‗certainty‘ of right [diritto]. The Constitution is no longer the  
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 G. Deleuze & F. Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus (London: Continuum, 2000) 25.  
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 n 1 above at 63. 
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 Ibid. 
                   43 of 242 
law of all laws: laws proceed by themselves, following the pace and 
coherence of the constitution of a new structure of political power. A 
new regime is taking shape day by day and a new material constitution 
is arising. [citation omitted]23 
By 1977 Negri would grasp the 1948 (formal) Constitution of Italy as more discordant 
with the (material) constitution of labour than ever.  He would argue that the modern 
science of the Constitution and the truth apparatus to which it corresponds is becoming 
increasingly destabilized. To convey this idea, Negri evokes the language of the event: 
―[t]his essay aims to demonstrate that the political event of the [Italian] Constitution of 
1948 is now over.‖ In a similar sense, this thesis aims to demonstrate that the political 
event of ‗patriation‘ the Canadian Constitution and the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms24 is now over.  
Our argument, like Negri‘s in 1977, will be that the temporal closure of the formal 
Constitution, its representation at a specific historical interval and the ultimate 
generalization of its rationalities and imperatives into the future cannot (particularly 
where it is in the species of a representational compromise between interests, 
constituencies or stakeholders) resist the forces of insurrection and resistance 
immanent to its own unfolding. It cannot, in other words, withstand the test of time. 
When Negri says that ―a new material constitution is arising‖,25 he is suggesting as 
much.  
Another way of putting this, perhaps borrowing somewhat from Negri‘s later thought, is 
as follows. The multitude of productive bodies or living labour are producing and 
literally constituting a form of being and a collective subjectivity which refuses the 
social contractual mystification of sovereign Power (and the de-ontological normative 
science of the formal Constitution to which it corresponds). Similarly, when Negri writes 
―liturgical ceremonies and visits to the temple are probably going to continue, even 
more often as faith in them fades‖,26 he is saying that even as the formal Constitution is 
increasingly unable to carry the burden of representing or recognizing the material 
constitution (if it ever was), it will stipulate for its own centrality all the more. In this way, 
he implies, constitutionalists of all sorts (be they social scientists, normative 
philosophers or public lawyers) will continue to insist on the determinative primacy of 
the formal Constitution over the material one.  This is a point Negri would continue to 
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insist on, not only in his collaboration with Hardt, but in his own writings in subsequent 
decades. 
Jumping forward significantly to Negri‘s most explicit interface with English language 
critical legal theory in ‗Postmodern Global Governance and the Critical Legal Project‘ 
(2005), he would sound a note which recalled the old autonomist one, but which was, 
at the same time, intensely biopolitical: ―Why is it – for this is precisely the paradox – 
that the efficacy of the constitution grows weaker and weaker to the point of extinction 
at the very moment in which the constitutional production of ‗jurisdicity‘ [giuridicità] 
extends its cover into life ever increasingly, directly arranging [disponendo] subjects 
and objects therein?‖27   
Well before Negri had begun to engage with English-speaking critical lawyers after the 
publication of Empire however, he had already grasped, in the distinction between the 
material and the formal c/Constitutions, a potential answer to his own question: The 
productive power of language. Itself, simultaneously a species of corporeal reality 
(materiality) and of incorporeal (formal) representation, or what Christian Marazzi calls 
verbal ―dialogue between fleshy beings‖.28  
C. The constitution of language  
For Marazzi, much like Negri, language contains a materiality and corporeality as well 
as a purely symbolic and formal function.29 Here social autonomy and sociality 
themselves are grounded on language. Language is therefore both symbolic and real. I 
open up this parenthetical on Marazzi only insofar as it sets out the matter well. 
Glossing the scientific literature on the human capacity for speech and referring heavily 
to the philosophy of language expounded by Felice Ciamatti, Marazzi describes what 
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 A. Negri, ‘Postmodern Global Governance and the Critical Legal Project’ (2005) 16 Law and Critique 
27, 29. Note, I am not ignoring the fact that the word ‘constitution’ is left in lower case in a passage in 
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 C.  Marazzi, Capital and Language (Los Angeles: Semiotext(3), 2008 ) 32. 
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Commonwealth n 11 above at 46: “The common is the language spoken by the multitude, which is 
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method of legal science needs therefore to get ever more close to linguistic community [communità 
linguistic] and retrieve that materialist and creative telos, which constitutes it. In this situation, law’s 
grammar (which is to be rebuilt) will be able to bow before the word of liberation.” 
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he calls the compelling argument of ‗the biological theory of language‘ in which (1) 
―language is neither historical, because man certainly didn‘t invent language, nor 
simply natural, because it is equally true that without the participation of the human 
animal our language wouldn‘t exist‖; and, (2) ―the human animal is what it is because it 
literally constructed itself around language.‖ The result, Marazzi suggests, is a fairly 
significant breakthrough insofar as it demonstrates ―how the language faculty, the fact 
of talking, is one and the same with our bodies.‖ Or even more plainly, ―our language 
faculty developed physically/physiologically (in nature) inside the phenomena of life, 
right from our very first proto-semiotic interactions.‖30   
For Marazzi and other autonomist and post-autonomist thinkers including Negri, the 
corporeal and bodily quality of language, its formulation as a species of living labour, 
which has as its product something which is, at the same time as its utterly symbolic 
and representational (and therefore immaterial), also completely embedded in the 
unique capacity of the body (and therefore material) is the only possible departure 
point for theory and praxis.  Negri‘s autonomist reading of the Grundrisse, in particular, 
is perhaps in Marazzi‘s mind when he writes ―[l]anguge not only a vehicle for 
transmitting data and information, but also a creative force.‖31 What precisely animates 
this creative force, whether it is life or sociality, living labour, or something else is not 
made explicit, however it is clear that all of them overlap for Marazzi as much as they 
do for Hardt and Negri. Such a thought is increasingly interested in language as a 
mode of constitution and not simply an instrument of communication, one which poses 
language not only as a species of abstraction or representation, but as a species of 
concreteness and materiality which flows from the social capacity of bodies and minds.  
Certainly, English speaking jurisprudes will be on familiar grounds when they find, 
sprinkled throughout Negri‘s collaboration with Hardt, and elsewhere over the last 
decade, an increasingly Wittgensteinian grasp of language. Language is for Hardt and 
Negri, as much as it is for Wittgenstein and countless other key thinkers of the 
twentieth century from the English legal positivists to French postructuralists, the 
question. For Hardt and Negri this idea goes back to Wittgenstein more than any other 
because it is he who identifies language as a very serious game indeed; a game 
whose play refuses any dialectical closure or determined teleology32 to insist instead 
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 n 28 above at 30. 
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 Ibid. 27. 
32
 n 9 above at 379: “Wittgenstein recognizes the end of every possible dialectic and any meaning that 
resides in the logic of the world and not its marginal, subjective surpassing.”; n 11 above at 122: “We 
should highlight two aspects of Wittgenstein’s operation. First, by grounding truth in language and 
language games, he removes truth from any fixity in the transcendental and locates it on the fluid, 
changeable terrain of practice, shifting the terms of discussion from knowing to doing. Second, after 
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only on contingency and variability. The result is to open up a problematic with which 
we continue to grapple today. 
Locating Negri relative to his peers on the loosely „postructural‟ left 
 
To understand how Negri‘s theorization of the material constitution can be grasped as 
a philosophy of language, it might be worth fleshing out the similarities and differences 
between Negri and what he describes as more ‗Heideggerian left‘33  colleagues from 
Derrida to Agamben for whom language is an equally important question. What 
distinguishes Negri from these and other more Heideggerian inflected thinkers is that 
he does not view the margin as a space of pure play between the formal and the 
material, the representative and the real, but as a space of invention and ultimately of 
affirmative politics, of resistance or counter-power. To make this argument, Negri 
works his way back, not only to Marx (again, whom he suggests more Heideggerian 
inflected thinkers tend too easily to forsake, even when they are ostensibly on ‗the 
left‘), but to Spinoza34 as much as Wittgenstein. 35  In what follows, I explain this by way 
of the conceptual apparatus of ‗the constitution of language‘.  
Returning to Negri‘s 1977 essay, ‗Toward a Critique of the Material Constitution‘ in 
which he argues, ―the formal continuity of the Constitution remains but its material 
dimension does not.‖36 We might say that this formulation points to the way in which 
the modern social contractual mystification of sovereignty (and the conceptual 
apparatus upon which it relies) can be said to be at the limits of its representational 
capacity. Or even to be on precipice of exhaustion.  At this juncture, Negri seems to 
suggest, the modern social contractual heuristic for explaining the legitimacy as much 
as the foundation of the Political, has become, already by the sixties and seventies, 
inadequate to the task. So much so, they tend to collapse into a dialectic of terrorist 
violence and state brutality.  
                                                                                                                                         
destabilizing truth he restores to it a consistency. Linguistic practice is constituent of truth that is 
organized in forms of life: ‘to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.’ …. Language and 
language games, after all, are organizations and expressions of the common, as is the notion of a form 
of life.” 
33
 A terminology with Mandarini credits to Negri see generally M. Mandarini, ‘Beyond nihilism: notes 
towards a critique of left-Heideggerianism in Italian philosophy of the 1970s’ in L. Chiesa & A. Toscano 
(eds), The Italian Difference: Between Nihilism and Biopolitics (Melbourne: re.press, 2009) 55-80, 61-62, 
62 at fn19. 
34
 n 29 above at 85-86: “Spinoza indentified, in the density of being, the potential (puissance), the 
dynamis that renews being itself…The Spinozian potential (puissance) is opposed to the Heideggerian 
Dasein in the same way as amor is posed to Angst, mens to Umsicht, cupiditas to Entschlossenheit, 
conatus to Ansesenheit, appetitus to Besorgen...”  
35
Ibid.  
36
 n 2 above. 
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In the prior chapter (Chapter I), I argued that in the Canadian case, the opening event 
of the contemporary epoch is the FLQ‘s kidnap and murder of Pierre Laporte in 1970, 
while in the Italian case it was the BR‘s kidnap and murder of Aldo Moro in 1978. In 
both, I suggested, we glimpsed a mutation in the uncritically presupposed social 
contractual balance between political autonomy and the rule of law and saw instead 
how political autonomy, in the form of legally unchecked state or police power, folded 
quite quickly into absolute power in crisis. Even in so called western liberal 
democracies like Canada and Italy. This was true in the Canadian case, insofar as the 
War Measures Act was evoked and in the Italian case insofar as there was a 
prosecutorial dragnet of prominent autonomist intellectuals, Negri among them.  
To offset this effectively negative formulation of the problem, I presented the various 
social movements of Montreal in the sixties and seventies as excavated in Mills‘ recent 
historiography of the period. For a needed insight into the Italian situation, I relied on 
Marazzi and Lotringer‘s edited anthology, Autonomia. A book whose mixture of 
informed editorial curation and translated archival materials from the sixties and 
seventies (the seventies in particular), permits a hitherto unavailable glimpse into the 
Italian situation of the time.  In it a variety of writings and texts speak to the autonomist 
experiment, in language and life. Particularly as it was carried out in central and 
northern Italian cities at the same time as similar experiments were being carried out in 
Montreal (as much as New York, Paris and countless other metropolises).  
Only by understanding how autonomia‘s insistence on autonomy of the social (rather 
than the political or the legal) shapes in the seventies in particular, is it possible to 
proceed with this thesis. When Negri and other autonomists speak of the social terrain, 
they are necessarily speaking of language. For them, language is only one thing: 
sociality. From here, the response is to imagine the relationship between the body and 
language as the intersection of the material from the formal c/Constitution. In what 
follows I will explain what might be meant by this in some detail.  
Beyond the Constitution of the State and the subjectivity of „the People‟: Toward 
an alternative conceptual rubric 
 
Already by 1977, Negri tells us, the ―leaders and administrators‖ of the bourgeois state 
apparatus can be seen to ―demand the correspondence, in principle, between the 
formal and the material character of the constitutional process, as required by the 
system of ‗certainty‘ of right [diritto].‖ Long before his collaboration with Hardt therefore, 
it is apparent here that Negri had already begun to mount a wide-ranging attack, not 
only on the Political Science view of the State, but also on the jurisprudential view of 
the Constitution. This is, in itself, perhaps not remarkable.  But what is remarkable is 
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the extent to which he proposes an affirmative alternative other than the usual 
legislative reformism or juridical incrementalism, both of which are effectively legal 
technical language games.  In favour, not of a higher level constitutional reformism or 
juridical reversal of prior case law, but instead of a moment of linguistic reinvention or 
at least an opening to a form of conceptual philosophy not hitherto understood to be a 
process or act of material constitution.37 For the moment however, it suffices to take 
Negri‘s words in the seventies seriously.   
In the seventies Negri is no more a social democratic crusader than he is a liberal 
reformer. Instead, he is resolutely communist. His interest is therefore in the exercise 
of class antagonism and its productive potentiality.  In ‗Toward a Critique of the 
Material Constitution‘, Negri writes that it becomes possible to not only to imagine, but 
also to exercise and discern ―[a] new regime‖ taking shape and ―a new material 
constitution‖ with it.38 I have repeatedly emphasized this passage very early on in this 
thesis because of its centrality. Now, I connect it yet again, albeit in a different way, to 
the question of language. 
Well before his millennial collaboration with Hardt and the development of his 
Spinozian interest in the alternative political subjectivity of the multitude (rather than 
‗the People‘) and its alternative project of constituting the common (rather than the 
State), both of which began in earnest in The Savage Anomaly,39 Negri had already 
taken a first radical step toward reconceptualising constitutionalism. Particularly insofar 
as he suggests in the sixties and seventies that the formal Constitution, in which 
language is a species of pure representation, could be defeated or at least decentered 
by an adequate remobilization and re-theorization of its materialist alternative.   
I noted earlier that if this thesis proceeds on any a priori assumption whatsoever it is 
the following: If it is convincing for Negri to speak of ―the political event of the [Italian] 
Constitution of 1948‖ (the adoption of its formal Constitution) as being decisively ―now 
over,‖ it should be possible to make a similar assertion relative to the political event of 
patriation in 1982 (the adoption of the Charter). To make this argument more broadly, 
particularly in the Canadian case studies developed in the latter half of the thesis (Part 
II: Chapters IV-VI), it is first necessary to understand how it is that Negri perceives ‗the  
                                               
37
 It is this very same idea which Negri suggests in the subheading to The Porcelain Workshop: a new 
political grammar n 29 above. Paolo Virno makes the same move in his A Grammar of the Multitude 
(London: Semiotext(e), 2004). 
38
 n 2 above at 180. 
39
 n 3 above 9 
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State‘, namely, as a representation of, and at the same time, as a transcendental 
mystification of, sovereign Power, an operation which it carries out by way of the formal 
Constitution. 
To explain, for Negri, language is at once the necessary and central most feature of the 
formal Constitution as well as its greatest betrayer. It is that which makes possible the 
formal Constitution while constantly exposing the gap between its representational 
metaphysics (its deferral of foundations to the historical outside) and the actual 
material constitution of the present (or what Negri will later describe as kairòs40). 
Things might be summarized as follows: the question of language is essential to social 
contract theory in a superficial sense, whether as the object of a Constitutional Science 
(usually positive) or a normative philosophy (usually liberal) or in the deeper sense of a 
taken-for-granted quality of the coincidence between the formal and material 
c/Constitution, one which is more than anything covered over and hidden in language 
itself.  
Rather than insisting on legal certainty in a system of right (with the formal Constitution 
as its Kelsenian grundnorm), Negri insists instead that there is, by the latter half of the 
twentieth century an increasing excess of social antagonism which cannot be mediated 
and meets directly on a plane of immanence. So much so, ―[t]he [formal] Constitution is 
no longer the law of all laws: laws proceed by themselves, following the pace and 
coherence of the constitution of a new structure of political power.‖41  
But what is this new structure of political power being constituted? Is it co-extant with 
the rising of ―a new material constitution‖? Certainly this is what Negri seems to 
suggest. And, what does any of this have to do with the question of language? Is not 
language the essence of the formal, pure representation? No. This is precisely what we 
are resisting. Instead, we ask, how might language itself also be understood as a 
species of materiality? To the extent it is possible to begin answering these questions it 
is necessary to note that Negri connects his own thought on the material constitution in 
particular to Carl Schmitt and C. Mortati‘s earlier usages of the phrase.42 In a footnote 
to their English language translation of ‗Toward a Critique of the Material Constitution‘, 
Bove and Murphy point readers back to those crucial passages in the earlier ‗Labour in 
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 Kairòs is the opposite of chronos or “the linear accumulation of time”. It is, in other words, not the 
realization of a particular telos but instead the “moment when the arrow *of time+ is shot by the 
bowstring” see eg n 10 above at 357; A. Negri ‘Kairòs, alma venus, multitudo’ in M. Mandarini (ed) Time 
for Revolution (London: Continuum, 2003) 141, 241-242, 248-261; n 24 above at 148; A. Negri ‘Logic and 
Theory of Inquiry: Militant Praxis as Subject and as Episteme’ in S. Shukaitis, D.Graber & E. Biddle(eds) 
Constituent Imagination (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2007) 63.  
41
 n 2 above at 180. 
42
 Ibid. fn 3, 223. 
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the Constitution‘ (1964) which introduce the idea in its Negrian particularity.43 In this 
crucial earlier essay, Negri tests the outer limits of the narrative of formal Constitutional 
completion against the material reality of life and the inequitable distribution of power 
and resources to which it tends to correspond. In so doing, he opens up the ground to 
critique the inclusion of labour at the head of the postwar Constitution, insisting against 
the dominant viewpoint of PCI functionalists and even some Marxist intellectuals, that 
the working class can enjoy no real autonomy within the bourgeois State and its formal 
Constitution.44 Here, a more radically communist praxis requires an alternative theory 
of language. One in which language is as much as species of material reinvention as it 
is formal representation.  
D. A communist constitutionalism 
For Negri, only social autonomy and spontaneous organization of the multitude, as a 
species of collective living labour, define a radically communist project. Therefore, 
wherever the old autonomy of the political reasserted itself, whether as insisted upon 
by legal or political scientists, or by the PCI leadership, the problem was the same. For 
Negri, the formal Constitution could not, from the beginning, in any way be married to, 
let alone underpin, ―a mode of democratic socialist, or at least anti-capitalist, society‖. It 
could not, in other words, ―establish prescriptive [ordinante] criteria for social 
transformation. [citation omitted].‖45 This was because the movement politics of the 
sixties utterly surpassed reform as a terrain of struggle or progressive politics. In other 
words, it threw the loftier aspirational rhetoric of the formal Constitution right up against 
its own administrative techniques, its Power. This is what I believe Negri intends to 
convey when he writes, ―[t]he sixties sweep away reformist politics along with the 
juridical form of its management.‖46  
What Negri begins to grapple with in a variety of ways in the two major essays, ‗Labour 
in the Constitution‘ (1964) and ‗Toward a Critique of the Material Constitution‘ (1977), is 
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 n 1 above at 56. In this seminal essay, Negri insists that the working class is weakened by its 
subsumption, not only to Capital, but to the State, a form of subsumption constantly reproduced and 
deepened by the Constitution’s reflexive insistence on itself as a unified and ultimately final authority. 
Here, the Constitution is a “normativity” which escapes the legislative field to “invest the entire 
orientation of political discourse”. It is, in other words, a transcendental structure, a meta-narrative and 
a positive law at the same time.  One which subsumes everything, bringing it all within its subjectivizing 
networks, and remaking the entire social terrain in accordance with its own logic (formal/legal technical) 
and modalities (representative/mediatory). Against the Constitution of the State, Negri proposes an 
alternative line of inquiry into the constitution of labour itself, one which tracks the basic distinction 
between the material and formal c/Constitutions. He also introduces a powerful polemic against 
constitutional reformism as a strategy. Both of which become fundamental to his radicalism in the 
coming years.  
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 n 2 above at 180. 
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the possibility of a renewed and radically communist polemic against liberal and social 
democratic parliamentary politics and formal constitutionalism. A sort of critical left 
attack on representational government and parliamentary democracy tout court. One 
which is perhaps more than anything reminiscent of what was seen on the opposite 
side of the political spectrum a generation earlier in Schmitt's famous Weimar polemic 
against ‗parliamentary democracy‘.47 Ultimately, this theme returns again and again in 
these early essays, both of which have only relatively recently become available in 
reliable English language translation. What we grasp in them is that in the sixties and 
seventies, as Western European Communist Parties in Italy and elsewhere sought 
‗historic compromise‘ with the bourgeois State and its Constitution, they became, albeit 
perhaps inadvertently, reactionary and co-opted insofar as they began to believe that 
changes to the formal Constitution of the Political might resolve the immense 
inequalities which characterized the material constitution of the social.  
Beyond socialism: the critique of the social welfare state  
 
Negri observes, in a variety of texts, that the governance and economic management 
theory of Keynes, which was ascendant in the sixties and seventies (only to go into 
decline in the eighties and nineties), was a mirage of leftist progress.48  In so arguing, 
Negri has consistently gone against the grain, even on the mainstream left. For him, 
the socialization of the State as the realization of a social democratic Welfare State 
was no prelude to revolution, only a species of real subsumption in which the entire 
productive capacity of labour is brought into the administrative architecture of the 
formal Constitution and the State. In fact, he has argued that the social state is 
Capital‘s lifesaving measure, that which permits it to thrive more rather than less, by 
administering the private as much as the public sphere.  
For Negri, it was already clear in the sixties and seventies that reformist politics, whose 
quest is for inclusion and representation (of labour or any other previously 
unrepresented constituency, in the formal Constitution) could not be endorsed. The 
template for this position was in Negri in his seminal 1964 essay, ‗Labour in the 
Constitution‘, in which he suggests that the PCI successfully fought for the description 
of Italy as a ‗republic of labour‘ at the head of the Constitution, only to find the material 
reality of the bourgeois State unchanged, even strengthened. For Negri, a 
representation of the proletariat in the institutions of the bourgeoisie is no victory at all, 
incremental or otherwise.  Quite the opposite, it is a moment of capture, expropriation 
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 See generally C. Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 1985).  
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 See eg A. Negri ‘Communist State Theory’ (1974) in Labour of Dionysus n 1 above at 169-171.  
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or corruption.49 Going back to the question of language we might say that this is a key 
early formulation of the distance between the formal promise in the language of the 
Constitution, and the material reality, in the language of class struggle.  
By 1977, Negri could only say of ―juridical representation‖ that it was ―still effective 
despite its mystifications‖50 but nevertheless increasingly challenged to deal with the 
constitutive materiality of new forms of class relations and new forms of antagonism 
between labour and capital. Negri foresaw already at this point ―the capitalist 
restructuring‖ which was coming in the eighties and nineties, even sensed its shadow 
lurking beneath the cover of Keynesian economics and social democratic politics in the 
sixties and seventies. Here, at the height of what Negri calls ‗the social‘ (rather than the 
merely ‗rights‘) state, the formal Constitution (and perhaps earlier and more hazily the 
imagined social contractual basis of it), is generalized absolutely across the social 
terrain. Primarily as an apparatus of capture and expropriation, none of this will suffice 
for Negri. Nor, as emphasized, will any dynamic of constitutional reform, or political 
representation which does not acknowledge the reality of this situation:  
The new material constitution is taking shape around the capitalist 
attempt to end its crisis. The Constitution of labor of 1948 registered a 
certain set of relations in order to control them: it accounted for a state 
of diffuse conflict in the relations of production that was nevertheless not 
meant to turn into antagonism. Today the dimension and quality of 
conflict are instead immediately antagonistic: the whole circuit of 
reproduction is involved in such antagonism. Thus, the new material 
constitution must be tested against the reality of this antagonism, and 
more specifically against the new dimensions and quality of workers‘ 
struggle, the new composition of the proletarian and the working class. 
Unexpectedly, capital hysterically declares a general interest in 
production and in the co-management [cogestione] of social profit. The 
urge to achieve a new state form and a regime that denies conflict while 
heightening co-management corresponds to the realization that class 
struggle has definitively blown up the proposition of developments from 
both the quantitative and qualitative points of view.51  
Here, Negri is already relying on his unique reconstruction and interpretation of Marx‘s 
nascent argument in the Grundrisse. Namely, that it is the form of exchange itself 
which capital must overcome as a barrier or limit to its productive capacity (in 1978 he 
would deliver lectures at the College de France on this very subject at the invitation of 
Althusser and publish them a year later as Marx Beyond Marx52). Here we find the 
concept of material constitutionalism, as praxis, action or verb is capable of throwing 
up a crucial barrier to the old a priori of the formal Constitution, as a noun, as pure 
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representation or mediation. The result which is most interesting for this thesis is that it 
drives the social contractual political, as much as the economic, model of exchangeinto 
crisis. 53  Here, the basic framework of contract, which underpins capitalism as much as 
the State form, is refused. No longer is any representation of work in exchange for the 
monetary form of value, or the representation of unlimited freedom (in the state of 
nature) in exchange for limited freedom, security and order (in the civil state), be left 
undisturbed as an underlying structure or metaphysical frame. No longer, in other 
words, is the hegemonic logico-semantic frame of social contractualism permitted to 
persist unchallenged.  
Realist or idealist?  
 
Some of Negri‘s critics charge him with being idealist but this arguable in the 
extreme.54 Negri‘s approach is thoroughly realist, particularly insofar as realism is 
consistent with materialism and not with formalism, which on the contrary, finds its 
partner in idealism. For Negri, the concreteness of bodily intervention infuses every 
form of sociality and dictates the need for language; it also produces language in a 
sense beyond the usual formal or representative apparatus to which it is usually seen 
to correspond:  
The Constitution of 1948 attests to social organization (and its 
regulation) that is founded on conflict, exchange and the functioning of 
the law of value (and secondarily on compromise). These conditions are 
in the process of changing; the Constitution too must be altered 
materially. But how? ‗Competition generally, this essential locomotive 
force of the bourgeois economy, does not establish its laws, but is rather 
their executor‘ [citing the Grundrisse]. Therefore, the Constitution has to 
change....55 
Negri‘s reading of the Grundrisse suggests that once the working class begins, as it did 
in the sixties and seventies, to assert itself in mass movements which refuse the 
exploitative exchange between labour and capital, the formal Constitution faces a 
double crisis. Not only does it need to facilitate capital‘s surpassing of exchange, 
insofar as it spreads itself even more generally across the social terrain (as a form of 
value tout court), Negri argues, but it must mediate labour‘s insistence on a new deal. 
This is the basic crisis of capital which leads to FDR‘s New Deal and Keynesian social 
state.  Again, Negri argues that both are generalized in a variety of ways to bolster, 
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rather than defeat capital. Here, the social State becomes an intervention by public on 
behalf of private Power, nothing more or less.   
This basic structure, that of the social or welfare State, which can be understood to be 
the interventionist but nonetheless rhetorically liberal, is never far from Negri‘s mind. 
This specific passage is evinced in the language of an expanded social as much as 
individual rights discourse, one in which the model of the high modern individual, or the 
rights bearing citizen subject, is generalized across what is said to be ‗society‘ and 
given over to (what Negri believes is an ultimately false, diversionary and 
propagandistic approximation of) communitarian and social democratic platitudes. 
Negri cannot abide this position and it is one which he repeatedly polemicizes as 
reformist and associates with the electoral strategy of the PCI rather than any properly 
radical communist politics.56  
The reason for this is not because Negri is temperamentally immoderate, but because 
the struggle between labour and capital is, in the better part of the twentieth century 
increasingly laid bare in the drift between the representational apparatus of the formal 
Constitution and the real productive capacity of the material constitution. A year before 
his lectures at the College de France, which would eventually become Marx Beyond 
Marx, in ‗Toward a Critique of the Material Constitution‘, the beginnings of a novel 
reading of the Grundrisse was already being fleshed out. In that crucial essay, Negri 
argues that the dialectical relation between labour and capital can no longer, if it ever 
could, be resolved in the form of exchange, settlement or contract.57 The 
reverberations of this idea flow through this thesis in a variety of ways.  
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At this still introductory stage, it is sufficient to draw attention to a couple of Negri‘s 
conceptual formulations of the matter in the seventies. Particularly insofar as he treats 
the ―massification and socialization of labour‖ which renders the formal Constitution 
obsolete as the question of the epoch: ―[t]he [formal] Constitution is obsolete and in 
crisis not simply because of its failure to constrain the massification of labour within the 
rule of exchange and the proportions of planning, but especially because of its inability 
to respond to the alternative valorization the working class carries out on and of 
itself.‖58 This is what Negri is driving at when he repeatedly declares that the formal 
Constitution is obsolete.59  
The purpose of all of this is not to propose the material constitution as an idealized 
alternative to the formal one. This is prohibited immediately in the title of the essay 
itself (which is ‗toward a critique of the material constitution‘ and not ‗toward a 
valorization of the material constitution‘). For Negri, the material constitution of reality is 
as much a product of exploitative forces in both the public and private sphere (which 
are increasingly intertwined) as it is the affirmative constituent capacity of living labour, 
the multitude or constituent power.  Certainly, sovereign Power and Capital also have a 
species of material constitution, often one which takes the form of material lack rather 
than plenitude, suffering rather than joy, isolation rather than sociality, etc. In this way 
Negri is careful not present the material constitution as facile negation of the formal 
Constitution. This aspect of Negri‘s argument in ‗Toward a Critique of the Material 
Constitution‖ is coincident with his writings more generally in the seventies and the 
intellectual milieu of autonomia specifically, all of which pose to a strongly realist view, 
attached not to a negative dystopian alternative, but an affirmative one which is not 
utopian, but constitutive. 
                                                                                                                                         
of labour into the commodity form, then into capital and back again. Rather than this cycle of capitalist 
production and consumption, he offers in the concept of the material constitution, the imagining of 
labour as having substance beyond the commodity or monetary form of value. This is closely related to 
the idea of political subjectivity as something other than the abstract citizenry or sovereignty of ‘the 
People’. What is presented is instead corporeal and bodily (re)production as much as it is social and 
linguistic (re)production. This is nowhere more true, Negri argues alongside fellow autonomist thinkers, 
than in the move from Fordist to post-Fordist production, or simply the move from material (usually 
industrial and factory-based/hierarchical/centrally organized) to immaterial (variously 
informatic/affective/communicative/de-territorialized/decentralized/horizontally networked) 
production. 
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E. Refusing the determination of labour by capital as much as constituent 
by constituted power 
During the sixties and seventies Negri developed the theory, in concert with other 
leading autonomists, that labour‘s refusal of work permits it a means of escape, a short 
circuiting of, or a line of flight from, the old hegemonic binaries, labour and Capital as 
much as constituent and constituted Power.60 The result, the representative 
metaphysics and transcendental mystifications of modernity, the social contract first 
among them (the ultimate in idealist iterations) can no longer be insisted upon as the 
foundation or structural apparatus of the formal Constitution.  
In the place of the usual social contractual modality of the formal Constitution, Negri 
offers a return to the act of constitution itself, material as much as immaterial. The 
project is again not an idealist one but a realist one which takes up the making of the 
present as praxis. Again, an idea Negri develops more recently, as kairòs.61 The point 
is not simply the representation of the constituent moment at some isolated zero hour, 
or of isolating some mystical point of origin, some historical determination of the 
dialectic between constituent and constituted Power. But rather, the isolation of the 
dynamic of social production itself, the way in which the present is constituted, 
materially as much as formally.  
Well before the language and conceptual rubric of the multitude had begun to emerge 
in earnest in The Savage Anomaly (1981) and at least two years prior to Negri‘s unique 
reading of the Grundrisse in Marx Beyond Marx (1979), the basic contours of the 
formal and material constitution, as a species of productive antagonism and of a 
potentially radical critique of the extant state of affairs, was already emerging. The 
result was not so much a preference for the material over the formal c/Constitution in a 
blunt or oversimplified sense, but instead, dissolution altogether of the obviousness of 
the distinction between the two:  
This means that the [formal] Constitution is failing in the face of the 
collapse of the law of exchange because the reduction in necessary 
labour (and its social medium: the wage) is becoming rigid and 
expanding. But above all, the [formal] Constitution is failing when 
confronted with the quality and articulation that the reproduction of the 
working class is assuming, according to the rhythm of the rising cost of 
necessary labor. The refusal of work (and all the political and social 
phenomena related to it) assumes a positive connotation: in pursuit of 
capitalist development, it shifts he terrain of struggle from production to 
the totality of social (production and) reproduction; here again, it 
anticipates capital and determines not only the crisis but also its quality, 
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framing the crisis around its own needs. The refusal of work defines the 
modes of working class self-valorization in reproduction, it demands 
differential and/or indirect wages – it no longer seeks to realize itself on 
the terrain of production – it determines counterpower and proves itself 
willing to exercise it.62  
As is typical of autonomia scholarship, there is no distinction between the economic 
and the political mode of production or the formulations of subjectivity to which they 
correspond. This is a crucial anti-dialectical movement. Here, constitutional theory is 
rearticulated in a distinctive way. Certainly, the basic thrust and originality of this line of 
thought is linked more than anything to the particularities of Negri‘s very much 
autonomist reading of Marx. Negri‘s Marx emphasizes how distinctions between 
historical epochs are graspable by a contemplation of a mutation in the social form of 
production, in other words the material constitution of living labour itself. After having 
written so extensively on Marx during the autonomist period of the seventies, the jailed 
Negri of the eighties would begin to look for answers in Spinoza. A crucial philosopher 
who would permit him to build on the earlier distinction between the material and formal 
c/Constitutions in autonomist thought toward a more wide ranging critique of the social 
contractual apparatus underlying bourgeois constitutionalism.  
F. The Spinozian turn 
Like other subversive and iconoclastic philosophers in prior generations (perhaps most 
notably, Nietzsche) and in his own (Deleuze, Balibar and Matheron), Negri turns to 
Spinoza as a kindred spirit. Well before his co-authorship of the trilogy with Hardt had 
begun in earnest, and less than three years after the publication of Marx Beyond Marx 
(1979), while serving time in Rovigo, Rebibbia, Fossombrone, Palmi and Trani prisons, 
from April 1979 to April 1980, Negri wrote, The Savage Anomaly (1981). Translated by 
Hardt a decade later, it introduced English language readers to a reading of Spinoza 
which revealed a thinker centuries ahead of his time, a strong counterpoint to the 
hegemonic strain of western modernity galvanizing, not only around his contemporary 
Hobbes, but also in the dominant thinkers of subsequent centuries, Rousseau and 
Hegel as much as Locke and Kant.  The savage anomaly which Negri attributes to 
Spinoza is ―the irreducibility of his thought to the development of Modern rationalism 
and empiricism‖. Unlike the hegemonic formulations of modernity, ―always dualistic‖ 
and ―versed in transcendence‖,63 Spinoza‘s alternative, Negri writes, looks to the 
―ontological elements‖ which adhere to ―the constitution of reality‖.64  
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The constitution of reality 
 
In his conceptualization of ‗the constitution of reality‘, Negri finds in Spinoza the tools 
for a critique of the self-serving ―relation between the prudence of the politicians and of 
the rulers and the multitude as a living reality to be contained within determined 
limits.‖65 In addition to his grasp of the emergence of the populace as a going concern 
to be managed, governed and administered (a premonition of Foucault‘s piercing 
insight centuries later), Negri argues, Spinoza suggests an alternative to what was to 
become the hegemonic form of the social contract (most notably an alternative to his 
contemporary, Hobbes, for whom the transcendental mystification of sovereign Power 
was the necessary basis for any imaging of constitutionalism). This is a subterranean 
branch in western thought Negri distinguishes sharply in The Savage Anomaly from 
Spinoza‘s more ambitious ideas of ‗absolute democracy‘ or ‗absolute process‘. All of 
this is yet another important node in Negri‘s theorization of the material constitution of 
the social as an alternative to the formal representation of the Constitution of the 
Political. For the moment however, what is crucial is that Spinoza refuses the bargain 
or exchange entailed by the form of the social contract, most notably, the exchange of 
liberty for security, freedom for order and the ‗natural‘ for the ‗civil‘ state. 
Alternatives to the formal Constitution and the de-ontological normative science 
to which it corresponds 
 
Much like Machiavelli before him, Spinoza is of acute interest to Negri insofar as his 
thought reveals an early modern tension within the imagining of politics itself. One 
which he regards as having significant lessons for the present, on the one hand, as a 
praxis-based politics: Prudence as art of government; and, on the other, as theoretical 
metaphysics: Prudence as science of government. Although both trajectories are 
(early) modern insofar they address the crisis of authority and truth arising from the 
passage between the religious and secular forms of authority and social organization, 
Negri suggests they are useful today insofar as they demonstrate how to forego the de-
ontological normative register of what ought to be done for a less abstract 
consideration of what is (and its potentialities). Something which Negri terms ‗the 
constitution of reality‘, a concept which has everything to do with the material 
constitution (and very little to do with the normative science of the formal Constitution 
and its social contractual heuristics): 
Politics is not the realm of the what ‗ought‘ to be done; rather, it is the 
theoretical practice of human nature seen in its effectual capacity. This 
is very nearly a summary of chapter 15 of Machiavelli‘s The Prince. 
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[citation omitted] Here, though, it is not only the great Florentine who is 
evoked; rather, this passage involves the entire seventeenth-century 
critique of the utopia, from Hobbes to Descartes; this involves the spirit 
of the century. And yet with what difference! In Spinoza the crisis does 
not constitute a horizon but a condition; it does not characterize being 
but only qualifies its effectiveness. The hegemony of being over what 
‗ought‘ to be makes being equally as effectual as it is dynamic and 
tendential, capable, that is, of comprehending the development within 
itself, of knowing itself as efficient cause.66 
Moring ourselves in the crisis of the transition from feudal to modern imaginings of 
sovereignty, from its religious to its increasingly secular representation, we can detect 
the problematic of ‗the constitution of reality‘ as far back as the seventeenth century. 
For Hobbes and Descartes, albeit in different ways, Negri argues, the normative ought 
is a representation of the closure or determination of crisis in order and rule. The same 
can be said for the dominant trajectory of bourgeois thought which was to harden in the 
vast permutations of social contractualism. In Negri‘s reading of Spinoza and 
Machiavelli however, there is a different imagining of the constitution theory or science. 
Here, the normative ought is from the beginning absent. In its place, there is only the 
thought of caesura. For Negri, who will later employ a similar idiom in his treatment of 
the contemporary epochal passage, Spinoza best exemplifies what it means to develop 
an interregnal philosophy. The millennial and epochal resonances between Spinoza‘s 
position at the opening to the modern and Negri‘s at the opening to the postmodern are 
very much implied.  
In modernity‘s antechamber, between a feudal cosmological imagining of the world and 
a secular rationalistic rendering of it, there is a vacuum of meaning, a loss of ordering 
and a collapse of reliable metaphysics. In other words the trust that the formal 
determines the material begins to wane. This is as true in today‘s interregnum, 
between the modern and the postmodern as it was in the last between the feudal and 
the modern. In both cases, Negri suggests, the epochal passage is experienced 
alternatively as crisis or catastrophe. Evoking Hobbes and Spinoza as the primary 
thinkers of the last historical interregnum between modes of production, economic as 
much as politics, he suggests that unlike Hobbes, Spinoza is not struck by panic for a 
reconstituted order, which albeit insistently secular, retains in its bosom the verticality 
and hierarchy of its absolutist forbearers.   
For Hobbes, the crisis of passage calls for management by a reinvigorated 
transcendentalism and absorption into a new order, a new representational apparatus 
for sovereign Power; a new formal Constitution, one which would eventually, in 
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successive thinkers of the social contract throughout western modernity, collapse the 
multitude into ‗the People‘ and the common into the ‗State‘. For Spinoza this tendency 
is suspect from the beginning. Or at least, this is part of what Negri suggests in The 
Savage Anomaly.  
For Spinoza, Negri insists, there is no form of politics removed from the immanent 
constitutive praxis of the multitude, a constituent power which seeks to escape the 
transcendental ordering and vertical hierarchy of constituted Power, not reassert it. 
This is a basic formulation which recurs in Negri‘s thought after being set up in the 
highest levels of abstraction, first as a critique of Cartesian rationalism in Political 
Descartes,67 and then as a reading of Spinoza in The Savage Anomaly.  
What is most crucial for the purposes of this doctorate‘s Negri-inspired critique of the 
social contractual modality, can perhaps be distilled as follows: For Negri, it is Spinoza 
rather than Hobbes who breaks decisively with medieval thought to herald something 
original. Against the transcendental imagining of sovereign Power and the re-
constitutive tendency to which it corresponds in Hobbes, Spinoza proposes an 
immanence of the many which refuses representation or dialectical closure. In the 
transition between epochs, he warns, the conservative drive to stabilize and otherwise 
contain the multitude within fixed and clear parameters of order is strong. This is as 
true, Negri seems to suggest, today in the passage from the modern to the postmodern 
as much as it was three and a half centuries ago in the passage from the feudal to the 
modern.  
No historical passage or interregnum can be, nor need be, isolated in one particular 
event or constellation of events, they are better grasped as tendencies, not only in the 
mode of production but in the structure of authority. First as grasped in the early 
modern movement of authority from the Catholic Church and the aristocracy toward the 
market structure of cities and the emerging commercial thoroughfares of a mercantile 
bourgeoisie. Second, as Negri would later develop the idea with Hardt in Empire, in the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first century movement of authority from the State and 
its ruling class toward the market structure of Empire and the merging commercial 
thoroughfares of global markets. To understand history in this broad sweep Negri 
insists first on Spinoza rather than Hobbes. The reasons are instructive and give many 
crucial clues to uncovering the Negri-inspired theory of constitution I aim to propound in 
this thesis.  
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For Hobbes, the great patrician of public law and the first of the modern social 
contractarians, the passage from one mode of social organization to another presents 
a historical vacuum into which a reconstituted metaphysics must be inserted. Spinoza 
however is read by Negri to present a potent alternative to this reflex. If Hobbes is the 
genesis of the social contract and the modern logico-semantic frame of the (formal) 
Constitution which flows from it, Spinoza is its anomaly, the stubborn insistence that 
the many enjoy a materiality and immanence which refuses representation or 
metaphysical closure tout court. By seeking to explode the modern horizon of 
representational politics and transcendental sovereignty before it had even established 
itself, Spinoza, Negri suggests, presaged the next great epochal passage, our own. 
This is a crucial basis upon which his autonomist thought in the sixties and seventies 
corresponds to his widening interest in the critique of bourgeois constitutionalism in the 
nineties. A decade after The Savage Anomaly Negri would enter directly onto this 
terrain in Insurgencies.68 
G. Insurgencies: previewing the collaboration with Hardt 
In the place of those subjectivities comparatively weakly represented in the idiom of 
‗the People‘ and its derivative ‗popular sovereignty‘, Negri posits constituent power in 
Insurgencies, a crucial bridge to his collaboration with Hardt, as an unlimited, open, 
contingent and possibility laden capacity. To this end he writes, ―constitutive strength 
never ends up as power, nor does the multitude tend to become a totality. Instead, he 
[Spinoza] describes it as a set of singularities, an open multiplicity.‖ 69 At this juncture, 
Negri returns to the Spinozian idiom of ‗absolute‘ process, government and democracy, 
all of which present themselves as an alternatives to the ‗due process‘ and ‗limited 
government‘ of the liberal social contractual model as it was to evolve in modernity. 
Namely, as an ostensibly more and more ‗democratic‘ reformulation of the absolutist 
Hobbesian structure and its metaphysics as much as its language and its conceptual 
apparatus.  
 
For Negri, only constituent power is coterminous with democracy and therefore 
inherently unlimited, or again, in this peculiarly Spinozian sense, absolute in its 
purview. This is why he applies the prefix ‗absolute‘ in connection to ‗power‘ (a prefix 
explicitly not to be conflated with ‗absolutism‘ as it is usually understood). The absolute 
quality of constituent power is, for Negri, one which is indicative of its sociality, 
expansiveness, strength and will, its desire to drive history and reconstitute the 
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‗politicodemocratic dynamic anew‘. 70 This is the dynamic in which Negri investigates 
the basic distinction between the two forms of power (power/Power) and their complex 
relation to the two forms of c/Constitution (material/formal or constitution/Constitution).  
It is also one which leads him to polemicize sovereign power in whatever its form. This 
all converged when Insurgencies was published in the nineties, particularly insofar as it 
simplified many of the more difficult to unlock arguments contained in Negri‘s work on 
Spinoza and Marx in prior decades.  
 
In this thesis, which seeks to propose a Negri-inspired theory of constitution based on 
a critique of the social contract (and at the same time to open up a conceptual 
alternative to it), Insurgencies like The Savage Anomaly and ‗Toward a Critique of the 
Material Constitution‘ and ‗Labour in the Constitution‘ in prior decades, is essential 
insofar as it continues to open up a series of constitutional phraseologies and 
conceptual formulations worthy of expanded consideration and experimental usages. 
These include: (1) ‗the constitution of time‘(which imagines the opening and closing of 
the aperture of historical time in the constitution of events); (2) ‗the constitution of the 
common‘ (as a production and emancipation of property from the logics of private as 
much as public expropriation); (3) ‗the constitution of space‘ (which opens up an 
analysis of imperialism); and, (4)  ‗the constitution of labour‘ (which reminds readers of 
the autonomist sense in which modes of production, political, economic and legal, tend 
to converge in the social). Each of which will feature prominently in this thesis and 
operate, not only as part of the backdrop for exposition in the case studies (Part II: 
Chapters IV-VI), but for the presentation of Empire and the critical literature 
surrounding it (Chapter III).   
 
For the moment however, it will suffice to say that each of these myriad forms of 
constitution, (1)-(4), which are greatly concretized in Insurgencies and carried forward 
into the trilogy with Hardt, have a fundamental continuity with Negri‘s earlier treatment 
of the distinction between the material and the formal c/Constitutions. This passage 
from Insurgencies is useful by way of summary. Particularly insofar as it anticipates the  
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deeply ontological theory of constituent power which Negri would continue to build in 
the nineties and beyond: 
 
Constituent power is the creative strength of being...Constituent power 
constitutes society and identifies the social and the political in an 
ontological nexus...But one might object that from the humanistic 
revolutions to the English Revolution, from the American Revolution to 
the French and Russian ones, and to all the other revolutions of the 
twentieth century, once the exception and uncontainable moment of 
innovation is over, constituent power seems to exhaust its effects. Now, 
as Marx pointed out and as we think we can continue to sustain, this is 
not true. This appearance of exhaustion is the effect of the mystification 
that the practices of constitutionalism stage in order to block the 
investment of the social and the political in being...The rationality of 
modernity is in fact, as we have seen, a linear logic that corrals the 
multitude and subjects it to a unit and controls its difference through the 
dialectic...modern rationality blocks the constituent process and founds 
modern constitutions: this obstacle is posed through the determination 
of subjects, the naturalization of their creativity the fixation of their 
temporality and therefore through a series of operations of normalization 
and movement.71   
 
There could be no better summary of Negri‘s critique of modern constitutionalism or of 
the desire which drives his research: To understand what renders constituent power so 
indomitable, as much as what makes it resistant to repeated constitutional attempts to 
coral its productive capacity. In many ways this is precisely where he would begin in 
Empire, yet another decade later, this time with Hardt.  
 
H. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented at the highest level of generality, drawing from a variety of 
crucial texts, the complex and yet nevertheless immensely important distinction Negri 
makes between the material and the formal c/Constitutions. To the extent that much is 
left unexplained or at too high a level of abstraction in this chapter, it is hoped that 
further clarity about this long standing distinction, along with further development of 
some of the key Negrian formulations of the constitution of time, space, the common 
and labour, will emerge in subsequent chapters.  The overarching question of the 
constitution of language itself will come into sharper relief in the analysis of Negri‘s 
collaboration with Hardt. An English language collaboration which I will argue, in the 
next chapter (Chapter III), updates and clarifies the ideas contained in Negri‘s earlier 
work while staying true to their originality and immense conceptual and linguistic 
inventiveness. 
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Chapter III - Thinking about Empire: Updating a Negri-inspired 
theory of c/Constitution 
The end of the outside is the end of liberal politics. 
M. Hardt & A. Negri, Empire (2000)
1
 
The transformation of a political vocabulary is a real process, which will 
involve the elimination of some of the fundamental political categories of 
modernity... 
A. Negri, ‘Living the Imperial Transition – In Order to Struggle’ (2004)2 
Now, democratic political representation no longer works. If there is 
something that has been burnt out by this brief century, it is democratic 
representation.... 
A. Negri, ‘Postmodern Global Governance and the Critical Legal Project’ 
(2005)
3
  
The political lexicon of modern liberalism is a cold, bloodless cadaver. 
M. Hardt & A. Negri, Multitude (2005)
4
 
 
A. Introduction 
The best possible connecter between the first more theoretical half of this thesis and 
the second more concretized one, may lie in the way which Negri, both prior to his 
English language collaboration with Hardt, and after, emphasizes tertiary as much as 
binary concepts. Here, the productive power of difference expresses itself as 
something other than the negation of its opposite. The concept of the common, as the 
constituent project of the multitude, within and against Empire, is a prime example of 
what Hardt and Negri call an alter (rather than purely anti) dialectical methodology.5 
Common, because at its most basic level, it is that which refuses ownership outright,  
public as much as private expropriation. However, it also refuses to accept a tepid 
ontology of friendship, encounter or ‗being in common‘. Rather, it insists on ―the 
process of making the common‖.6 This complex distinction belies an imagined 
alternative to the constitution of the state, neither on a realist nor an idealist plane, but 
in an active, constitutive, even Dionysian sense.  
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Negri‘s fundamentally constitutive ontology always shines through. In his millennial 
collaboration with Hardt, it is something which takes the shape of the collective 
subjectivity and constituent power of the multitude and its project of constituting the 
common.7 Both of which are given over to concretized development in the second and 
third volumes of the trilogy. Nevertheless, the three concepts should not be artificially 
separated insofar as they work together. Again, as a productive conceptual 
triangulation, to grasp a contemporary form of sovereignty and constituent power as 
much as a template for a renewed communist project. I found this was too often 
overlooked or left to the side, even by the best reviewers of Empire. 
One of the reasons for this may be that the logico-semantic frame or conceptual 
apparatus attached to Negri‘s English language collaboration with Hardt can strike first 
time readers as strange.  This is nowhere more true that relative to Hardt and Negri‘s 
oft repeated (and perhaps for some, counter-intuitive) argument that although Empire 
permits of no exterior from which to resist, it remains possible, indeed it is the only 
possible iteration of a democratic politics, for the multitude to form a line of flight from it. 
This, after all, is a construction upon which Hardt and Negri repeatedly insist, using a 
largely Deleuze (and Guattarian) idiom to make the point.8 Tellingly, it is this which is 
most irksome to Empire‘s sharpest reviewers. Notably Žižek, who asserts Hardt and 
Negri treat this type of conceptual experimentation as an exercise in obscurantism 
reducing it to an empty ‗Deleuzian jargon‘.9 I disagree with Žižek and aim to develop a 
counter argument which largely defends Hardt and Negri‘s presentation, or at least my  
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interpretation of it. In so doing, I return at the heart of the chapter to the distinction 
between the two forms of c/Constitution.  
 
B. The old question of form and content  
Recall, Hardt and Negri present the distinction between the formal and the material 
constitutions as one which is wrapped up with the constitution of language itself. To 
make this point obvious Hardt and Negri permit language a line of flight which operates 
textually in Empire by way of intermittent use of poetics, italics, unconventional prose, 
unusual forms of headings, transitional passages and exclamation marks scattered 
throughout the text. In this way, Hardt and Negri constantly experiment with the 
constitution of language, the form as much as the content of their writing. Where they 
are successful, I argue, they are able to provocatively link otherwise difficult or unusual 
arguments and conceptual experiments in ways which are inspiring and original. 
Unfortunately, few of the reviews of Empire hone in on the question of language in a 
way which speaks directly to this originality.  
Some, like Paul Passavant, the co-editor of a major English language anthology of 
critical essays on Empire, Empire’s New Clothes (2004),10 grasp the linguistic element 
of the distinction between the formal and the material c/Constitution it in its broad 
strokes but stop short of naming it or connecting the intersection of language and 
representation in the formal, as much as the material constitution.  Or perhaps more 
precisely, the way in which biopolitical production mobilizes the human capacity for 
language and the animal capacity to speak in ways which are capable of upsetting 
virtually all the settled assumptions of what Passavant calls ‗postmodern liberal legal 
jurisprudence‘:   
According to Hardt and Negri, representation is everywhere in 
crisis. Postmodern liberal legal jurisprudence has likewise 
abstracted law from social conflict, producing and empty and 
abstract unity through the exclusion of difference...The history of 
modernity, for Hardt and Negri, represents a struggle between the 
democratic forces of immanence and the transcendent power of 
sovereignty. The American Revolution and the U.S. Constitution, 
however, represent something of an exception to this history of 
modernity...The Constitution, as illustrated by Negri‘s reading of the 
Federalist Papers, absorbs constituent power and its subject 
through its centralizing powers...During the first half of the 
nineteenth century, America‘s ‗material constitution‘ exceeded its 
formal ‗formal constitution,‖ according to Negri, as the ‗constituent 
principle and its determination of freedom and originality manage 
                                               
10
 P.A. Passavant & J. Dean (eds) Empire’s New Clothes (New York: Routledge, 2004).  
                   67 of 242 
each time to materialize and break through the constitutional 
wrapping‘ [citation omitted].11  
Passavant‘s reading of the consistency between Insurgencies and Empire, as an 
ongoing critique of the hegemonic formulation of constituted power is quite accurate. 
However, it does not adequately consider how ‗the constitutional wrapping‘, or the 
formal Constitution, might point to the representational and subjectivizing limits of the 
existing language of the social contract. There are also those among Hardt and Negri‘s 
shrewdest reviewers, like Laclau and Žižek, who critique Empire for slipping back into 
the language of right and the formal Constitution. Back, in other words, into the very 
same representational apparatus from which the multitude had supposedly sought to 
carve a line of flight.   
For Laclau,  
I can only say that I do not disagree with any of these plans [right to 
global citizenship, wage and reappropriation of the common]—
although it is clear that they do not amount to a full-fledged political 
program—but what sounds strange, after a whole analysis 
centered on the need to strike everywhere from a position of total 
confrontation with the present imperial system, is that these three 
political aims are formulated in the language of demands and 
rights...12  
For his part, Žižek adds,  
The authors propose to focus our political struggle on three global 
rights: the rights to global citizenship, a minimal income, and the 
reapporpriation of the new means of production (i.e., access to and 
control over education, information and communication). It is a 
paradox that Hardt and Negri, the poets of mobility, variety, 
hybridization, and so on, call for three demands formulated in the 
terminology of universal human rights. The problem with these 
demands is that they fluctuate between formal emptiness and 
impossible radicalization.13  
What each of these critiques, for all their persuasiveness and apparent obviousness, 
seems to miss however, is that formulating rights in terms of the collective right of the 
multitude to freedom of movement and access to the resources of the common (as 
Hardt and Negri do toward the end of Empire),14 is conceptually very different than the 
usual formulation of rights afforded to the individual citizen or more recently, specific 
identitarian constituencies. So different, it cannot be inserted into the social contractual 
model of the formal Constitution as a species of reform. The right of the multitude to 
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freedom of movement and access to the resources of the common is no return to the 
old fashioned language of high modernity, the rights state or even the late modern 
social state. It instead nothing short of the right to (re)make, (re)constitute and 
(re)produce the political situation and the social coordinates to which it corresponds, 
from the bottom up, now.  
Because so few commentators on Empire, even those as acute as Žižek and Laclau 
tend to grasp the creativity Hardt and Negri muster to presenting a species of 
conceptual philosophy which grapples with the constitution of language itself, albeit by 
experimenting with concepts, more than by making arguments drawn from the 
philosophy of language or even from semiotics, they miss much of what is of value in 
Empire.  
In the English language bourgeois press which took an unprecedented interest in 
Empire, the figure of the multitude is generally grasped as a species of global subaltern 
and not as a simple postmodern reincarnation of the old industrial working class, which 
is indeed the case. At first this much would seem obvious and require little by way of 
analysis. Commentators like Lev Grossman of Time Magazine are typical. They chide 
Hardt and Negri for what they suggest are unnecessarily complex and ornate 
arguments as much as utopian or idealistic formulations, all of which seem, at least to 
them, a little bit farfetched. This, a simple and bluntly defensive response to a book the 
magazine would not have asked him to review had it not already proven itself. Empire 
is many things. Among them is not an exercise in intellectual puffery. 
Even Grossman, from his perch in midtown however, grasps in response to Empire‘s 
sequel, Multitude, a question of collective subjectivity, political capacity and constituent 
power: ―‗[m]ultitude‘ is the word for a whole new kind of political entity, one made up of 
the entire population of the world in all its infinitely complicated, irreducible variety.‖15 It 
is however, a formulation which he finds thoroughly unbelievable, again ―utopian‖, even 
at risk of ―shading into utter fantasy‖.16 Unfortunately Grossman does not comment on 
how the usual imagining of ‗the People‘ might be preferable or any less fantastical than 
that what is understood by the more inclusive, non-difference dampening, collective 
subjectivity understood by the multitude.  
Of course, Grossman has an excuse insofar as he is not writing for an academic 
audience. But he is not the only one to simply graze the surface of the distinction Hardt 
and Negri draw so decisively between ‗the People‘ and their ‗popular sovereignty‘ on 
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the side of constituted Power and ‗the multitude‘ and their refusal of sovereignty on the 
side of constituent power. However, because he is not a theorist, the way in which he 
does it is blunter.  
I have made this slight detour into the bourgeois media‘s reception of Empire only to 
reveal an unexpected commonality between its reading of Empire and that one on the 
more theoretical and critical left. In both groups, few recognize the depth of the 
distinction which Hardt and Negri make between ‗the People‘ and ‗the multitude‘ as one 
which is related, not only to the question of collective subjectivity and autonomy, but 
also to the complex relationship between language and representation,  meaning and 
power. There are however notable exceptions. Among them is Saveiro Ansaldi‘s 
contribution to the special ‗Dossier on Empire‘ edition Rethinking Marxism, itself a 
veritable treasure trove of incisive reviews of Empire.17  
 
C. The (new) question of constitution 
Ansaldi‘s ‗The Multitude in Empire: Biopolitical Alternatives‘ (2001)18 is not only written 
in a more theoretical register but offers a more thoughtful critique of Hardt and Negri 
than does Grossman. It also grasps a quality which even Žižek and Laclau do not. 
Ansaldi develops the question of the formation of subjectivity itself to ask why it is 
necessary to speak of ‗the multitude‘ in the singular rather than ‗the multitudes‘ in the 
plural. This seems to me to be a very pertinent aspect of any inquiry into the 
constitution of language and one which opens up a variety of avenues in Hardt and 
Negri‘s thought which others tend too quickly to gloss over:  
Why think about the power of the multitude in terms of the subject? 
In other words, why introduce a unifying and organizational element 
into the nomadic and dispersed multiplicity of the multitudes? 
Doesn‘t the notion of the subject risk introducing the threatening 
shade of the dialectic there where, precisely, there exists no longer 
a dialectic, where the nomadism of the biopower of the multitudes 
is already constituent.19  
This is a perceptive critique which both absorbs the obviousness of the intended 
distinction between ‗the People‘ and ‗the multitude‘ while at the same time pushing the 
multitude to remain internally differentiated, horizontal, non-uniform and most of all 
plural, so as to avoid any returns to the old hegemony of the social contract between 
the People and the Sovereign (as grounded in the metaphysics of the Constitution and 
the dialectical form of logic which supports it). It is also worth noting here that the 
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French language journal multitudes, an interdisciplinary journal devoted to theoretical 
writing within the conceptual nodes of a loosely ‗post-autonomist‘ thought, and to which 
Hardt and Negri are themselves frequent contributors take this plurality for granted in 
the title of the journal itself.20  
While the European debate on language which prevailed throughout sixties, seventies, 
eighties and nineties spilled into critical jurisprudence and radical political theory in 
North America and the UK as much as it did in Europe, it remained a marginal 
influence in major Anglo-American and Canadian Law faculties. I take this to be a 
relatively non-controversial observation which should come as no real surprise insofar 
as most legal theorists writing on the constitution in the English language formulate 
their thought in the language of normative political philosophy or social science. Both of 
which are without a doubt quite reflexive insofar as those interested in the science of 
the norm, like jurisprudes and political scientists, cannot see things in any other way.  
In the US, the departure point for all of this was the social contractual theory of John 
Rawls. In Europe figures like Jürgen Habermas, for whom a renewed democratic public 
sphere was required to ground a more perfect communications-based understanding of 
democracy, featured prominently.  
Recall, in the last three decades of the twentieth century endless similar questions of 
social order and collective life were being considered in all quarters of the western 
intelligentsia. At the broadest level, Hardt and Negri place Rawls and Luhmann at the 
head of the pack in this universe. Certainly, neither is a jurist nor a constitutionalist. 
Luhmann is a social scientist and Rawls a normative philosopher. Taken together 
however, Hardt and Negri make the novel argument that they point to the most perfect 
social scientific formulation of the Constitution of Empire possible. Like the Luhmannian 
systems theory or the Rawlsian social contractualism, Empire knows no limits within its 
sphere of competence. Unlike them, on the other hand, it cannot be bound into a 
particular representational architecture, system, structure or foundation.21  
Shortly after the publication of Empire, perhaps wishing to make this point before the 
English language legal audience which needed to hear it the most, or simply detecting 
it had perhaps been less obvious to his newly expanded English language readership 
than he might have thought, Negri reintroduces the strange union of Luhmann and 
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Rawls in a keynote address to the 2001 annual UK Critical Legal Conference held at 
the University of Kent on the weekend before what was to become known as 9/11.  
On this occasion, Negri delivers his remarks by video link from Rebibbia Prison in 
Rome and uses the moment to revisit the strange pairing, describing it, in an obvious 
reference to the recently mapped human genome as ―a destructive double helix‖. One 
which he warns is taken up by critical legal thought only at the risk of collapsing 
completely into a de-radicalized and purely reformist, never genuinely revolutionary 
modality: 
[I]n Luhmann and Rawls (once they are not taken to be conflicting, 
a singular resemblance and connection between the two becomes 
discernible)... there is a destructive double helix...whether that be a 
postmodern, luhmannian, or rawlsian awareness, the creative 
sense of the ‗dispositive‘ between reality and normativity, history 
and orientation, is entirely cancelled out and legal realism is not 
only diluted but destroyed...as well as the entire tradition of 
reformism, for that matter.22   
My sense in passages like this one, which draw unusual or unexpected parallels 
between thinkers, is that (Hardt and) Negri are reconnecting to an earlier critique, not 
only of representation in the formal Constitution, but of the transcendental mystification 
of sovereign Power in the social contractual imagining which undergirds it. A tendency 
which they suggest in Empire runs in a fairly solid line through modernity and which 
has come to mutate in extraordinary ways in postmodernity. More than a simple 
hypermodern valorization or anti-modern reversal and negation of hegemonic 
structures of meaning and Power, (Hardt and) Negri opt, following Foucault and 
Deleuze, to present new dispositives of power which break open, escape and carve 
lines of flight from the old determinisms and hierarchies. This is not a utopian dream or 
a ‗Deleuzian jargon‘, as Žižek suggests,23 it is an original contribution to legal and 
political theory, and especially the hybrid field of constitutional theory. A terrain in which 
various forms of rationality, political and legal in particular, comingle in ways which are 
increasingly difficult if not impossible to disentangle without more and more complex 
forms of interventions by courts and legislatures (both Chapters V & VI explore this 
tendency in contemporary Canada from different angles).  
Normative philosophers from the Anglo-American tradition like Rawls, as much as 
critical social scientists from the European one like Luhmann, Hardt and Negri argue 
early in Empire (and Negri pointedly reinforces before an English language critical legal 
audience in 2001), converge unexpectedly insofar as both can be said to share an all-
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encompassing grasp of political, legal and social ordering. An ordering which is, in 
some way indexical to the logics of the formal Constitution of Empire, and yet at the 
same time tends either to overlook it, or fundamentally misunderstand the nature and 
quality of the material constitution which it (re)produces and is (re)produced by.  
In Rawls, (Hardt and) Negri make the point, we can think of what it means to be inside 
or outside the social contract as the question or organizational dialectic and in 
Luhmann of what it might mean to be inside or outside of a variety of closed normative 
system at all times. In the political sense this has, albeit inadvertent, Schmittian 
implications. Insofar as it leaves undisturbed not only the basic friend/enemy distinction 
which so easily explodes in violence but also the basic legal/illegal distinction to be 
infinitely manipulated by political ideology.  
I take it is a decisive clue to unwinding some of this, that Hardt and Negri‘s remarks on 
the matter appear on the same page of the preface to Empire in which they define, as 
readers will require from the prior chapter, the distinction between the formal and 
material constitutions: ―by ‗constitution‘ we mean both the formal constitution, the 
written document along with its various amendments and legal apparatuses, and the 
material constitution, that is, the continuous formation and re-formation of the 
composition of social forces‖.24 Later, they offer the following pithy formulation: ―the 
concept of Empire, is characterized fundamentally by a lack of boundaries‖. 25 For 
some reviewers of Empire this is an especially mind boggling point.26 However, it is 
properly congruous with Negri‘s broader project of understanding c/Constitution in two 
ways:  
(1) as a noun, as in the case of the formal Constitution which has as its basic 
formulation the use of language for the representation and stabilization of 
boundaries; and,  
(2) as a verb, the act of material ‗constitution‘, which has as its basic function the 
(re)production language for the (re)invention and destabilization of boundaries 
as much as the (re)production of life. 
Together, I have argued, (1) & (2) take us back to the increasing centrality of a 
postcolonial problematic in Hardt and Negri‘s thought. One which intensifies with each 
subsequent volume of the trilogy and plays itself out at the most basic level of 
language: Language is at play in the distinction between the two species of 
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c/Constitution in particular. Again, insofar as the formal Constitution is a question of 
representation and the material constitution a question of life. Both of which are 
simultaneously necessary for theory and praxis.  
Some of the strongest English language critical interfaces with Empire to grasp this, or 
at least approach it, are found amongst the contributions to the special ‗Dossier on 
Empire‘ double edition of Rethinking Marxism devoted to reviewing it. 27 There is also 
an English language critical anthology dedicated to critiques of, and critical 
commentary on, Empire. It contains the representative contributions by Passavant and 
Laclau cited above.28 Outside of the English language publications universe, an 
enthusiastic response to Empire also emerged in Paris, primarily around the 
intellectuals and artists who were Negri‘s colleagues, students and collaborators while 
he was in exile.  Many of whom had collaborated with him in the now defunct French 
language journal future antérieur,29 and many of whom would again do so in writing for 
the multitude,30 a successor journal which continues to publish today, and to which 
Hardt and Negri continue to contribute.31  
 
D. Why the multitude? 
No doubt, there is no single concept which fascinated and inspired Empire‘s readers 
more than that of multitude and of the collective subjectivity to which it corresponds. In 
the most obvious sense this is very likely why Hardt and Negri titled their follow-up up 
to Empire, Multitude, as they did. As much as it inspired a younger generation of 
thinkers the concept also quite directly spoke to Negri‘s generational peers and 
countrymen on the Italian critical left.  Including Paolo Virno, who was himself arrested 
in the same dragnet as Negri in the spring of 1979. Virno has recently written two major 
monographs, both of them very different but equally inventive, addressing the multitude 
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in the years after Empire. The first, A Grammar of the Multitude (2004),32 published 
immediately prior to Hardt and Negri‘s Multitude, took up the constitution of language 
directly; the second published a year before Commonwealth, titled, Multitude: Between 
Innovation and Negation (2008), examined hitherto under-developed psychoanalytic 
dimensions of the multitude.33 It should also be noted that the multitude is one of the 
core concepts clarified and addressed in two volumes of translated essays, lectures 
and reflections on Empire by Hardt and Negri themselves, both prior to, 34 and after,35 
the publication of Multitude in 2005.36  
In all of these texts, the concept of the multitude, as a collective subjectivity, captures 
centre stage to propose an imagining of collectivity and constituent power which has 
become immensely influential in ‗post-autonomist‘37 circles, and become a loose 
rallying cry for ‗anti‘, or perhaps more precisely, alterglobalization activists and artists of 
all sorts.38  
Reviewers of Empire often report being both exhilarated and rattled by Empire‘s 
conceptual ambitiousness, by its willingness to work with large and even atypical 
notions, the multitude in particular. For Žižek, in yet another review, this one published 
in the special edition of Rethinking Marxism, the suggestion is however that while Hardt 
and Negri succeed in proposing an affirmative template for a renewed communist 
project, they ultimately lose grip and reconstitute the very form of dialectical logic which 
they so cacophonously rejected.39 More than anything, Žižek is referring here to the  
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proposed Empire/multitude conceptual dyad which does indeed provide a sort of 
conceptual structure for their work. As emphasized above, Laclau converges with Žižek 
on this point.40 
Some critical commentators suggest instead that Hardt and Negri‘s use of sources and 
intellectual universe shows a failure to adequately grasp the theoretical vectors flowing 
through postcolonial thought.41 Some of these critiques have merit and very likely 
struck Hardt and Negri as constructive. No doubt still others do fall prey to fundamental 
misunderstandings.42 One of the things which all of them treat too lightly and without 
adequate reflectionis the question, or better the problem of, biopolitics and biopower 
(which is essential to Empire and which most closely links Hardt and Negri to their  
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peers on the contemporary European critical left, many of whom are as interested in 
unearthing the potential within this Foucault‘s theoretical legacy as are Hardt and 
Negri).   
E. The problem of biopolitics and biopower 
Ultimately, the Deleuze and Guattarian Hardt and Negri are as distinct from the 
Hegelian Lacanian Žižek as they are from other critical European left intellectuals 
widely translated into English, including Negri‘s friend, Georgio Agamben. This 
divergence is nowhere more obvious than in Empire where Hardt and Negri distinguish 
between what they call homo homo in a reference to early humanist, republican and 
the materialist strains of modernity and what Agamben calls homo sacer. For Hardt 
and Negri this triangulates broadly in the joining of Machiavelli-Spinoza-Marx (a 
triangulation into which Nietzsche, Bergson and others may be added in a variety of 
less intensive and more minor ways, largely by way of Deleuze). The result, a 
Dionysian creativity and strength, but most of all a capacity for production or 
constitution: a ―humanity squared, enriched by the collective intelligence and love of 
the community‖.43 This basic formulation of homo homo is perhaps the most central to 
Hardt and Negri‘s collaboration from the beginning and is nowhere more obvious than 
their choice of title for their first collaboration prior to Empire, Labour of Dionysus 
(1994).44  
By the time Empire is published a half a decade after Agamben‘s Homo Sacer 
(1995),45 Hardt and Negri would begin to describe their own thought as a species of 
―antihumanist (or posthuman) humanism‖.46 In so doing, they simultaneously signal 
that they are interested, like Agamben, who also experiments with a Foucault‘s 
scattered and under-developed theorization of biopolitics and biopower, to theorize the 
present.  However, the form of subjectivity which Agamben arrives at, particularly in the 
concept of homo sacer,47 is refused by Hardt and Negri outright who treat it as an 
overly Heideggerian response to the dissolution of the margin in postmodernity.48  
As emphasized in the preceding chapter (Chapter II), Negri prefers a Spinozian and 
Marxian ontology to any other. This puts him at odds with Agamben, whose reading of 
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Foucault in particular takes shape via variously Heideggerian and Schmittian lenses.49 
Again, to the extent that Negri and Agamben come into conflict it is where they meet on 
the terrain of Foucault. For Negri this occurs in the passage from the disciplinary to 
control power. The very passage in which the contemporary form of biopower and the 
exercise of biopolitical resistance to it becomes simultaneously possible: 
Foucault‘s work allows us to recognize the biopolitical nature of the 
new paradigm of power. [citation omitted]. Biopower is a form of 
power that regulates social life from its interior, following it, 
interpreting it, absorbing it, and rearticulating it....These two lines of 
Foucault‘s work dovetail with each other in the sense that only the 
society of control is able to adopt the biopolitical context as its 
exclusive terrain of reference. In the passage from the disciplinary 
society to the society of control, a new paradigm of power is 
realized...Disciplinarity fixed individuals within institutions but did 
not succeed in consuming them completely in the rhythm of 
productive practices and productive socialization; it did not reach 
the point of permeating entirely the consciousness and bodies of 
individuals...By contrast, when power becomes entirely biopolitical, 
the whole social body is comprised by power‘s machine and 
developed in its virtuality...Power is thus expressed as a control 
that extends throughout the depths of the consciousnesses and 
bodies of the population—and at the same time across the entirety 
of social relations.50  
For Agamben however, the notion of biopolitics points to an earlier and more basic 
capacity of sovereign power to inscribe itself in the life of the body, social as much as 
biological, individual as much as collective: 
[T]he inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the 
original – if concealed – nucleus of sovereign power. It can even be 
said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity 
of sovereign power. In this sense, biopolitics is at least as old as 
the sovereign exception. ...In Foucault‘s statement according to 
which man was, for Aristotle, a ‗living animal with the additional 
capacity for political existence,‘ it is therefore precisely the meaning 
of this ‗additional capacity‘ that must be understood as 
problematic.51  
                                               
49 In January of 2011 I instigated a series of email exchanges and a Skype conversation with 
Michael Hardt. I had at that point largely completed my research and wanted to informally 
clarify a few questions about my reading of his work, both alone and with Negri. I found the 
exchange edifying and it helped to clarify some points. For purposes of presenting theoretical 
propositions or conceptual apparatuses in this thesis however, I have relied, exclusively on his 
published texts. During my exchange with Hardt, my sense that Agamben's project, or any 
other which attaches a Schmittian and/or Heideggerian apparatus to Foucault's reading of 
biopolitics, stands at some distance from the project pursued by the multitude in the 
constitution of the common was however confirmed. 
50 n 1 above 23-25.  
51 n 45 above at 3. 
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In some sense Agamben is not far from Hardt and Negri here, but in others he is. 
Perhaps close insofar as both perceive in Foucault the key insight that ―the production 
of a biopolitical body‖ is ―the original activity of sovereign power.‖ Further apart, 
however, insofar as Hardt and Negri treat what Agamben calls bare life as an 
inadequately stripped down, even weak or negative form of (minimally collective) 
subjectivity. One which is not given a democratic horizon in the concept of homo sacer, 
only mystified. The fundamental difference between Hardt and Negri and Agamben in 
reading the Foucaultian concept of biopolitics in particular, is that Agamben does not  
examine the robust revolutionary capacity, the materially constitutive and productive 
quality of the biopolitical body and its potential to resist, even to (re)constitute and to 
(re)produce or square itself. This is a significant, complex and potentially serious 
difference between the reading biopolitics and biopower presented in Homo Sacer and 
the one presented in Empire and it is one which requires further study and 
consideration.  
Although interested in a similar set of questions having to do with the intercession of 
life and politics, Hardt and Negri‘s treatment of Foucault‘s legacy is to make it coexist 
with an autonomist reading of Marx,52 while for Agamben he is retrieved alternatively in 
a Schmittian53 or Heideggerian register.54 These two approaches do not sit well 
alongside each other. 
                                               
52
 Most explicitly see n 5 above at 31: “Foucault adopts many disguises – larvatus prodeo – in his 
relationship with Marxism, but that relationship is nonetheless extremely profound.”  
53
 n 45 at 11: “Carl Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty (‘Sovereign is he who decides on the state of 
exception’) became a commonplace even before there was any understanding that what was at issue in 
it was nothing less than the limit concept of the doctrine of law and the State, in which sovereignty 
borders (since every limit concept is always the limit between two concepts) on the sphere of life and 
become indistinguishable from it.”; 25: “The sovereign decides not the elicit and illicit but the originary 
inclusion of the living in the sphere of law or, in the words of Schmitt, ‘the normal structuring of life 
relations,’ which the law needs.”; 36: “Exteriority – the law of nature and principle of the preservation 
of one’s own life – is truly the innermost center of the political system, and the political system lives off 
it in the same way that the rule, according to Schmitt, lives off the exception.” See also 43-44 in the 
same in which Agamben explicitly highlights a major convergence with, and equally major divergence 
from Negri’s Insurgencies (it will be recalled that Homo Sacer was published between it and Empire). For 
both, constituent power “conceived in all is radicality, ceases to be a strictly political concept and 
necessarily presents itself as a category of ontology”. Both he and Negri, Agamben emphasizes, seek to 
develop an “ontology of potentiality” (which Agamben describes as “beyond the steps that have been 
made in this direction by Spinoza, Schelling, Nietzsche, and Heidegger”). Negri’s complex relation to 
‘weak thought’ (a term widely adopted from Vattimo’s essay of the same name, ‘pensiero debole’) is 
however different than Agamben’s. Thus Agamben’s castigation of Negri’s study of constituent power in 
Insurgencies for its purported failure to “find any criterion in his wide analysis of the historical 
phenomenology of constituting power, by which to isolate constituting power from sovereign power”, a 
difficulty which leads Agamben back to Schmitt in a way which it does not in Negri.   
54
 Ibid. 1, 188: “Today bios *“a form or way of living proper to an individual or group”+ lies in zoē *“the 
simple fact of living common to all living beings (animal, men, or gods)”+ exactly as essence, in the 
Heideggerian definition of Dasein, lies (liegt) in existence”. Failure to grapple with this basic fact, 
Agamben warns, risks “unprecedented biopolitical catastrophe.”  
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Perhaps more precisely, Foucault is for Hardt and Negri given a Deleuzian reading and 
combined with Marx. This generally has a tendency to rankle even some of those who 
are otherwise most impressed with Empire. 55  This was clearly the case with Žižek, for 
whom Empire was, from the beginning, weakened by its ‗Deleuzian jargon‘.56 Relative 
to Agamben, a different type of thinker, the sticking point is not precisely the same.  
Hardt and Negri reject what they perceive to be Agamben‘s fetishization of the limit, the 
gauzy quality of the liminal points between life and death, inclusion and exclusion. 
Instead, they insist, mixture and boundary dissolution is itself a crucial engine of 
production and of constituent power (and therefore necessary to any understanding of 
the present and the modes of power, production and subjectivity to which it 
corresponds). For Hardt and Negri, the Agambenian approach, particularly the 
imagining of homo sacer, goes too far toward the edge of the abyss. It is from this 
perspective which Hardt and Negri are coming when they suggest that Agamben risks 
collapsing into the ultimately negative ontology and fundamentally reactionary thought, 
again referring, sometimes more explicitly than others, to the Schmittian and 
Heideggerian elements in Agamben‘s thought.57 Other late twentieth century thinkers 
like Derrida, however, fall equally, according to Hardt and Negri, into a similar trap. 58 
There is no doubt a weakness in Hardt and Negri‘s treatment of this matter insofar as 
Heidegger and Schmitt are conflated at a variety of points in the text without adequate 
explanation. As are a variety of other thinkers loosely designated on ‗the Heideggerian 
left‘, however, the gist of what Hardt and Negri are saying is clear (particularly insofar 
as it implies an insistence on an affirmative Spinozian rather than negative 
                                               
55
 Some Negri scholars, like Toscano, suggest that the intellectual marriage of Marx and Foucault is risky, 
particularly insofar as it is taken to support a “dichotomization between biopower and biopolitics”. A. 
Toscano, ‘Always Already Only Now: Negri and the Biopolitical’ in T.S. Murphy & A.K. Mustapha (eds), 
The Philosophy of Antonio Negri (Vol. II) (London: Pluto Press, 2007) 113. Others like Mandarini are 
more supportive of Negri’s broader project: “for all the theoretical and practical fractures in the 
development of his thinking, all attempts to separate a Marxist (or Marxist-Leninist) Negri from a 
postmodern or, more precisely, a post-structuralist one (his very own ‘epistemological break’) fail to 
grasp either his Marxism or his post-structuralism.”  M. Mandarini, ‘Antagonism, contradiction, time: 
Conflict and organization in Antonio Negri’ (2005) 53 Sociological Review 192-214.  Toscano’s suspicion 
is representative of a broader one among Foucault scholars. Hardt and Negri responded to this type of 
criticism in Commonwealth by examining some of the hitherto under-emphasized overlap between 
Marx and Foucault see eg n 5 above at 31.  
56
 n 9 above at 192. 
57
 n 1 above at 333; n 4 above at 364 fn 37; n 5 above at 57-58. 
58
 n 5 above at 114. Recall, Hardt and Negri distinguish their own ideas from what they identify as a 
‘weak’ form of postmodern thought arising in the eighties and the nineties n 53 above, first as a species 
of Derridian deconstruction and on then on the broader ‘Heideggerian left’ in the thought of key peers 
like Nancy and Agamben. The basic critique of the so called Heideggerian left and its variants, Hardt and 
Negri launch, is that it offers only the negation of the dialectic, which, however necessary, offers 
nothing by way of a programmatic for action or new forms of socially autonomous political intervention 
(a bottom up democracy instead of the old top down or autonomous ‘politics’).  
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Heideggerian ontology).59 Once again, the affirmative alternative they propose in its 
place: kairòs.  
 
F. kairòs and the constitution of temporal events 
Much as they refuse an Agambenian reading of the limit, Hardt and Negri do not adopt 
Badiou‘s theorization of events,60 one which they describe in Commonwealth, perhaps 
over simplistically, as a ‗retrospective‘ rather than prospective, or constituted, rather 
than constituent.61 To clarify, what Hardt and Negri propose as a prospectively 
constituent event rather than retrospectively (Badiouian) constituted one, we can look 
to the concept of kairòs. 62  
                                               
59
 Working back from Commonwealth n 5 at 124 , 181, in which Hardt and Negri pose to the basic 
distinction between Spinoza at the opening of the modern and Heidegger at its closure, it becomes 
possible to clarify the theoretical break between themselves and Agamben, but also those like Merleau-
Ponty, Derrida and Levinas, whom they describe as asking after “the state of being in common” rather 
than thee affirmative “process of making the constitution.”  This notion has as its backdrop a broader 
Spinozian theory of the constitution of Being by love. This effectively is what Hardt and Negri 
understand by ontological constitutionalism: “When we engage in the production of subjectivity that is 
love, we are not merely creating new objects or even new subjects in the world. Instead we are 
producing a new world, a new social life. Being, in other words, is not some immutable background 
against which life takes place but is rather a living relation in which we constantly have the power to 
intervene. Love is an ontological event in that it marks a rupture with what exists and the creation of the 
new. Being is constituted by love.” Over and over again, Hardt and Negri describe the form of 
ontological constitutionalism which they prefer as one which is antithetical to Heidegger’s and 
coincident with Spinoza’s: “This ontologically constitutive capacity has been a battlefield for numerous 
conflicts among philosophers…Spinoza stands at the opposite end from Heidegger….” See also A. Negri, 
The Porcelain Workshop (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008) 86: “Spinoza counters Heidegger, on this 
great theatre of being and presence. The Spinozan potential (puissance) is opposed to the Heideggerian 
Dasein...”; 173: “Heidegger was probably right in telling us that we had to immerse ourselves 
wholeheartedly in the ontological materiality...Yet he was wrong to consider this delving [into real 
temporality’+ to be fated, without issue, and to make Being a weight on our shoulders (or a rock to hang 
from our necks, so as to better sink into the sea of Being)…He was wrong because this ontological 
delving into temporality, into despair and poverty, is immediately transfigured by love understood as an 
ontological power (puissance): it becomes fundamental for the production of political subjectivity as 
well as the production of riches…To become the multitude is to become democracy.” 
60
 Like the differences between Negri and Agamben, the differences between Negri and Badiou are 
often subtle and difficult. In both cases they are also largely determined by the question of biopolitics. 
A. Badiou, The Meaning of Sarkozy (London: Verso, 2008) (orig. pub. 2007) 13. Despite what he regards 
as the common ground between himself and Negri (namely a shared fidelity to ‘the communist 
hypothesis’), Badiou emphasizes an equally fundamental break between himself and “Deleuzian 
friends”, in an obvious reference to Hardt and Negri (and one in which he aligns himself with Žižek, who 
admonished Hardt and Negri for their ‘Deleuzian jargon’ n 9 above. In this case, the concern would 
seem to be that a Deleuzian reading has been permitted to ground an implausibly sharp, even definitive 
periodicization between the ascendant biopolitical ‘society of control’ and the modern ‘society of 
sovereignty’, something which is, Badiou implies is, at best, an oversimplification of Foucault’s legacy, or 
at worst, a misreading.   
61
 n 5 above at 60. 
62
 The notion of kairòs does not figure prominently in Commonwealth, which only gives it a passing, 
albeit precise and useful, definition as “the opportune moment that ruptures the monotony of 
chronological time”. n 5 above at 165. For a more expansive treatment see A. Negri, Kairòs, Alma Venus, 
Multitudo in M. Mandarini (ed), Time for Revolution (Continuum: London, 2003) in which Negri evokes 
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Kairòs is defined as the constitution of ‗biopolitical events‘. Biopolitical events are for 
Negri prospectively constituent or constitutive events insofar as they are brought about 
by the collective subjectivity of the multitude and its common intelligence (as much as 
its desire to assert its social autonomy, again, the basic autonomist impulse 
transplanted into the present). In what follows, I shall briefly explain how the concept of 
kairòs, as the launching of the time‘s arrow, begins to tie to the constitution of meaning, 
truth and event into the present moment, at the tip of the arrow.63 What is described 
here should not be mistaken for a reconstituted teleology or even a will to power. There 
is neither a Hegelian nor fully Nietzschean impulse which overwhelms Hardt and 
Negri‘s writing. 
In Commonwealth in particular, Hardt and Negri use the language kairòs 
interchangeably with the constitution of time and the production of ‗biopolitical events‘ 
which they describe as a form of coordinated and collective resistances to biopower. 
Perhaps elliptically, this leads us back again to the subjectivity of the multitude and its 
affirmative, constitutive capacity: ―[t]he biopolitical event that poses the production of 
life as act of resistance, innovation, and freedom leads us back to the figure of the 
multitude as political strategy.‖64 
In most regards Hardt and Negri‘s three volume collaboration is a mixture of 
plainspoken prose and compelling philosophical and literary writing, in some areas 
such as this it seems to trail off into the difficulty of posing the multitude as constituent 
power, Empire as constituted Power and the common as an alternative to ‗the People‘, 
‗the Constitution‘ and ‗the State‘. It certainly does not account for temporality on its 
own. In a three part series of essays, Kairòs, Alma Venus, Multitudo (2000) which 
emerged from Negri‘s more explicitly philosophical prison writing contemporaneous 
with his collaboration with Hardt in Empire,65 Negri more than makes up for the lack.  
In these three interlocking essays, translated into English by Matteo Madarini and 
published, alongside a much earlier short book, The Constitution of Time (1981), we 
can grasp the concept of kairòs better than anywhere else in Negri‘s thought. For our 
                                                                                                                                         
the concept of kairòs to link the tradition of materialism, particularly in the triangulation of Machiavelli, 
Spinoza and Marx, with an ontological approach as much as a materialist one. See also A. Negri, The 
Porcelain Workshop (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008 (orig. pub. 2006) 97 describing kairòs as “the 
instant of creation, the moment of potential (puissance) spreads on the edge of being, that is the 
capacity to invent....”; A. Melitopoulos & A. Negri, Antonio Negri: The Cell (a 3 part DVD of interviews 
from Negri’s period of exile in Paris in 1997, his incarceration in Rebibbia in 1998, and after his release in 
2003) see specifically the 2003 interview segment, ‘Subjectivity and Kairòs’.  
63
 Ibid.  
64
 n 5 above at 61. 
65
 All three essays were subsequently bundled and published as an edited translation Time for 
Revolution n 62 above.  
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own purposes, the concept of kairòs matters because it points, once again toward 
alternative formulations of both the recent and historical past as well as the present. By 
this, I mean the constitution of events which are collectively grasped as ‗truths‘. 
Certainly a similar idea to what Badiou has in mind, but nevertheless distinguishable in 
a variety of crucial ways which point to the novelty not only of Negri‘s thought, but also 
his English language collaboration with Hardt.  
Perhaps at the risk of over simplification or caricature, what Negri styles in the Greek 
word kairòs is the affirmative alternative to what he polemicizes as ‗weak thought‘, in 
what is obviously a reference in the most basic sense to Vattimo‘s Pensiero Debole,66 
(perhaps as much as it is a variety of other formulations with which Negri does not 
agree, and which he has begun increasingly to associate with a broadly ‗Heideggerian 
left‘67). Again, the concept of kairòs also brings (Hardt and) Negri into conversation with 
Badiou, the most celebrated thinker of the event in contemporary European critical 
theory. Certainly Hardt and Negri are at times indiscriminate, over generalized and 
even somewhat unclear in their critique of their contemporaries, particularly those of 
equal stature who are equally widely studied in the English language. Nevertheless, 
with the concept of kairòs some of it begins to come together.  
It his editor‘s introduction to Kairòs, Alma Venus, Multitudo, Mandarini describes kairòs 
as ―the event of knowing, of naming, or rather knowing as singularity, interweaving of 
logical innovation and ontological creation... and so making the name adequate to the 
event and constructing legitimation, not over or beyond, but within the common.‖68 In 
the idea of kairòs specifically, Negri presages the form of ontological constitutionalism 
on display in Commonwealth, all of which very much links to, and builds upon, his 
critique of Badiou as much as his fundamental belief that Heidegger is irredeemably 
reactionary.69 This is perhaps what he is driving at when calls kairòs ―an extremely 
singular force of production of temporality, the reverse of the very sad and naked 
Heideggerian figures of powerlessness‖.70  
                                               
66
 For Vattimo’s own intellectual history of the concept see G. Vattimo & P. Paterlini, Not being God: A 
Collaborative Autobiography (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009) Chapter 35 ‘Weak Thought’. 
See also, G. Vattimo, ‘Nihilism as Emancipation’ in L. Chiesa & A. Toscano (eds) The Italian Difference 
(Melbourne: re.press, 2009) 31-36. 
67
 See generally n 5 above at 114 and n 58-59 above. For an analysis of the contours of this complex and 
multi-faceted set of theoretical differences see M. Mandarini, ‘Beyond Nihilism: Notes Toward a Critique 
of Left-Heideggerianism in Italian Philosophy of the 1970s’ in The Italian Difference  above at 61-62. See 
also A. Zinini, ‘Weak Thought Between Being in Difference’ in P. Virno & M. Hardt (eds) Radical Thought 
in Italy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1996) 53-59; M. Hardt, Deleuze (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993) xvii, 10-13, 57-58. 
68
 Kairòs, Alma Venus, Multitudo n 62 above at 142. 
69
 n 59 above. 
70
 Kairòs, Alma Venus, Multitudo n 62 above at 142. 
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In place of this sad and naked Heidegerian ontology, Negri proposes a Spinozian 
alternative in which desire or cupiditas directs time‘s arrow toward the ends of the 
archer, which, in this case is the multitude, which acts according to its common 
intelligence and constituent desire. Elliptical perhaps, but not without reason - this is 
where Negri uses the phrase: ―time of ontological constitution‖.71 A concept which was 
very much foreshadowed in Insurgencies, particularly relative to the French Revolution, 
which it treated as a question of the constitution of time, or perhaps more precisely, the 
opening and closing of the aperture of time by the multitude (see generally Chapter II, 
s. G).72 
 
G. Conclusion 
But what is to be made of these schisms between Negri and other major critical left 
intellectuals of his generation? How does it speak to the initial question posed by 
Empire? Namely, what is this contemporary situation in which the arrangements in the 
formal Constitution, as the holdover of representation and modernity, seem 
increasingly divergent from the material constitution of reality even where they are 
interposed at the most expansive and generalizable level across the social terrain? The 
answer, it would seem, insofar as it is possible to formulate one, at least as a 
hypothesis, is that the material constitution of Empire has as its autonomous subject: 
the multitude. This is not to suggest the material constitution and the multitude are 
coterminous or synonymous. But, that the multitude carves itself out from the material 
constitution in a variety of immensely powerful ways. The multitude is, after all, nothing 
if it is not living labour, a form of productive strength which underpins life, being and 
sociality at once. And one, which cannot, even under conditions of real subsumption, 
ever be fully expropriated. It is, in other words, a return to the subjectivity 
corresponding to the concept of ‗the common‘ which was so completely obliterated in 
the passage from the feudal to the modern as much as the Indigenous to the 
European.  
What has been crucial for the purposes of this chapter has been that Hardt and Negri 
refuse the negativity or weakness of which they associate with a Heideggerian left 
ontology.73 And by extension, the idea that even among their friends and otherwise 
likeminded critical left colleagues, many of whom have earnestly taken up Heiddegger 
and Schmitt with the hope of retrieving something of value from their thought is that 
they cannot, for all their considerable intellectual work, formulate an affirmative 
                                               
71
 Ibid. 
72
 A. Negri, Insurgencies (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991) 2, 193-230. 
73
 n 58-59, 66-67 above. 
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alternative or any renewed constituent project. Let alone account for how such 
possibilities might be understood to arise from human life and sociality. The potential 
distinction between Negri and his close friend, Agamben in particular, is perhaps more 
illustrative than any other.74  
By the time Commonwealth, the third (and final?) volume of the trilogy is published, 
Hardt and Negri‘s position is clarified. It is clear that they regard the reception or 
renewed interest in Heidegger and Schmitt on the European critical left as, broadly 
speaking, a good sign, even a spark insofar as it presents a willingness to pursue 
subversive readings of complex but fundamentally reactionary sources. But only a 
spark and not a revolution insofar as it does not, in the sense of the Communist 
Manifesto, destroy the present state of affairs as precursor for their reinvention rather 
than merely their negation or inversion.75 More specifically, Hardt and Negri would 
seem to suggest, the revival of Schmitt is helpful in a descriptive sense insofar as his 
imagining of sovereign power foreshadowed what Foucault would later call biopower. 
Nevertheless, they also quite clearly suggest, it is ultimately inadequate insofar as it 
does not offer any theory of biopolitical resistance. Hardt and Negri are interested 
instead in the affirmative praxis of the present which is entirely forward looking and 
toward the future. Again: kairòs.   
In this chapter, before we could speak of the distinction between the theoretical 
apparatus of Hardt and Negri and those like Agamben whose project is more 
Heideggerian (than Spinozian) and whose reading of Foucault is more Schmittian (than 
Marxian), we had to consider Empire‘s earliest and most persuasive reviewers. Many 
of whom, like Žižek and Laclau, were quite right to suggest that Hardt and Negri, 
despite their intensely anti-dialectical polemics, themselves use the dialectic as an 
engine for their thought, at least insofar as what they style ‗productive antagonism‘ is 
akin, more than anything else, to an open-ended and non-deterministic variation on the 
(closed and deterministic) dialectic. The problem, I argued, with such critiques is that 
they tend to miss how Hardt and Negri do their own form of highly subversive semiotic 
tinkering,76 both within and against the dialectical form. Or better, as an immanent 
critique of it.  
                                               
74
 Ibid. 
75
 A question which is sufficiently important to inform Žižek’s pointed query in the special edition of 
Rethinking Marxism devoted to review of Empire n 9 above. 
76
 A turn of phrase I borrow form Lotringer’s description of the revolutionary strategies employed by the 
Italian autonomist movement and how sharply they differed from the terroristic strategies of the BR. S. 
Lotringer, ‘In the Shadow of the Red Brigades’ in n 37 above at v.   
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In Commonwealth, Hardt and Negri reinforce their project relative to that of others by 
defining it as a species of alter rather than post, hyper or anti-modern thought.77 In so 
doing, they are very careful, even more basically, to distinguish themselves from more 
crudely anti-dialectical stances taken a generation earlier. However, they are equally 
careful to distinguish themselves from the sort of hypermodern or reinvigorated 
modernity proposed by neo-Kantian thinkers as diverse as Habermas and Held, who 
attempt, again and again, to resurrect the promise of the humanist Enlightenment in 
the formal institutions of the bourgeois State and its Constitution.  It is in this way, 
which Hardt and Negri attempt, in Commonwealth, to explicate conceptually (a decade 
after Empire and no doubt having absorbed much of what was written about it) their 
thought as a species of alter, again rather than anti, hyper or postmodernism.   
What Hardt and Negri call altermodernism in Commonwealth channels the 
antagonisms of both the anti-globalization (or perhaps more specifically ‗alter-
globalization‘) movement78 and the struggle of Indigenous peoples to retain their 
traditional cultures and forms of being (or what Hardt and Negri terms ‗Indigenous‘ or 
‗Amerindian ontology‘).79 What is proposed here is something quite different than the 
bluntly anti-colonial nationalism of the immediate decolonization period. It is also 
something which is at some distance from the form of ethnic or identitarian politics in 
which difference is represented, mediated or otherwise recognized in the formal 
Constitution. Instead, it coincides with modes of being characteristic of subaltern 
peoples everywhere. This is where the collective subjectivity of the multitude can be 
said to arise spontaneously, from life, and yet also have a capacity to organize and 
exercise its collective intellect and to assert its social rather than strictly ‗political‘ 
autonomy.   
This way of thinking leads in a very different direction than the one familiar to students 
of contemporary Canadian constitutional historiography. In the second half of this 
thesis I am to concretize this (Part II: Chapter IV-VI). First, insofar as I examine the 
strange relationship between the so called ‗Rule of Law‘ and ‗the autonomy of the 
political‘ in Empire (Chapter IV). Second, insofar as I consider the difficulty, or better  
                                               
77
 Commonwealth n 5 above at 113. Hardt and Negri locate their thought in the vein of an emerging 
‘altermodernity’ introduced for two purposes as: (i) a way of breaking the modern/antimodern dialectic; 
and, (ii) an alternative to the two dominant late twentieth century modernisms of the (more or less) 
critical left, ‘hypermodernism’ and ‘postmodernism’.  
78
 Ibid.102. 
79
 Ibid. 123-125. On Indigenous ontology generally see Chapter VI. 
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impossibility, of containing, representing, recognizing or mediating the subjectivity of 
the multitude in any discourse of reformism (Chapter V); and, third, as I consider the 
possible outlines of an Indigenous ontology of the common within and against the 
emerging constitutional subfield of ‗Aboriginal Law‘ (Chapter VI).  
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PART II 
Chapter IV - The APEC Affair and the Constitution of Empire 
 
 
Today a notion of politics as an independent sphere of the 
determination of consensus and a sphere of mediation among 
conflicting social forces has very little room to exist...Politics does not 
disappear; what disappears is any notion of the autonomy of the 
political...  
 
M. Hardt & A Negri, Empire (2001)
1
 
 
[T]he political is not an autonomous domain but one completely 
immersed in economic and legal structures. There is nothing 
extraordinary or exceptional about this form of power. Its claim to 
naturalness, in fact its silent and invisible daily functioning, makes it 
extremely difficult to recognize, analyze, and challenge. 
   
M. Hardt & A. Negri, Commonwealth (2009)
2
 
What united the various protesting groups [at the 1997 APEC Summit] 
was a belief that the economy cannot be separated from everything 
else...it is possible that the apolitical pretence of APEC was itself partly 
responsible for officials‘ disregard of civil rights. Immunization of world 
leaders from political dissent probably seemed less problematic for 
meetings seen as purely economic and not political.  
 
J. Bakan, ‘The Significance of the APEC Affair’ (2000)3 
I was in extreme pain – I was soaked head to toe in pepper spray; it 
was honestly one of the worst experiences of my life...My eyes were 
firmly shut, I couldn‘t see, my nose was just running and full of mucous 
and it just felt like my entire face and my ears were burning up.... 
 
Anti-APEC student militant (1997)
4
 
―Pepper? I put it on my plate.‖ 
 
J. Chrétien, Prime Minister of Canada (1997)
5
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5
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A. Introduction 
Empire presents a series of concepts which are likely to be unfamiliar to English 
speaking constitutionalists, some because they are drawn from the particularity of the 
Italian Marxist tradition and others because they contain an experimental and at times 
poetic extension of Deleuze and Guattarian (as much as Foucaultian) thought to the 
sphere of constitutional theory. In this chapter, I aim to further familiarize English 
speaking Canadian constitutionalists with some of the key turns in Empire and the 
literature surrounding it. I do so by way of a situated reading of the 1997 Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference in Vancouver. The focus is, in particular, on 
one event: The summit meeting of November 25, 1997 held at the University of British 
Columbia (UBC) Museum of Anthropology, a meeting of 18 heads of state and 
government relatively contemporaneous with the time of Hardt and Negri‘s completion 
of their draft of Empire.6 An event which is today remembered less as the historical 
occasion of APEC‘s expansion from 18 to 21 ‗member economies‘ (its most recent 
expansion to date in which it acceded to the membership of Peru, Vietnam and 
Russia7) than it is for being the site of an explosive student protest and clash with 
police. 8  Or, what I argue in this chapter is an early expression of antagonism between 
the multitude and Empire.  
B. Canada, APEC and Empire 
In the last chapter (Chapter III) I explained that Empire has as its symptom not only the 
blending of the political and the legal, the political and the economic modes of 
production, but of the emergence of a possible alternative conceptual landscape which 
takes none of the old vernacular for granted. In the chapter before (Chapter II), I 
suggested that Negri‘s autonomism is based, throughout his life, on an insistence on 
the autonomy of the social in the place of the autonomy of the political, at least insofar 
as sociality implies a quality of bottom up and common being whereas the political 
implies an form of organization which is necessarily a species of top down or 
centralized command. In this chapter I consider how these complex notions might be 
grasped in a portrait of the form of sovereignty corresponding to the concept of Empire 
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in Canada. Specifically on the occasion of the meeting of APEC heads of states and 
government at the UBC Museum of Anthropology on November 25, 1997. 
APEC as an organization, a form of inter, trans or supranational institution, takes great 
pains to insist explicitly on its website that it is definitively an economic and not a 
political club: ―The word 'economies' is used to describe APEC members because the 
APEC cooperative process is predominantly concerned with trade and economic 
issues, with members engaging with one another as economic entities.‖ 9 What is 
expansive, in other words, is capital, not purely, or even primarily, the variously 
imperialist or humanitarian aspirations of member states. 
On APEC‘s publicly available and freely downloadable membership application, 
applicants are introduced to the various conditions for joining. They are asked, rather 
perfunctorily, to commit to a litany of neoliberal policy reforms as prerequisites for 
application. Some involve the privatization of the state apparatus and the de-regulation 
of its markets.10 The preconditions for entry have all the familiar hallmarks of neoliberal 
(de)regulation. From banker and technocratic ‗peer review‘ of applicant progress in 
exchange for the ostensible benefit of new foreign direct investment to other forms of 
intrusion into the sovereignty of the State over the old levers of public Power.  All of this 
is largely in the name of free trade and capital flows.11 Whatever real imbalances there 
may be in the material constitutions of member states, those imbalances can be 
remedied, APEC suggests, by increased trade liberalization.  APEC tells applicants, or 
better ‗applicant economies‘, that an end to protectionist policies and the privatization 
of vast swaths of the publicly owned economy is the requisite exchange, the price of 
entry into this lex mercatoria of the Pacific Basin. Certainly this configuration is familiar 
to any constitutionalist or political scientist who has studied the nascent institutions of 
global capitalism. Anyone who grasps neoliberal capitalism at the most rudimentary 
level will know that ‗economic integration‘ is one of its key tropes. Although not 
specifically cited by Hardt and Negri, APEC is part of the global architecture of 
neoliberal capital and it is a component of the formal Constitution of Empire. 
Recall, Empire is anchored by wealthy ‗middle powers‘ like Canada. Canada is a 
country which enjoys a seat with the major powers in certain forums,12 while being 
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excluded from others13. Nevertheless it has one of the world‘s largest economies by 
any indication, an immense natural resources cache, a comparatively well regulated 
banking system and robust military spending output which keep it at the head table, 
albeit as a definitively junior partner in Empire.14  
Carrying forward a Negri-inspired analysis of the nature of the relation between formal 
and material C/constitution, I toggle throughout this chapter between the formal and 
material constitutions of Empire as grasped in clashes between police and student 
protestors at the APEC summit in 1997. In so doing, APEC is treated as emergent 
institution in the formal Constitution of Empire. Its expansion and generalization, which 
was again re-affirmed in Vancouver by the ascension of three new ‗emerging‘ or 
‗transitional‘ economies to the fold, was on display for all to see. But few will remember 
it today. Instead, what they are more likely to recall is the spontaneous outbreak of 
student militancy which greeted it and the police response it engendered. The 
suggestion is quite plainly that the APEC Affair is a crucial event, a template for similar 
one across Canada and the world with ever greater intensity in the coming decade.  
The question of locality: what does it mean to imagine a deterritorialized form of 
constitutionalism? 
Despite its decentered quality, Empire‘s generalized ubiquity, its real subsumption of 
the entire social terrain, its dispersion, makes instantiating it in a particular place both 
possible but necessarily partial. It is important to recall that there can be no 
conventional understanding of Empire as having a centralized authority or symbolic 
head. Certainly, we are able to examine the APEC Summit in this chapter as an 
instantiation or facet of Empire, but we are not suggesting that it is anything more than 
a symbol. The point is, of course, not to imply that one can properly mount a frontal or 
critical attack on Empire. But rather, to insist it remains possible to destabilize it from 
within, to situate an immanent critique of it from anywhere from within its immense 
reach. This is among Hardt and Negri‘s most crucial points in Empire.15 It is also 
important to recall that since Empire‘s characteristics are most obvious at the level of 
generality and often do not have any physical or territorial markers,16 they can indeed 
pervade a variety of institutions and apparatuses of governance without explicitly 
announcing themselves as such. This is why Hardt and Negri famously insist that 
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Empire is a decentered form of sovereign Power.17  What they mean is that it stands 
ready to respond to the multitude‘s attack anywhere across the globe without needing 
to be permenantized in any single structure, institutional apparatus or particular 
jurisdiction.  
At the APEC Summit in 1997, Empire‘s security apparatus or police Power passes 
through the bodies and brains of the multitude as Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP) pepper spray. It is a form of biopower. Pepper spray is a chemical dispersant 
used by RCMP to subdue and disable protesters and activists staging a variety of non-
violent direct actions at the UBC summit site (ranging from the erection of signage 
containing humanitarian platitudes to the occupation of ostensibly public spaces to the 
more provocative charging of a security fence). In what follows I will consider how 
political interference and police excess escalated in into a full blown crisis of the so-
called ‗Rule of Law‘ on November 25, 1997.   
We have already underlined APEC‘s self-described mission, its unification of markets 
unfettered by the political interference.  What we get, when we critique it, when we are 
being naughty or tangential, is pepper-sprayed and dispersed.  Arrested and detained. 
We can grasp the material constitution here in both how our bodies revolt against 
Empire as much as how they are subjectivized, conditioned and made docile by it. Any 
reader of Foucault will feel this in their bones. Although the outlines of the material 
constitution and of a theorization adequate to it do not come easy without careful study 
of Hardt and Negri, some of its outlines are also discernable in the leading critical legal 
commentary on APEC.  
APEC‟s rules of entry and the logic of Capital  
Before examining the critical legal literature responsive to APEC, we might remind 
ourselves of the guidelines for aspiring members of APEC:  ―an applicant economy 
should be pursuing externally oriented, market-driven economic policies‖.18 Note, the 
language of politics is totally removed and a purely economic register is preferred. 
Nevertheless, even here, a subterranean politics persist. The ‗member economies‘ are 
named as such for political reasons. Not only to avoid upsetting the delicate balance 
between the three Chinas: the Republic of China (Taiwan), Hong Kong (the then newly 
reabsorbed former British protectorate) and the Peoples Republic (‗Mainland China‘), 
but also to de-emphasize the question of democratic bona fides and human rights and 
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to mark them as outside the purview of APEC. APEC is not a democratic club, it is an 
economic club, we are insistently told. One whose members (or at least their 
representatives) negotiate the rules of global Capital in the interest of global Capital.   
APEC describes its own ‗mission‘ accordingly: ―Our primary goal is to support 
sustainable economic growth and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. We are united 
in our drive to build a dynamic and harmonious Asia-Pacific community by 
championing free and open trade and investment, promoting and accelerating regional 
economic integration, encouraging economic and technical cooperation, enhancing 
human security, and facilitating a favourable and sustainable business environment.‖19 
The 1997 APEC Affair forced Canada to answer to a moral and ultimately political 
challenge to Empire.  To consider, at least fleetingly, the ideological coordinates and 
real human life animating transnational neoliberal forms of global governance like 
APEC. It is no coincidence that APEC takes pains in all of its communications to 
emphasize that it is an association of private economies, not of public states. Canada‘s 
then Prime Minister, Jean Chrétien, would also find this fact convenient in his own 
rhetoric. The reasons again go well beyond diplomatic niceties.  There are deeper 
reasons for insisting on the neutrality and non-ideological quality of neoliberal 
capitalism.  And, when the cavalry arrived on campus, UBC militants saw through the 
whole facade.  
 
The APEC Affair: mise-en-scêne 
On November 25, 1997 when anti-APEC protesters penetrated the security perimeter 
surrounding the summit site and motorcade route, events began to unfold quickly. For 
those students living inside the perimeter of the security barriers in the Green College 
residence at UBC, including soon to be President of the BC Civil Liberties Union and 
then enterprising law student Craig Jones, this meant unfurling various banners and 
signs designed to catch the eyes of summit delegates on their way to draft the final 
communiqué at the University‘s famed Arthur Erickson Museum of Anthropology.  Most 
of these signs were quite formulaic and un-provocative.  
Jones‘ sign for instance was inoffensive and liberal in the extreme. It read simply: ‗Free 
Speech, Democracy and Human Rights‘. Nevertheless, his sign, along with a variety of 
other similarly aimed ones were removed by the RCMP. In the days before the summit 
campus opposition groups to APEC had been infiltrated, harassed and arrested by 
police. On the day of the final summit meeting at UBC there would be violent clashes 
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and mass arrests between police and protesters. All of this would eventually become a 
matter of national importance as evidence began to surface that the Prime Minister‘s 
Office (the PMO) had directed police to violate protesters Charter rights.20  
APEC is not only an organ of the pyramidal structure of (the formal Constitution of) 
Empire21 and student protest a species of (material) resistance to it. The APEC Affair is 
itself what Hardt and Negri call a ‗biopolitical event‘. In Commonwealth Hardt and Negri 
define a biopolitical event as an ―innovative disruption of la parole beyond la language‖ 
which ―translates to an intervention in the field of subjectivity‖. But most of all as a 
creative, productive and constitutive force: ―this irruption of the biopolitical event is the 
source of innovation and also the criterion of truth.‖ 22  
To unwind the contours of the APEC affair as a species of biopolitical event, I begin 
with the Canadian critical legal literature addressing it. Particularly UBC Law Professor 
Wesley Pue‘s edited anthology, Pepper in Our Eyes (2000),23 in which he quite rightly 
sets the tone for subsequent contributions, asking provocatively: ―What did police do in 
the autumn of 1997 to so stir the University of British Columbia‘s notoriously docile 
students?‖24 
Unfortunately, few of the contributions to the anthology answer this question. In fact, 
we never really get a satisfactory response because most of the contributions to the 
book operate exclusively in the language of the formal Constitution. Most emphasize 
‗the Rule of Law‘ as a constitutional principle or axiomatic whose meaning and 
importance, as reflected in the preamble of the Charter.25 Few of the contributors, 
including Pue himself, succeed in posing the APEC imbroglio as anything other than a 
species of technical dispute or moral crisis for the formal Constitution. However, from 
Pue‘s colleague, Joel Bakan, also a critical constitutionalist, there is something which 
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perhaps more closely resembles a Hardt and Negri-inspired approach to the APEC 
Affair.   
A „Charter-free zone‟? Reconsideration of „the Rule of Law‟ as much as the 
„autonomy of the Political‟ 
Bakan scratches below the surface of the various questions posed under the rubric of 
the ‗Rule of Law‘ and in so doing begins to peel back certain legal science 
presuppositions taken for granted by the other contributors to the anthology. He signals 
this move by asking, ―but what is the real [emphasis my own] significance of the APEC 
affair?‖ And answering: it rendered UBC ―a ‗Charter-free zone‘‖.26 No doubt, this plain 
answer was one which would eventually be borne out, in a variety of more subtle ways, 
in the 40,000 pages of testimony taken before the RCMP Public Complaints 
Commission culminating in the much anticipated report of Commission Chair, Judge 
Ted Hughes, ―the Hughes Report‖,27 a report which itself was religiously fixated on ‗the 
Rule of Law‘ (in this case, as grasped in the formal Constitution and its language 
treating the mediation of legal and political Power). However, by declaring, even before 
the commission had completed its inquiry, that the APEC Affair was ―about more, much 
more, than Charter violations‖, Bakan signals the importance of what Hardt and Negri 
call the material constitution. Primarily by grasping the hallmark convergences of 
economic, political and legal rationalities at play in the APEC Affair.  
Let us examine where this leads us. If APEC protesters express a desire which is, as 
Bakan tells us, only awkwardly inserted within the familiar idiom of liberal 
constitutionalism, its ―civil rights narrative‖ and ―free speech‖ semantics, the result is a 
need to invent alternatives. Bakan poses one such alternative insofar as he 
acknowledges the relevance of the protesters themselves, inclusive of their ―general 
concerns about world exploitation and oppression, and the growing power of 
transnational corporations‖. In other words, questions about the nature and quality of 
Empire. Bakan also quite rightly emphasizes the non-uniformity of student protesters. 
They are, as Bakan tells us, constituted of ―a large array of groups and individuals 
holding divergent, even contradictory, positions‖.28 In so doing, he takes note of their 
internal differentiation, their multiplicity in a way which is potentially congruent with 
Hardt and Negri‘s description of the multitude.29   
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APEC protesters were not a homogenous mass dialectically posed against APEC.  
They had no single uniform ideology which placed them in critical opposition to the 
summit. Student protests were not orchestrated exclusively by any single group, they 
had elements of spontaneity as much as elements of organization. In fact, student 
protesters, some more organized than others, gathered for the first time on the day of 
the summit. Many, including myself (I was a UBC undergraduate at the time), were 
freshly radicalized by witnessing what appeared to be a paramilitary takeover of (what 
we had perhaps naively regarded as) ‗our university‘.  Anecdotally, we were incensed 
by the hypocrisy of a Federal (Liberal) Government which insisted, in true mercantilist 
form, in concert with the other APEC member ‗economies‘, that the question of trade 
was necessarily separate from the question of politics.30  
Bakan grasps with alacrity what galvanized diverse protesters: the common refusal of 
―the neoliberal ideology that dominates today‘s public discourse‖,31 a refusal which was 
and remains to some extent sufficiently nascent, to be confusedly and loosely framed 
in a language of rights, justice and humanitarianism. But which is perhaps something 
altogether different, namely, a striving to invent a new conceptual and terminological 
landscape adequate to the novel and experimental forms of democratic praxis invented 
within and against Empire (or as an immanent critique of it). 
It is perhaps in this way that it may be possible to translate some of Bakan‘s insights 
into a more Hardt and Negrian idiom. Again, especially insofar as Empire insists that 
the old distinction between private and public Power has increasingly dropped out to 
become coordinated and interpenetrated.32 This is nowhere more obvious than in 
organizations like APEC which, as Bakan tells us, were explicitly founded to ―transcend 
politics‖ by turning ―neoliberal ideology into ‗truth‘‖ in which ―neoliberalism‘s all-too easy 
division between economics and politics‖ becomes farcical.33 Bakan arrives here at a 
very Hardt and Negrian point indeed. Particularly insofar as he suggests the autonomy 
of the political is now in the past. Or, that the political is now a function of the economic 
(or perhaps more precisely, that all forms of production, economic as much as political, 
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tend, in the neoliberal present, to overlap). This is perhaps the basic, even today banal, 
insight upon which most critical left thinkers can largely agree. It might in this sense 
therefore be only the most superficial or basic form of similarity between Bakan‘s 
reading of the APEC Affair and what would be a properly (Hardt and) Negri-inspired 
one.  
Bakan‟s hypotheses 
Bakan especially does not use the type of Deleuzian language upon which Hardt and 
Negri rely. Nor does he go beyond pure ideological critique into the realm of conceptual 
philosophy in the way that Hardt and Negri do. Bakan does not, in other words, invent 
a new conceptual or logico-semantic frame as a means of escaping the old dialectic 
between public and private, political and economic rationalities.  He does however 
show that he understands very clearly what is at stake in events like the APEC Affair. 
In answer to the most basic question, ―how could a university campus become a 
‗Charter-free zone‘ for a day?‖34 he offers ―two speculative hypothesis‖, both of which 
go some way to examining the force which animates the multitude in its struggle 
against Empire. 
The first hypothesis is as follows: 
[T]here may be a connection between the low value ascribed to civil 
rights by state officials and the neoliberal character of the APEC 
meeting. When the economy is understood as technical and apolitical, 
political protest is, by definition, irrelevant – akin to protesting the 
politics of gravity. When the public interest is defined [ironically in the 
same way as the private one] as the advancement of business 
interests, protesting business-friendly economic policy as undermining 
public interests is oxymoronic. Neoliberal logic compels the conclusion 
that protesters are ill-informed and irrational, driven by ideology add 
ignorance rather than by reasoned understanding of economic 
science...35 
And, the second hypothesis: 
[T]he crackdown of APEC protesters relates to broader aspects of 
neoliberalism. Political power is maintained either through 
legitimization or coercion, with most systems using some balance 
between the two. The last few years have been marked by what 
appears to be a greater readiness on the part of state agencies to 
quell dissent with coercion, and increasing intolerance of ‗unruly‘ 
citizens. The APEC crackdown joins the ranks of increasingly frequent 
and disturbing examples of state repression within Canada: municipal 
laws that ban panhandling, busking, and sign posting on public 
property; back-to-work legislation as the norm rather than the 
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exception in labour disputes; crackdowns on protests by poor and 
homeless people; and quasi-military actions against First Nations 
dissidents.36 
Let us consider these hypotheses alongside Empire and the complex relationship 
between the material and formal c/Constitution.  Bakan‘s first hypothesis relates to the 
insistence on the ―the neoliberal character of the APEC meeting‖ and the 
corresponding notion that participating governments, including Canada‘s, were 
participating in a ―technical and apolitical‖ form of peer to peer international cooperation 
driven by hard economic science rather than any deliberative social policy. This 
provides and interesting complement to Hardt and Negri‘s assertion in Empire: 
The multitude affirms its singularity by inverting the ideological illusion 
that all humans on the global surfaces of the world market are 
interchangeable. Standing the ideology of the market on its feet, the 
multitude promotes though its labour the biopolitical singularizations of 
groups, and sets of humanity, across each and every node of global 
interchange.37  
The multitude is for Hardt and Negri the only possible antidote to the ―technical and 
apolitical‖ character of Empire‘s formal Constitution and institutions like APEC which 
reside near its pinnacle. The multitude is more than anything a form of biopolitical 
resistance to Empire and the ideology of the market. Although Bakan certainly does not 
use the same idiom as Hardt and Negri to theorize the affirmative quality of the 
material constitution, as embodied by the subjectivity of the multitude which carves 
itself out of it, there is a grasp of the administrative and techno-bureaucratic guises of 
neoliberal ideology which it resists:  
A first principle that defines imperial administration is that in it the 
management of political ends tends to be separate from the 
management of bureaucratic means. The new paradigm is thus not 
only different from but opposed to the old public administration model 
of the modern state, which continually strove to coordinate its system 
of bureaucratic means with its political ends... it is created by 
conforming the structural logics that are alive in the construction of 
Empire, such as the police and military logics (or really repression of 
potential subversive forces in the context of imperial peace), the 
economic logics (the imposition of the market, which in turn is ruled by 
the monetary regime)...38 
For Hardt and Negri the idea of western rationality, as means/ends, instrumental 
relationship, must be de-naturalized along with the various false universalisms which it 
supports. Hardt and Negri recognize that the impersonal neutrality rhetorically insisted 
upon by modern western rationality is, not unlike Bakan suggests, something which 
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occludes its ideological coordinates or worse, denies them. What distinguishes Hardt 
and Negri substantially from Bakan is that they do not stop here. They develop a 
conceptual philosophy, a new grammar of constitution: an affirmative alternative.   
Police Control (bio)Power: Understanding the relationship between „police right‟ 
and „the Rule of Law‟ 
For Bakan, ―the crackdown on APEC protesters relates to broader aspects of 
neoliberalism‖ in which there ―appears to be a greater readiness on the part of state 
agencies to quell dissent with coercion, and increasing intolerance of ‗unruly‘ 
citizens‖.39 In this general sense we find a confluence with some of the arguments 
formulated by Hardt and Negri in Empire. Recall, Empire is a form of police (bio)Power. 
It is a new form of sovereignty whose imperative is to absorb and incorporate modern 
ideas of scientific rationality and ideological neutrality and set them to work for capital. 
This is the very same contemporary context in which Hardt and Negri describe in the 
transformation of modern juridical and political right into postmodern police right and 
law of the exception:   
In order to take control of and dominate such a completely fluid 
situation, it is necessary to grant the intervening authority (1) the 
capacity to define, every time in an exceptional way, the demands of 
intervention; and (2) the capacity to set in motion the forces and 
instruments that in various ways can be applied to the diversity and 
the plurality of the arrangement in crisis. Here, therefore, is born, in the 
name of the exceptionality of the intervention, a form of right that is 
really a right of police. The formation of new right is inscribed in the 
deployment of prevention, repression, and rhetorical force aimed at 
the reconstruction of social equilibrium: all this is proper to the activity 
of the police. We can thus recognize the initial and implicit source of 
imperial right in terms of police action and the capacity of the police to 
create and maintain order...40 
This takes us some way toward an appraisal of Bakan‘s treatment of APEC, 
particularly his second hypothesis which suggests that ―the crackdown on APEC 
protesters relates to those broader aspects of neoliberalism‖ in which there ―appears to 
be a greater readiness on the part of state agencies to quell dissent with coercion, and 
increasing intolerance of ‗unruly‘ citizens‖.41 Bakan is speaking to what Hardt and Negri 
call ‗a right of police‘ is today expanded across the global terrain. Indeed anyone who 
has ever considered the unusual semantics of ‗armed intervention‘ or ‗peacekeeping‘ 
will be immediately struck by the collapsing of police and military actions onto the 
domestic as much as the sub, trans, supra and international terrains. This notion can 
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perhaps best be explained by the recent reawakening, in International Law, of the old 
medieval doctrine of bellum justum, 42 of the ―so-called right of intervention‖ in which 
―the dominant subjects of the world order intervene in the territories of other subjects in 
the interest of preventing or resolving human rights abuses, guaranteeing accords, and 
imposing peace‖ are global instantiations of police right.  Here, ―the right of the police is 
legitimated by universal values‖.43 
Hardt and Negri link this notion of ‗police right‘ and the intra, supra, trans or 
international level with a tendency of the modern State to become absorbed within, and 
part of, the rationality of Empire. Here, the national police, the RCMP, comes 
increasingly to correspond to the more generalized military logic of Empire. Indeed, 
armed intervention by military and police around the globe in the name of human rights 
is central to Canada‘s foreign policy (Canada‘s immediate past and present 
deployments in Cyprus, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Afghanistan are only the 
most high profile examples). Across the surface of the globe however, we can also say 
that domestic police operations which suspend constitutional norms and invoke 
emergency powers are by no means rare.  In the Canadian context, the FLQ crisis is 
the most obvious historical example which is why we introduced it in the first chapter 
(Chapter I),44 however, the various forms of paramilitary action against First Nations 
people45 and the poor46 referred to by Bakan are part of the same continuum of ―police 
right‖.  
Each time riot police or special forces move against a politically activist or insurgent 
group, we have a manifestation of what Hardt and Negri call police right. This is not 
unlike what Bakan may be driving at when describes ―a greater readiness on the part 
of state agencies to quell dissent with coercion, and increasing intolerance of ‗unruly‘ 
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citizens‖.47  It is also perhaps a part of the answer to the question of how the UBC 
became a ―Charter free Zone‖ on the occasion of the 1997 APEC Summit.48  
 
The strange confluence of the material and formal c/Constitution in „Police right‟ 
The formal Constitution of Empire powerfully intervenes not only in the materiality of 
life. It subsumes the formal Constitution of the State: ―[T]he imperial process of 
constitution tends either directly or indirectly to penetrate and reconfigure the domestic 
law of the nation-states....‖49 This is a key point insofar as it points to how Empire can 
be localized or instantiated at the state level when ‗police right‘ comes to prevail. 
Pursuing this line of inquiry, which is slightly different than the usual one taken up in 
the context of globalization and constitutional law, one which tends to examines how 
new forms of trans or supranational organization, like the EU in Europe or NAFTA in 
North America, might be said to whittle away the sovereignty of underlying member 
states (depending on whether their constitutional order is rigid or semi-rigid, etc.), Hardt 
and Negri ask instead about the question of police right. Whether exercised on behalf 
of, or by the state, in conjunction with, or impossible to discernable from, a new form of 
supra/trans/international sovereignty: 
How can we call right (and specifically imperial right) a series of 
techniques that, founded on a state of permanent exception and the 
power of the police, reduces right and law to a question of pure 
effectiveness? In order to address these questions, we should first 
look more closely at the process of imperial constitution that we are 
witnessing today. We should emphasize from the start that its reality is 
demonstrated not only by the transformations of international law it 
brings about, but also by the changes it effects in the administrative 
law of individual societies and nation-states, or really in the 
administrative law of cosmopolitical society...50  
From here, it is not difficult to imagine how Canada and its Charter might come to be 
subsumed by, or incorporated wholly within Empire and its form of imperial or police 
right. It will also be recalled here, that the degree to which APEC, like virtually all of the 
nascent institutions of Empire, defines itself according to its coincidence with the 
generalized fact of the market, it is a part of the emerging formal Constitution of 
Empire.51  The extent to which this is the case however, is not entirely graspable by the 
type of (still largely ideological) critique which Bakan develops. To make the necessary 
leap we again require some form of conceptual invention. This point relates to the 
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broader notion that Empire is coincident with the termination of the autonomy of the 
political:   
The contemporary phase is in fact not adequately characterized by the 
victory of capitalist corporations over the state...We need to take a 
much more nuanced look at how the relationship between state and 
capital has changed. We need to recognize first of all the crisis of 
political relations in the national context. As the concept of national 
sovereignty is losing its effectiveness, so too is the so-called autonomy 
of the political. [citation omitted] Today a notion of politics as an 
independent sphere of the determination of consensus and as sphere 
of mediation among conflicting forces has very little room to 
exist....Government and politics come to be completely integrated into 
the system of transnational command....Politics does not disappear; 
what disappears is any notion of the autonomy of the political.52 
 
Again, this brings us closer to grasping how UBC became ‗a Charter free zone‘ during 
the APEC summit. Once, as in Empire, capital and the state come into ever closer 
orbits. Eventually, capital eventually over determines the state and it is impossible to 
think of any formulation of political power autonomous from it.53 The spill over effect is 
a total integration of the command rationalities of public and private Power and the 
exercise of police right as their guarantor. Here, what were previously graspable as 
fundamental questions of the Rule of Law are no longer resolvable as such because 
they are increasingly taken up with the contemporary epochal passage in which the law 
bound character of political Power gives way to a more generalized economic over 
determination of the social terrain (or at least a generalized blurring between private 
and public rationalities).54  The result is a situation in which the formal Constitution of 
Empire might be said to correspond as much with ‗a Charter-free zone‘ as it does with 
the human rights and civil liberties rhetoric of liberal thought and the formal Constitution 
which it comprehends. Again, this is true whether at the domestic, sub, supra, trans or 
international level. 55  
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The crumbling of the old and the emergence of the new  
By linking APEC, however obliquely, to other contemporary forms of insurrection 
playing out both globally and in Canada, or more specifically, to other instances of 
legally unmediated police interventions on the bodies of the multitude (from the pepper 
spraying, arrest and detention of student protesters to the far worse fate of Indigenous 
militants and other subaltern activists), Bakan signals a good appreciation for the 
complexity and non-uniformity of what Hardt and Negri describe as the multitude. A 
multitude which exists within and against Empire, itself a non-place in which the rule of 
law continues to exist as a rhetorical flourish while nevertheless becoming 
interchangeable with a coercive police right or simply police Power (in an increasingly 
normalized state of exception). 56  Once the rule of law becomes interchangeable with 
Police right, as it does in what Bakan describes as APEC‘s ‗Charter free zone‘, all the 
usual formulations fail. Here, the so called Rule of Law is effectively suspended and 
has ceased to imply any mediation between social forces. The inevitable result: direct 
confrontation between police Power and the multitude. 
Insofar as Bakan identifies a linkage between the response of police to protest at 
APEC and a more generalized ―crackdown‖ by Canadian courts on ―panhandling, 
busking, and sign posting on public property‖ as well as ―protests by poor and 
homeless people‖ and ―quasi-military actions against First Nations dissidents‖,57  he 
grasps the way in which the various localized struggles within and against Empire 
(again, immanent to it) may leap up from anywhere on the surface of the globe and 
touch each other at highest level of generality.58  Every deployment of police Power, 
whether it be at the supra, sub, trans or international level, today partakes of the same 
tendency to crackdown on subversives who rebuff what Bakan calls the ―neoliberal 
strategy.‖59  To make matters more complex however, their refusal is then recoded 
back into the language of the formal Constitution. So much so that it is possible, even 
in a country like Canada, to gloss over police violence and still insist on a view of the 
polity as one in which a diversity of viewpoints and subjectivities are permitted to 
coexist peacefully.  
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The question of „difference‟ 
I highlight Bakan‘s contribution to the critical legal literature treating the APEC Affair 
because it foregrounds the rhetorical slippage in the aspirational imagining of Canada 
as a multicultural ―pluralist state‖ (with a ―pluralist ideology‖ holding ―sway among elites 
(albeit often as lip-service)‖) and the reality of neoliberal economics in which pluralism 
is valued only as multiplier of markets rather than as a real ethico-political project.  
Hardt and Negri make a similar point: ―The imperial ‗solution‘ will be not be to negate or 
attenuate these [cultural, linguistic, religious, ethnic, racial, gender, sexual, etc.] 
differences, but rather to affirm them and arrange them in effective apparatus of 
command.‖60 Bakanunderstand that in a self-regarding liberal pluralist State like 
Canada, one which frames both its own ‗national identity‘ and its ‗international role‘ 
within a mixture of an idealist rhetoric (a reinvigorated, cosmopolitan social 
contractualism) and a worship of the market (and a naturalization of its logic) certain 
avenues of critique must be quashed.  
Recall, Negri, not only in Empire, but in earlier texts, made a similar point (see 
generally Chapter II). Negri‘s Insurgencies in particular sets out the bourgeois model of 
the social contract as unswervingly evolving from early modernity onward in the nexus 
of the private Power of property and the public Power of sovereignty,61 most 
rudimentarily in Hobbes and the social contractual exchange of freedom in the state of 
nature for security in the civil state.62  Later in Locke and Kant, as much as Rousseau 
before them, and Hegel after them, the same arrangement is refined and accompanied 
less or more with a species of natural rights flourish. All theories of social contract, 
despite their various cleavages however, together perfect the metaphysics of the old 
Hobbesian model (as does Rawls in our own epoch). Today, (Hardt and) Negri 
consistently argue, this old model has reached a point of crisis.  
Capital and sovereign Power are always entwined in the State. That they share a 
mutual enterprise of representing value, mediating conflict and ordering the productive 
power of the body and mind cannot be contested. One does not have to be an 
autonomist to see things this way.63 Economic and political production are today 
connected at an even higher level of intensity than they were when Marx launched his 
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path breaking critique of ‗political economy‘. In this sense, although there is no 
evidence that Bakan has read Hardt and Negri, he makes some of the same 
preliminary moves as them simply by letting this fact operate in the background. 
Particularly insofar as he grasps the bleeding together of economic and political 
rationalities, of private and public, in emerging institutions and forms of global rule like 
APEC. Something which is felt wherever there is a suspension of law, a state of 
emergency, or in Canada, a ‗Charter-free zone‘.  
Exception: the (new) norm 
This brings us some way from Empire to its successor, Multitude. In Multitude, Hardt 
and Negri explain how the apparent generalization of war power, emergency and 
Schmittian exception has become the new norm (marking the permanent exception as 
the reality of the new millennium).64 APEC was an early instantiation of the type of anti-
globalization protests which would explode across the world in subsequent decades 
(all staged in a carnivalesque but deadly serious ways, all variously interposed against 
the backdrop of large symbolic gatherings of Empire).65 Although there is no evidence 
that Bakan has read Empire, his article is published contemporaneously with it. In both 
cases, a similar set of important questions open.  
Resistance is not futile: Constituting the biopolitical event 
In the various forms of direct action staged by students against APEC, bodies 
coordinated and placed themselves against police truncheons and pepper spray 
canisters. Suddenly the deterritoriazed, decentered form of Empire whose presence 
protesters had perhaps sensed before had suddenly become intensely localized and 
powerfully represented in a single event. Bakan does a good job of setting this up.  Yet, 
what Bakan ultimately offers is more in the order of ideological critique than what Hardt 
and Negri have in mind. Hardt and Negri are better able to theorize forms of protest 
within and against globalization (in other words as an immanent critique and alternative 
to it). This is perhaps because they grasp how the formal Constitution, both of the State 
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and the emerging global order in Empire, remains simultaneously a product of and 
producer of, the material constitution which lies beneath it. This is why the politicization 
of the global multitude occurs at a radically local level and passes through bodies of 
real people as much as it is capable of suddenly leaping up to the level of the global.66 
In such instances the total immanence of the multitude‘s critique as well as the 
unmediated relations of force circulating between it and Empire are at least 
momentarily unleashed in extraordinary ways.  
Deterritorialization: APEC as machine of deterritorialization 
The militancy of protesters and the police violence which met it at the APEC summit in 
Vancouver was a disturbing spectacle for Canadians because it was disjunctive and 
out of keeping with the civilized imagining they had of their country. A country imagined 
(greatly assisted by the subjectivizing effects of the post-Charter epoch in English-
speaking Canada at least) as an idealized bastion of liberal pluralism and cosmopolitan 
idealism. Not as an oriental despotism:  
The lasting image of the summit, seared in Canada‘s collective 
memory, was that of a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation television 
cameraman being pepper-sprayed by irate-looking police officers. 
Newsworthy and dramatic, video footage of this incident has been 
broadcast repeatedly since...Such images jarred Canada‘s self-
understanding. Using a noxious chemical to attack non-violent 
protesters who appeared to be obeying police orders seemed un-
Canadian. The apparent ‗taking out‘ of a news camera looked more 
like something that police and soldiers in other, less civil, countries 
would do.67  
This is a very telling way of recapping the national mood in response to the APEC 
Affair represented on their television screens (it will be recalled that in 1997 neither 
mobile phones nor the internet had achieved the degree of ubiquity or sophistication 
that they enjoy today). It reminds us that one of the central theses in Hardt and Negri‘s 
Empire is a spatial one: there is no longer any distinction between the first and the third 
world, between the centre and the periphery. 68   As a result, the modern imagining of 
the political community no longer suffices.  
The animus of protesters and militants were directed not only at the reliable Asiatic 
bogeymen in attendance (including notorious enemies of democracy such as then 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin, Indonesian President (General) Suharto, and then 
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed, all of whom featured prominently in 
contemporaneous news media reports) but also at their own Head of Government and 
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the various Heads of State and Government of Canada‘s closest ‗western‘ or ‗liberal 
democratic‘ friends and allies (including then US President Bill Clinton and then 
Australian Prime Minister John Howard, recall, APEC‘s only real unique characteristic 
is that neither Europe nor Africa is territorially integrated into it). There is therefore no 
central or singular figure at which the rage of all protesters is uniformly directed; only a 
collective ―revolt against the imperial constitutionalization of the world order‖ which 
culminates in a ―machine that imposes procedures of continual contractulaization that 
lead to systematic equilibria – a machine that creates a continuous call for authority.‖69 
And of course, a machine is not a single person, territory or political leader but rather a 
modality of control.  
What is APEC if not such a machine? 70 For Hardt and Negri the formal Constitution of 
Empire is pithily defined as ―a heterogeneious set of associations (including more or 
less the same powers that exercise hegemony on the military and monetary levels).‖71  
These include groupings of the leading neoliberal economies to which Canada clearly 
belongs (indeed, Canada is a member of the elite G-7 and now G-8/G-20 as well as 
being among the founding members of APEC). Canada is, was, and remains in this 
way, very much a part of the formal Constitution of Empire. 72 But what of the material 
constitution of Empire, what of the multitude which resists it? 
Even the best critical commentators on the APEC Affair, like Bakan, have difficulty 
naming or meaningfully conceptualizing the productive antagonism (the creative 
dynamism, Dionysian spark, or constituent power) generated by protesters in their 
clash with police. Bakan does not fully grasp the breadth of the challenge to the formal 
constitution of Empire presented by the material strength, corporeality and potentiality 
of the multitude. Others also fail to grasp what Hardt and Negri describe in the negative 
as ―not representational but constituent activity.‖73 A close reading of the Interim Report 
of Commissioner Ted Hughes of the Commission for Public Complaints Against the 
RCMP arising out of the APEC Affair, ‗the Hughes Report‘,74 and Pue‘s critical 
comment on it, take us some way further, albeit not all the way, toward grasping this 
distinction.  
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C. The Hughes Report 
The Hughes Report is a creature of statute. Section 45.43(1) of the RCMP Act, permits 
the Commissioner of the RCMP, under the authority of the Solicitor General of Canada, 
to appoint commissions of inquiry to hear complaints of police misconduct and make 
―findings‖ and ―recommendations‖ with respect thereto. It therefore falls, like the 
immense regulatory apparatus surrounding APEC itself, within the broad definition of 
what Hardt and Negri describe as the formal Constitution, ―the written document [the 
Constitution] along with its various amendments and legal apparatuses‖.75 This is so, 
not because the Hughes Report itself is a species of positive or Constitutional Law 
(although it is clearly a source of interpretive authority), but because it is the product of 
a legal apparatus statutorily permitted to make findings and policy recommendations 
pertaining to, the interpretation and application of the formal text of the Constitution. In 
this case, section 2 of the Charter,  
Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: 
(a) freedom of conscience and religion; 
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press 
and other media communication; 
(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and 
(d) freedom of association.76 
The Hughes Report itself is an instantiation of what Hardt and Negri define as the 
formal Constitution insofar as it deals with questions relating to the Charter. Both in 
terms of interpretation of the sort demanded by section 2, but also insofar as it pertains 
to the rule of law more generally as a foundational principle or metaphysical centre 
embedded in the preamble to the Charter itself.77 Aporetically, ‗the Rule of Law‘ is such 
an important principle in Canadian Constitutional Law that it is simultaneously written 
and unwritten at the same time. Preambles always occupy such an ambiguous terrain 
between the natural and the positive law, but they are no less fictional than the 
boundary they attempt to stabilize.  
For the Supreme Court of Canada, ‗the Rule of Law‘ is an ―unwritten or implicit 
principle‖ which, along with ―democracy‖, ―the independence of the judiciary, the 
protection of civil liberties and federalism‖ and (perhaps somewhat redundantly) 
―constitutionalism‖ itself, is the essence of the constitutional culture and the normative 
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sciences to which it corresponds. We need look no further than the Court‘s unanimous 
decision in the 1998 Quebec Succession Reference for a reminder and clarification of 
this.78 Namely the rule of law as a basic, unwritten principle which has ―profoundly 
influenced the drafting of the [formal] text‖ (see generally Chapter V to follow),79 yet, 
what good is the rule of law is where it faces up to an unbridled expression of political 
autonomy? 
The Commission of Inquiry as species of Formal Constitution 
The RCMP Commission of Complaints is itself is a quasi-judicial body of statutory 
creation, which although it has no power to determine civil or criminal liability, is 
capable of making ―findings‖ and ―recommendations‖ of all sorts.80 The Commission 
therefore remains well within the definition of what Hardt and Negri describes as ―the 
formal constitution‖ (at least in the American template) as ―the written document along 
with its various amendments and legal apparatuses‖ [emphasis added].81  
In the particular case which concerns us here, the Commission takes as its object of 
inquiry ―events that took place during, or in connection with, demonstrations during the 
APEC Conference in Vancouver between November 23 and 27, 1997 on or near the 
UBC Campus and subsequently at the UBC and Richmond Detachments of the 
RCMP.‖  The Hughes Report tells us that the guts of the Commission‘s work was 
procedural and formal, it was compiled after 170 days of hearings,  examination of 153 
witnesses, scrutiny of 710 exhibits and review of over 40,000 pages of testimony. All of 
which is swallowed up into the Report itself.  
The Hughes Report groups the 52 individual complaints, many of them by student 
protesters, into ―17 separate events or situations.‖82 This method of presentation 
permits the Commissioner to make more generalized findings about what happened in 
connection with a variety of overlapping claims over a period of several days. While it is 
not possible to review all 17 findings or more thoroughly anatomize the Commission, its 
internal structures or functions (including the significant requirement that a Commission 
of Inquiry‘s findings be presented as an Interim Report with the Final Report to be 
issued, after review, by the government appointed Chair of the Complaints 
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Commission83), it  is nevertheless crucial going forward to present what Pue ably 
summarizes as ―a nutshell‖ of the allegations the Commission is called upon to 
investigate: 
(1) Allegations of improper or even criminal actions by individual police 
officers (wrongful arrests, unnecessary roughness, gratuitous use of 
pepper spray, police dogs, improper strip-searches, use of pepper 
spray as punishment, and so on); 
(2) Allegations that the police wrongfully attempted to buffer visiting 
dignitaries from the sight or sound of peaceful demonstrations, in so 
doing, violating fundamental rights of Canadian including the freedom 
of speech, freedom of association or assembly, freedom of movement, 
and so on [s. 2 Charter language]. 
(3) Allegations that the police did all or some of these things in direct 
response to wrongful orders from the Prime Minister‘s Office. (It was 
alleged in the hearings and in the media, the House of Commons, 
and elsewhere that these orders originated from Prime Minister 
Chrétien himself. Commissioner Hughes, however, had no 
jurisdiction to investigate the Prime Minister‘s conduct as such. 
Consequently, this intriguing, extremely important, question was 
never ‗before‘ the Commission [citation omitted] and has not been 
dealt with in any forum.)84 
Certainly it could be said that Pue is guilty of editorializing to some extent in his 
summary of the Commission‘s task. But the veracity of the underlying research cannot 
be ignored. Some very serious consideration ought also therefore be given to the 
lengthy parenthetical attached to the third provision. A parenthetical which points to 
Pue‘s well documented opinion that the events of November of 1997 entailed political 
interference with police Power at the highest level.85 As much as his view that the 
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Hughes Report was too timid, deferential and narrow in its findings, but nevertheless 
utterly damning to the Government and the Police if properly accented.86 Because I am 
largely in agreement with Pue‘s construction of events and views of the matter, I will 
not take time to quibble with them, but I acknowledge that such quibbling may be 
possible by those wishing to take up either the RCMP or the Government‘s defence, 
which I am not.87  
Regarding “allegations of improper or even criminal actions by individual police 
officers” 
Commissioner Hughes repeatedly emphasized that ―the CPC [RCMP Criminal 
Complaints Commission] is not in the business of finding fault, criminal responsibility, 
or liability as such‖. The result, Pue correctly notes, is that all allegations of police 
Charter violations are treated very gingerly. So much so, they are given a quasi-
criminal standard of proof and carefully defined so as to avoid findings against 
individual officers. In this sense, the Commission is able to absolve the police of any 
wrongdoing without acknowledging the substantial likelihood that alleged abuses 
occurred. This is the typical move of the Criminal Law and it is legitimate and proper 
within a fule of law frame.  Nevertheless it is oddly applied so as to overwhelmingly 
favour the police in this case. So much so, that Pue describes the wording of the 
Hughes Report as something which ―lay readers would likely think overly forgiving of 
the police officers concerned‖. Or more generally as failing to show that there were in 
fact, no ―vermin lurking in the shadows.‖88  
Regarding “allegations that the police wrongfully attempted to buffer visiting 
dignitaries from the sights or sound of peaceful demonstrations, in so doing, 
violating fundamental rights of Canadians” 
The Hughes Report did find that the RCMP‘s organization of the security for APEC was 
a massive debacle. Pue writes by way of summary that it is possible to conclude that 
―even straightforward, seemingly obvious, matters were not attended to‖ and most 
damningly, ―RCMP command left its officers open to improper pressure from the Prime 
Minister‘s Office and from the Chinese consulate.‖ Reminding critical readers of the 
degree to which the Hughes Report refrains from finding any sort of wrongdoing 
against particular RCMP officers, he notes that even where the Commissioner does 
find one of the student protester‘s allegations of abuse credible, he is by no means 
outraged. Implying that although unprovoked and unnecessary pepper-spraying is 
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neither justifiable, appropriate, nor legally sanctioned, it was nevertheless still a 
relatively ‗minor incident‘. To make his point that the Hughes Report is overly 
restrained, Pue cites the visceral, even corporeal, testimony of one student before the 
Commission. In so doing, he is able to distinguish between the formal neutrality of the 
Report and the materiality of actual police brutality: 
I was in extreme pain – I was soaked head to toe in pepper spray; it 
was honestly one of the worst experiences of my life...My eyes were 
firmly shut, I couldn‘t see, my nose was just running and full of mucous 
and it just felt like my entire face and my ears were burning up...the 
best analogy that I can come up with is, I‘d somehow gotten my face 
stuck on a hot burner, an element, and I couldn‘t peel it off. And during 
that time, I was hyperventilating, sobbing, screaming, kicking the door 
– basically just begging and pleading for somebody to help me, to 
make it stop.89  
This language is a sharp break from the usual language of Charter rights and civil 
liberties. In it, we have a very good snapshot of the circulation of police biopower. Not 
only its extreme violence, but also of its capacity to control at the same time as it 
produces a particular form of subjectivity, in this case one which strips life completely 
to its animal instincts and its bodily vulnerabilities (what Agamben calls bare or 
creaturely life).90  
Regarding “allegations that the police did all or some of these things in direct 
response to wrongful orders from the Prime Minister‟s Office”  
The Commission‘s capacity to make findings in this very delicate matter was formally 
circumscribed from the beginning by the immense limits on its jurisdiction and capacity 
to compel witnesses.  It must also be born in mind that the Commission was hobbled 
by allegations of political interference and bias at every stage of its inquiry.91 Pue 
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observes the efforts of Commissioner Hughes were doomed from the outset: the 
―Commission‘s ability to prove the facts was inhibited in a variety of ways.‖ So much 
so, ―that it became impossible to fully investigate the substance of any allegations of 
political interference.‖92  
Perhaps most shockingly for transparency watchdogs (and perhaps delightfully for 
conspiracy theorists), Pue does point to those sections of the Hughes Report in which 
it becomes fairly clear that there is at least a prima facie case that the PMO‘s Director 
of Operations, Jean Carle, directed police to arrest peaceful student protesters and 
tear down their signage.93 There is also evidence that Carle shredded key evidence 
requested by the Commission.94 Certainly the Hughes Report does much to suggest 
that although it is in possession of inadequate evidence to make findings of fact on 
these matters, it most certainly views the underlying allegations as having merit. Even 
despite the non-cooperation and production of evidence by the PMO, it is possible to 
make certain damning conclusions as to the existence of political interference in the 
police or law enforcement roles of the RCMP.  
Like all good critical legal realists, Pue is attentive to the gap between the material 
distribution of resources as much as the formal representation of equality in legal 
processes. He is therefore attentive to the problems of power: ―for all practical 
purposes, the combined RCMP-Government of Canada team enjoyed unlimited access 
to lawyers, background research and preparation...‖95 And yet, even despite this 
immense structural barrier, one added to the already extreme reticence of 
Commissioner Hughes to make sensitive findings of fact, Pue emphasizes ―[t]he APEC 
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report revealed that the RCMP had allowed itself to be subjected to political influence 
on at least two occasions.‖96 Firstly, in moving a security fence separating students and 
the summit site at the request of the PMO in a manner inconsistent with the rule of law 
and the separation of powers in a democratic society and the secondly in relation to 
complainant protesters‘ Charter rights.   
The irony of jurisdiction 
As is typical of formal legal processes, the RCMP Public Complaints Commission is 
hampered by jurisdictional restraints. In this case its jurisdiction is over the federal 
police, the RCMP exclusively. It has no jurisdiction over municipal police forces which 
cooperated in providing security at APEC, nor does it have any powers of compulsion 
exercisable over Parliament (inclusive of its typically Westminsterian fused legislative 
and executive branch, PMO included). It is therefore a commission which is on one 
hand tasked with investigating the matters which touch on the rule of law itself while at 
the same time being under immense constraints as to the scope of its investigation.  In 
this case, the Commission faced political pressure to avoid certain conclusions as well, 
particularly those which pointed indisputably to the total interpenetration of police and 
political power at the highest level of the State. On the basis of the foregoing, Pue 
suggests that it is a miracle that Commissioner Hughes was able to make any 
substantive findings at all.   
In particular, Pue emphasizes, Commissioner Hughes ably distils two facts which are 
very much worth emphasizing. First, the finding that the security fence separating 
student protesters from the summit site was moved forward, at the request of the PMO 
in a manner ―inconsistent with respect for the Charter because it limited the protesters‘ 
rights for reasons unrelated to security.‖97 A finding which Pue, tellingly summarizes as 
follows: ―[i]n short, the ‗security‘ perimeter had become a ‗political‘ perimeter.‖ Second, 
that the PMO ―was quite conclusively and unambiguously found ‗guilty‘ of persistently 
and aggressively seeking to improperly direct the police for colourable reasons.‖98 
Again, insofar as we are canvassing a (Hardt and) Negri-inspired reading, we can 
grasp here a very palpable sense in which political power collapses completely into the 
control power of the police. We can see here the outlines of an Empire-type analysis as 
Pue marks the breakdown of any coherent juridical doctrine of the rule of law in 
comfortable coexistence with the autonomy of the political.   
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Despite Commissioner Hughes‘ reticence to more expansively ‗connect the dots‘, Pue 
argues, the rule of law, as a formal proposition contained in the Charter and 
understood as axiomatic to the formal Constitution, was by no means safeguarded on 
the UBC campus on November 25, 1997. Drawing out the most damning conclusions 
of the Hughes Report, albeit still narrowly and cautiously, Pue notes the Commission‘s 
finding that police told witnesses that they had been ordered by the PMO to enforce a 
‗no signs and no people‘ order along the APEC motorcade route and at the UBC 
summit site. Nevertheless, because witnesses and complainant protesters were unable 
to identify whether this utterance had been made by RCMP or Vancouver Police 
personnel (over whom the Commission had no jurisdiction), the Commissions could 
draw no conclusions. 99  Having emphasized Commissioner Hughes‘ tepid and rather 
non-conclusive findings of ‗fact‘ as much as his more courageous ones, Pue returns 
again to highlight the structural problem. Namely, the ultimate impossibility of 
answering certain questions:  
...[T]he matter could not as a practical matter be pursued in order to 
find out who had uttered these words [‗no signs and no people‘], or 
whether such improper view of police officers‘ duties [as beholden to 
the demands of its political masters] was widely shared amongst the 
police. There was no way for this tribunal to find out how many police 
officers thought of their duties in this way or how they might have 
come to this conclusion. Thus, the fact that Ms. Pearlston‘s [a student 
protester complainant] signs were taken down and that she was 
threatened with arrest could only be treated as a case of a single ‗bad 
apple‘ or ‗stressed cop‘ making a dumb ‗mistake‘. Why the police 
officers invoked the Prime Minister‘s name, Commissioner Hughes 
could not say.100 
Because of, not in spite of, Commissioner Hughes ―extraordinary caution in all matters 
of fact finding‖, Pue relies very heavily on those instances in which the Hughes Report 
does make definitive findings of ―improper political interference with the police‖. 
Particularly insofar as it details ―stunning‖ insights into the involvement of Jean Carle, 
―[a]n extremely close personal friend of the[n] Prime Minister [Jean Chrétien]‖ and 
senior members of the PMO, with the actions of police against protesters, before and 
during the APEC summit.101  
Pue also cites the Hughes Report at some length for the finding that the arrest of 
peaceful protesters was carried out in the absence of any real security concerns102 and 
concluding, citing directly to the Hughes Report: ―‗I am satisfied that, in this instance, 
the federal government, acting through the Prime Minister‘s Office, improperly 
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interfered in an RCMP security operation.‘‖103 Pue also reminds readers of the fact that 
the Prime Minister was invited to testify before the Commission but refused (fully 
cognizant the Commission had no subpoena powers).104   
While it is clear from the plain language of the Hughes Report and from Pue‘s 
summary of it that the independence of police and political power became a farce at 
APEC. Beyond this, we are left to draw our own conclusions insofar as Pue leaves us 
with little by way of additional critical analysis. Yet what he does say in his conclusion 
is instructive for a variety of reasons: 
[Prime Minister] Chrétien has not wished to respond to the Hughes 
Report‘s central finding. The APEC affair moves now from the realm of 
law and in inquiry process into ‘politics’ [emphasis added]...The choice 
the Prime Minister faces is to either accept personal responsibility for a 
fundamental and unprecedented constitutional violation, or to try to 
distance himself from the matter by excoriating a key aide who is also 
a close personal friend. These choices must be equally unpalatable. 
The third choice is to ignore this issue hoping that it will go away.105  
These words were written almost a decade ago and it is now very clear that the third 
choice was taken. A few important addenda are however required to complete the 
story. First, let us consider the extent to which the APEC Affair might be a symptom of 
the blurring of lines, not only between police and political Power, but between the 
political and the legal forms more generally, a tendency which we have described as 
characteristic of Empire.106 Second, let us consider the weaknesses as well as the 
strengths of Pue‘s critical reading of the Hughes Report. Namely, that it may not make 
sense to view the APEC Affair, in the way that Pue seems to suggest, as largely a 
matter of personal responsibility, excess or wrongdoing by the Prime Minister and his 
minions in the PMO. Might such an approach, in other words, not be a simple 
dialectical inversion of the facile insistence that APEC is an economic and not a 
political organization? 
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A decade after the Hughes Report and over thirteen years since the events of 
November 25, 1997, we can only observe the following: Not only did then Prime 
Minister Chrétien continue to ignore the Report for the duration of his term in office, his 
successor, former Finance Minister Paul Martin (a neoliberal doyen and Davos 
favourite107) came and went to be succeeded by the Conservative Party‘s Stephen 
Harper, an economist (whose centre right minority government proved every bit as 
keen on neo-liberal principles as that of his centre left predecessors). None of them 
looked back at the Report and its findings. It should therefore come as no surprise that 
the very same spectacle which played out on the UBC campus in Vancouver has since 
repeated itself, globally from Seattle to Genoa, but elsewhere in Canada, from Quebec 
City to Toronto, at subsequent meetings of Empire‘s elites.108  Each time the same 
basic drama is played out between police and protesters, each time with a different 
Prime Minister and a different government. Prior to concluding this first case study, I 
consider how this might be theorized as a species of ‗biopolitical event‘ rather than 
simply as a species of political, legal or constitutional scandal.   
APEC as „biopolitical event‟ 
Recall, the Hughes Commission heard 52 complaints, each of which, in one way or 
another, grew from clashes between protesters and police.  Each of which can be said 
to involve some form of antagonism between the two forms of constitution which Hardt 
and Negri define, or better revisit, in the preface to Empire as the ―formal constitution‖, 
again inclusive of its ―the written document [the Constitution]‖ and ―its various 
amendments and legal apparatuses‖109 as much as the ―material constitution‖ as ―the 
continuous formation and reformation of the composition of social forces‖.110 I repeat 
this formulation again to point to its importance, centrality and usefulness. 
To grasp the form of this antagonism however we must move beyond the specificity of 
each of the 52 complaints toward the generality of a singular event which binds them 
together. One which goes well beyond the Commission‘s very constrained and 
temporally closed description of its own jurisdiction to examine ―the events that took 
place during, or in connection with, demonstrations during the APEC conference in 
Vancouver, B.C. between November 23 and 27, 1997 on or near the UBC Campus and 
subsequently at the UBC and Richmond Detachments of the RCMP‖.  
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Hardt and Negri‘s definition of the material constitution as ―the continuous formation 
and re-formation of the composition of social forces‖111  today coincides with the 
circulation of biopower and the mode of biopolitics to which it corresponds. In this vein, 
mass student protests and arrests at APEC might be said to mark what Hardt and 
Negri describe in Commonwealth as species ―biopolitical event‖.112 Something arising 
from a ―tightly woven fabric of events‖ which ―disrupts the normative system‖113 by 
proposing a ―materialist telos‖ leading ―back to the figure of the multitude as a political 
strategy‖.114  
If we examine the direct action of APEC protesters we can detect these very qualities: 
first, insofar as a direct action is understood only in terms of a ―phenomenology of 
bodies‖115, a species of material constitution driven by the ―continuous formation and 
re-formation of the composition of social forces‖;116  second, insofar as we grasp the 
normative system as profoundly overlapping with the formal Constitution.  In Canada, 
this means not only by reference to the enumerated clauses of the Charter but also the 
broader doctrine of the rule of law, or what we have styled ‗the Rule of Law‘ to 
accentuate at its highest order of generality.  This why, when I spoke of the formal 
Constitution as ―the written document along with its various amendments and legal 
apparatuses‖,117 I included the Commission and its Report (in this case, the Hughes 
Report) as part of it.  
My logic here is explicitly not to be confused with the old, less wrong than misleadingly 
oversimplified, legal realist assessment that law is politics by another name. What I am 
proposing instead, is a Negri-inspired theory of c/Constitution. One which is, less a 
renewed form of ideological critique than a species of immanent critique combined with 
conceptual experimentation, in which the two rationalities, legal and political, are 
shown to overlap so much as to become indistinct in events like those comprising the 
APEC Affair.  
By beginning to think about how the postmodern circulation of biopower through the 
bodies and minds of the multitude might open up new lines of sight and practices of 
liberation responsive to this reality, Hardt and Negri suggest, in a way which presents 
equal parts risk and opportunity, a novel perspective. In what remains of this chapter 
therefore, I attempt, in the context of the ongoing APEC case study, to flesh it out 
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further. This will involve the subtle and difficult move of explaining the conceptual 
relationship between biopower and biopolitics in Hardt and Negri‘s thought. One which 
is itself, fairly sharply distinguishable from other critical left thinkers similarly interested 
in the legacy of the rue d‘Ulm in a new century and millennia.  
The relation between biopower and biopolitics 
Empire is not exclusively a formal concept.118 For Hardt and Negri imperial rule has a 
―material functioning‖ which does much more than simply represent the benevolence 
and logic of the market, it is a form of biopower. Hardt and Negri grasp this, following 
not only their own ambitious reading of Foucault, but also Deleuze and Guatarri before 
them, to emphasize: ―Power is now exercised through machines that directly organize 
the brains (in communication systems, monitored activities, etc.) and bodies (in welfare 
systems, monitored activities, etc.)‖.119 This formulation of biopower is evident in the 
APEC Affair insofar as (bio)Power itself might be said to coincide with the logics of 
‗police right‘, not only in the brutality of pepper spraying and violent arrest, but more 
generally in the security or war footing which it reveals. Or perhaps most plainly, in the 
way the UBC campus itself, at least in the context of hosting the APEC Summit, 
became a ‗Charter free zone‘. 
Rather than taking this analysis of the norm and the exception in the direction of 
Agamben and others, including on the critical left, who return to Schmitt, Hardt and 
Negri emphasize instead the massification of students as bodies and minds against 
police as a form of biopolitical resistance. Or an exercise of constituent power in which 
the multitude collectively and spontaneously refuses or subverts a particular 
arrangement of (bio)Power. Here, student militants experience clashes with police as a 
species of war.120 In every lungful of pepper spray the form of sovereignty coterminous 
with Empire is circulated in the body. First in the body‘s defensive wheezing response 
to the inhalation of noxious gas and second in its counter-offensive in which it launches 
itself against police barricades and security perimeters. Some of this dynamic, I 
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believe, is uniquely graspable in how Hardt and Negri set up the distinction between 
biopower and biopolitics: 
Both of them [biopower and biopolitics] engage social life it its entirety, 
hence the common prefix bio – but they do so in very different ways. 
Biopower stands above society, transcendent, as a sovereignty 
authority and imposes its order. Biopolitical production, in contrast, is 
immanent to society and creates social relationship and forms through 
collaborative forms of labour.121  
If ―[b]iopower is a form of power that regulates social life from its interior, following it, 
interpreting it‖ and biopolitics is the form of struggle which plays out within and against 
the circulation of biopower,122 Empire is the new species of sovereignty to which 
biopower corresponds, one in which the disciplinary form of power adumbrated by 
Foucault, moves outside the walls of institutions to permeate the entire social terrain. 
Here, Negri‘s autonomist idea of the ‗factory society‘ intersects directly with his (as 
much as Hardt‘s) Deleuze-inspired Foucault (see Chapter III s. iii). This is not to say 
however, that the relationship between biopolitics and biopower is (any more than the 
one between the material and the formal c/Constitution, Empire and the multitude) an 
accidental or inadvertent return to the dialectic so loudly protested elsewhere (see 
Chapter III, s. D). Instead, Hardt and Negri‘s treatment of the relation between 
biopower and biopolitics it is a facet of a broader analysis of the rhizomatic quality of 
language as much as its sociality. A phenomenon which has no definitive or closed 
structure, only open ended and indeterminate roots and stems, all living and dynamic, 
all capable of producing and (re)producing meaning through life, democratically from 
below.  
The way in which Hardt and Negri develop the idiom of biopower and biopolitics in 
Empire is closely related to what they describe as a contemporary epochal transition 
from the modern disciplinary form of Power to the postmodern form of control Power. 
Without wishing to retrace the ground covered in the previous chapter (Chapter III), this 
line of inquiry necessarily reintroduces itself as a part of a broader, admittedly 
controversial reading of Foucault offered by Hardt and Negri:  
Disciplinary power rules in effect by structuring the parameters and 
limits of thought and practice, sanctioning and prescribing normal 
and/or deviant behaviours....We should understand the society of 
control, in contrast, as that society (which develops at the far edge of  
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modernity and opens toward the postmodern) in which the 
mechanisms of command become ever more ‗democratic‘, ever more 
immanent to the social field, distributed through the brains and bodies 
of citizens.123  
A decade later in Commonwealth,124 after having refined this idea in a variety of other 
texts,125 Hardt and Negri would become far more explicit in linking the language of 
biopolitics with the language and concept of the event.  In Commonwealth, they 
describe the biopolitical event in contradistinction to Alain Badiou‘s (perhaps more 
widely known) theorization, which entails a formulation of the event Hardt and Negri 
pointedly critique as a messianic, retrospective reconstruction rather than an active, 
prospective and affirmative one. This distinction is crucial for Hardt and Negri 
especially insofar as they are interested in constitutive praxis or the material 
constitution of reality rather than the old determinist science of the formal Constitution: 
...[R]ecognizing biopolitics as an event allows us both to understand 
life as a fabric woven by constitutive actions and to comprehend time 
in terms of strategy...Foucault‘s notion of the event is at this point 
easily distinguishable from the one proposed by Alain Badiou....In 
Badiou an event – such as Christ‘s crucifixion and resurrection, the 
French Revolution, or the Chinese Cultural Revolution, to cite his most 
frequent examples – acquires value and meaning primarily after it 
takes place. He thus concentrates on the intervention that 
retrospectively gives meaning to the event and the fidelity and generic 
procedures that continually refer to it. Foucault, in contrast 
emphasizes the production and productivity of the event, which 
requires a forward—rather than backward-looking gaze.126  
Without needing to take a position on Hardt and Negri‘s critique of Badiou, I emphasize 
this passage to explain what makes Hardt and Negri‘s formulation of the biopolitical 
event different relative to Badiou‘s more widely known theorization. Even more crucially 
however, this passage is interesting for what it implies beneath the surface. To explain, 
we must again turn in earnest to yet another crucial concept, one which Hardt and 
Negri have begun increasingly to designate as kairòs.   
Kairòs: the constituent event as temporal intervention 
In the prospective rather than retrospective constitution of events, Hardt and Negri hint 
at what they describe elsewhere as kairòs. Kairòs is the opposite of chronos or ―the 
linear accumulation of time‖. It is, in other words, not the realization of a particular telos 
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but instead the ―moment when the arrow [of time] is shot by the bowstring‖. Kairòs is 
constitutive of events materializing in time and space insofar as they arise from 
―accumulation of common and cooperative decisions‖ and present a ―moment of 
rupture or clinamen that can create a new world‖.  Or better, ―a new constitutive 
temporality‖ which inaugurates ―a new future‖.127 Insofar as kairòs, which means in 
ancient Greek, a ‗just or opportune moment‘ or ‗time of God‘128, points to the 
constitutive moment, it intersects precisely with what Hardt and Negri call the 
biopolitical event.129   
Ultimately, Hardt and Negri refuse any idea of the event which is coterminous with the 
closure of time and its historicization, its hardening into truth. One which they attempt 
to correct by emphasizing the absolute immanence of the event to being and history:  
The event is, so to speak, inside existence and the strategies that 
traverse it [emphasis my own]. What Badiou‘s approach to the event 
fails to grasp, in other words, is the link between freedom and power 
that Foucault emphasizes from within the event [emphasis my own]. A 
retrospective approach to the event in fact does not give us access to 
the rationality of insurrectional events and break from the dominant 
political subjectivities. Without the internal logic of making events, one 
can only affirm them from the outside as a matter of faith, repeating 
the paradox commonly attributed to Tertullian, credo quia absurdum, ‗I 
believe because it‘s absurd.‘[citing Being and Event]...The biopolitical 
event that poses the production of life as act of resistance, innovation, 
and freedom leads us back to the figure of the multitude as a political 
strategy.130  
The first point to remark upon is the immanent quality of the event, the way in which 
the event is grasped in Hardt and Negri as a temporal fold which refuses, rather than 
permits itself to be named. Hardt and Negri are less interested in the truth apparatus 
which corresponds to the event than they are in composing a strategy to bring about 
new events. This explains their insistence on a forward looking interpolation of the ―the 
multitude as a political strategy‖. Rather than treating the event as a form of relation to 
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a retrospectively constituted truth, no matter how dynamic, Hardt and Negri insist that 
events are prospective and affirmative. Or better, constitutive.   
For our own purposes what is most crucial in Hardt and Negri‘s critique of Badiou is 
their claim that he fails to grasp the prospectively constituted quality of truth (even its 
character as an act of material constitution) or its essence as ―a materialist telos.‖ For 
Hardt and Negri, biopolitics is coincident with the particularity of Deleuze‘s Foucault 
(admittedly, a controversial Foucault much less happily embraced by Badiou, Žižek 
and others131):  
Gilles Deleuze casts the biopolitical production of life, in a similarly 
partisan way, as ‗believing in the world‘ when he laments that we have 
lost the world or it has been taken from us. ‗If you believe in the world 
you precipitate events, however inconspicuous, that elude control, you 
engender new space-times, however small their surface or 
volume....Our ability to resist control, or our submission to it, has to be 
assessed at the level of our every move.‘ [citation omitted] Events of 
resistance have the power not only to escape control but also to create 
a new world.132 
The aspect of biopolitical resistance which tracks closest to the praxis of material 
constitution is the one entailed by what Hardt and Negri describe in Commonwealth as 
a ‗phenomenology of bodies‘, as a particular capacity to act in time, to constitute truths 
prospectively rather than retrospectively.  Again, this is the terrain onto which (Hardt 
and) Negri move in their description of the constitutive quality of time in the idea of 
kairòs and it is one which is not without a variety of precursors in (Hardt and) Negri‘s 
earlier texts.133  It means the production of new truths and new meanings as field of 
constitutive praxis.  
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To explain what they grasp by the biopolitics of the event, Hardt and Negri broadly 
distinguish their own readings of Foucault from those of their peers other than Badiou. 
Schematically, 
(1) Ewald and Esposito, Foucault‘s friends and translators, whom Hardt and Negri 
accuse of inadequately grasping the dual nature of biopolitics insofar as they 
analyze ―the terrain of biopolitics primarily from the standpoint of a normative 
management of populations‖ which although rich in ―philological fidelity‖ to 
Foucault‘s texts ―leaves us with a merely ‗liberal‘ image of Foucault and 
biopolitics insofar as it poses against this threatening, all-encompassing power 
over life not alternative power or effective resistance but only a vague sense of 
critique and moral indignation...‖ 
(2) Agamben, whom Hardt and Negri describe, alongside Derrida and Nancy, as 
accepting that ―biopolitics is an ambiguous and conflictive terrain‖ but 
nevertheless conceiving of ―resistance acting only at its most extreme limit, on 
the margins of a totalitarian form of power, on the brink of impossibility.‖ In other 
words, of adopting a Heidegerrian ontology which Hardt and Negri refuse: 
―These authors seek in Foucault a definition of biopolitics that strips it of every 
possibility of autonomous, creative action, but really they fall back on Heidegger 
in these points of the analysis to negate any constructive capacity of biopolitical 
resistance...‖ 
(3) Chomsky, Simondon, Stiegler and Sloterdijk, whom Hardt and Negri describe, 
despite not explicitly invoking the language of biopolitics, as grasping ―a certain 
autonomy conceded to biopolitical subjectivity, for example, in the invariable 
logical-linguistic structures proposed by Noam Chomsky or the ontological 
duration of preindividual or interindividual linguistic and productive relations in 
authors such as Gilbert Simondon, Bernard Stiegler, and Peter Sloterdijk.‖ 
Whom, Hardt and Negri argue, tend to turn back from at first penetrating 
insights into the old form of dialectical resistance. Here, a new outside is 
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imagined from which to launch a critique or from which to posit a newly 
naturalized baseline for truth.134  
Elements of each of these approaches to biopolitics, or something which at least 
namelessly approaches it, can be felt in the Canadian critical legal commentary on the 
APEC affair. In Bakan and Pue, whom I have presented as the leading examples, we 
find a different variation of the critical legal realist treatment of the matter. I might also 
have included Craig Jones, who both participated in and wrote about the events 
surrounding APEC,135 Trevor Farrow,136 Jackie Esmonde,137  or a variety of others.  
Many earnestly critiqued the deployment of police Power and political coercion at 
APEC. Some surpass the familiar language of civil disobedience and the rule of law to 
approach a solid ideological critique. Some do not. None adequately approach 
biopolitics or biopower in their analysis. 
Neither Bakan nor Pue, by far the shrewdest critical constitutionalists commenting on 
the APEC Affair, formulate their critique in the language of biopolitics or biopower. In 
this way they most resemble the critical modernists Hardt and Negri place under the 
third heading (3) (Chomsky, Simondon, Stiegler, Sloterdijk, et al). They also grasp 
without explicitly giving it a name, ―a certain autonomy conceded to biopolitical 
subjectivity‖ only to immediately mistake it for new form of dialectic. In each case their 
politics are a reaction against ―existing power structures‖ rather than the collective 
constitution of something new. The result is constraining insofar as it closes the 
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problem of protest ―within its invariable, naturalistic framework‖. Here, no possible 
horizon of freedom or democratic action is presented other than the general catchall of 
an imagined return to ‗the Rule of Law‘.   
Bakan and Pue‘s theorization of APEC however also contains elements of the first (1) 
and second (2) strains of proto-biopolitical theory outlined above. They resemble those 
like Ewald and Esposito, whom Hardt and Negri suggest fail to fully grasp the dynamic 
existing between two forms of power (power and Power) and whom they suggest 
collapse biopolitical resistance into a reaffirmed liberal politics, a species of reformism. 
At their best however, Bakan and Pue resemble those like Agamben, who grasp the 
real antagonism between the two forms of power but nevertheless imagine resistance 
at the outer limits of the possible. What they do not consider is the constitutive quality 
of the event, the way in which it opens up or sets in motion a series of subsequent 
protests and radical critiques of globalization over the next decade.  
In the ‗liberal‘ distillation of biopolitics which Hardt and Negri attribute to Ewald and 
Esposito‘s philologically accurate but nevertheless unambitious reading of Foucault, we 
feel as we do when we read Bakan and Pue. A rendering of police and political Power 
as a ―threatening, all-encompassing power over life‖, but one which does little to 
subvert the language of liberal constitutionalism; at their best however, Bakan and Pue 
share with Agamben (and perhaps in a similar way Derrida, Nancy and others) a sense 
of the liminal. The idea that biopower is so all encompassing that resistance is 
graspable at a vanishing margin. Still however, the problem remains: ―no alternative 
power or effective resistance‖ is on offer. Hardt and Negri do not fall into this trap.  
In Bakan and Pue there is more than ―a vague sense of critique and moral indignation‖, 
but it is not translated into a radical politics. It does not escape the old dialectics of 
legal and political power, in this case the legal use of coercion by the Police at the 
behest of the PMO. For Bakan therefore, the matter is graspable primarily in ―the issue 
of separation of power and especially the important line which is supposed to buffer 
police from political control.‖ Bakan goes as far as to say the Canadian polity became a 
‗police state‘ in the context of APEC at UBC: ―the defining feature of a police state is 
that the police are used to achieve political purposes.‖138 For Pue, the same point is 
made: ―[u]nlike civil servants, they [police] are not supposed to respond to ‗political  
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masters.‘ Their job, simply, is to enforce the law.‖ Or again, in very similar terms for 
Bakan, ―taking orders from politicians is a prescription for lawlessness, a harbinger of a 
‗police state.‘‖139  
Certainly Hardt and Negri would agree. They would however not view it as adequately 
radical to simply make this declaration. In certain ways, what Hardt and Negri say of 
Agamben (and to some extent Derrida and Nancy) also applies to Bakan and Pue. 
They conflate biopower with ―a totalitarian form of power‖, a negative limit rather than 
an affirmative opportunity to develop forms of biopolitical resistance. Bakan and Pue do 
not, of course, use the Foucaultian language of biopower or biopolitics. But, they do 
undoubtedly grasp in the forms of student protest at APEC, an interpolation of 
―alternative forms of life‖, even the possibility that biopolitical resistance might be a 
form of active or material constitution. Yet they fall short, in the same way as many 
others, including some of the most independent thinkers on the radical left, of 
proposing something genuinely new. But most of all of unwinding the morphology of a 
real constitutive process: 
[Foucault‘s] analysis of biopower are aimed not merely at an empirical 
description of how power works for and through subjects but also at 
the potential for the production of alternative subjectivities, thus 
designating a distinction between qualitatively different forms of power 
[‗power‘ and ‗Power‘ and in this thesis I argue correspondingly, 
‗constitution‘ and ‗Constitution‘]. This point is implicit in Foucault‘s 
claim that freedom and resistance are necessary preconditions for the 
exercise of power: ‗When one defines the exercise of power as a 
mode of action upon the action of others, when one characterizes 
these actions by the government of men by other men – in the 
broadest sense of the term – one includes an important element: 
freedom. Power is exercised only over free subjects...‘Biopolitics, in 
contrast to biopower, has the character of an event first of all in the 
sense that the ‗intransigence of freedom‘ disrupts the normative 
system. The biopolitical event comes from the outside insofar as it 
ruptures the continuity of history and the existing order, but it should 
be understood not only negatively, as rupture, but also as innovation, 
which emerges, so to speak, from the inside.140  
 
The question of language 
Hardt and Negri‘s rendering of biopolitical resistance as both revolutionary praxis and 
immanent critique of biopower is clear. Only biopolitical resistance is capable of 
producing or bringing about events. Events are not dialectic determinations, negations 
or systematic closure. They are ruptures in time and being opened up by the 
constitutive capacity of the multitude. For Hardt and Negri, this reading of Foucault is 
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opened up as soon as he engages in the question of language and meaning, of 
discourse. In this crucial way, the biopolitical event is, at least in part, a retooling of 
language, time and truth-- all of which run through the body: 
Foucualt grasps the creative character of the event in his earlier work 
on linguistics: la parole intervenes in and disrupts la langue as an 
event that also extends beyond it as a moment of linguistic 
intervention. [citation omitted] For the biopolitical context, though, we 
need to understand the event on not only the linguistic and 
epistemological but also the anthropological and ontological terrain, as 
an act of freedom. In this context the event marked by the innovative 
disruption of la parole beyond la langue translates into an intervention 
on the field of subjectivity, with its accumulation of norms and modes 
of life, by a force of subjectification, a new production of subjectivity. 
This irruption of the biopolitical event is the source of innovation also 
the criterion of truth. A materialist teleology, that is, a conception of 
history that emerges from below guided by the desires of those who 
make it and their search for freedom....141 
It is no coincidence that Hardt and Negri emphasize Foucault‘s intervention on the field 
of linguistics and his interest in the construction of meaning. Here, we can imagine the 
event as an intervention, a prospective act of constitution or kairòs in which meaning is 
produced.  APEC is one such event insofar as it ―intervenes in and disrupts‖ in the 
same way that la parole intervenes on la langue to bring about a truth. There is 
probably very little difference between Negri and any of his peers on the critical left on 
this. When Hart and Negri however write, ―we need to understand the event on not only 
the linguistic and epistemological but also the anthropological and ontological terrain, 
as an act of freedom‖, they distinguish themselves from those like Pue and Bakan who 
do not take this step. 
Hardt and Negri emphasize the innovative disruption of the event as analogous with 
the way in which ―la parole moves beyond la langue‖ and “translates into an 
intervention on the field of subjectivity, with its accumulation of norms and modes of 
life, by a force of subjectification, a new production of subjectivity.‖ What is imagined 
here, Hardt and Negri tell us, is nothing less than an ―irruption of the biopolitical event‖. 
Its status as ―the source of innovation also the criterion of truth‖ may sound 
exaggerated but it is not. Instead, we arrive finally at the point in which it makes sense 
to begin speaking of ―a materialist teleology, that is, a conception of history that 
emerges from below guided by the desires of those who make it and their search for 
freedom.‖142 
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To the extent that Hardt and Negri do not engage with Canadian critical constitutional 
scholarship and it does not, with a few exceptions engage with them, 143 it is perhaps 
speculative to bring Bakan and Pue‘s theorization of APEC into conversation with 
Hardt and Negri‘s broader theorization of Empire as I have attempted to do in this 
chapter. Nevertheless, Hardt and Negri repeatedly distinguish, particularly in 
Commonwealth, between what their reading of ‗biopolitics‘ and the one preferred 
colleagues on the broader critical left imply. They also point out the outlines of the 
biopolitical event in intellectual movements like American Pragmatism, which retain 
great, if sometimes invisible or too obvious to be mentioned, influence in the Anglo-
American critical legal science academies: 
The biopolitical event thus breaks with all forms of metaphysical 
substantialism and conceptualism. Being is made in the event. It is 
interesting to note the strong resonance of this notion of the biopolitical 
event with American Pragmatism. ‗If nature seems highly uniform to 
us,‘ writes Charles Peirce, ‗it is only because our powers are adapted 
to our desires.‘ …Pragmatists propose, in effect, a performative 
analysis of the biopolitical event and demonstrate that the movement 
of biopolitical powers functions equally in the opposite direction: our 
desires, in other words, are also adapted to nature.144  
The idea here is to consider how subjectivity as much as corporeality, the artificial and 
the natural, are conjunctive. Indeed how ―the virgin/whore dichotomy‖ critiqued by 
feminist theory and the similar gay/straight dichotomy critiqued by queer theory (in both 
cases passing through the body and constructed at the level of subjectivity) have 
porous borders across the social terrain. It is worth highlighting Hardt and Negri‘s 
insistence on the ―biopolitical event‖ as necessarily and in fact ―always a queer event, a 
subversive process of subjectivization that, shattering ruling identities and norms, 
reveals the link between power and freedom, and thereby inaugurates an alternative 
production of subjectivity.‖ 145 The notion is of a blurring or a mutation, not a simple 
negation, reversal or determination. It is not the outcome of the old dialectic but rather 
the outcome of productive difference itself. Events are, in other words, biopolitical and 
queer at the same time. In Commonwealth, Hardt and Negri would be prepared to 
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theorize this by schematizing Foucault in a very specific way. Primarily in the ―double‖ 
nature or construction of power in Foucault‘s thought in both Discipline and Punish 
(1975) and the first volume of The History of Sexuality (1976): 
In those books Foucault‘s notion of power is always double. He 
devotes most of his attention to disciplinary regimes, architectures of 
power, and the applications of power through distributed and capillary 
networks, a power that does not so much repress as produce subjects. 
Throughout these books, however, sometimes in what seems like 
asides or marginal notes, Foucault also constantly theorizes another to 
power (or even an other power), for which he seems unable to find 
and adequate name. Resistance is the term he most often uses, but it 
does not really capture what he has in mind, since resistance, as it is 
generally understood, is too dependent on and subordinate to the 
power it opposes. One might suggest to Foucault the Marxist notion of 
‗counterpower,‘ but that term implies a second power that is 
homologous to the one it opposes. In our view, the other to power that 
runs through these books is best defined as an alternative production 
of subjectivity, which not only resists power but also seeks autonomy 
from it...146 
In Hardt and Negri‘s reading of the doubleness of Foucaultian power, they grasp much 
of what they have already sensed in their more foundational reading of Spinoza and 
the distinction between the two forms of power (p/Power) which exist in modernity.147 It 
is the parenthetical ―(or even another power)‖ which is perhaps most telling in this 
passage. When, Hardt and Negri describe ―an other power‖ they are pointing to the 
strength which resists constituted Power, refuses its temporal as much as 
metaphysical closure.  
Before getting to the construction of biopower as the template for Power in the 
transition from the modern to the postmodern, or biopolitics as the template for a praxis 
of resistance in the same transition, Hardt and Negri locate Foucault in the 
antagonistic, rather than dialectic structure of power. In this way they inscribe 
themselves in the materialist tradition which stretches from Machiavelli to Spinoza to 
Marx. Readers of the earlier books in the trilogy as well as the authors‘ earlier writings 
alone and together will be familiar with the idea of ―the doubleness of power‖. It is also 
repeatedly emphasized in this thesis insofar as it formulates the basis for the 
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Negri’s writings we find a clear division between Power and power, both in theoretical and practical 
terms. In general, Power denotes the centralized, mediating, transcendental force of command, 
whereas power is the local, immediate, actual force of constitution.”  
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organizational distinction between the material and formal c/Constitutions as much as 
multitude and Empire:  
This understanding of the doubleness of power helps us approach 
Foucault‘s attempts to develop the concept of biopower...Here to 
Foucault‘s attention is focused primarily on the power over life – or 
really, the power to administer and produce life – that functions 
through the government of populations, managing their health, 
reproductive capacities, and so forth. But there is always a minor 
current that insists on life as resistance, an other power of life that 
strives toward an alternative existence. The perspective of resistance 
makes clear the difference between these two powers: the biopower 
[Power] against which we struggle is not comparable in its nature to 
the form of the power of life [power] by which we defend and seek our 
freedom. To mark this difference between the two ‗powers of life,‘ we 
adopt a terminological distinction, suggested by Focault‘s writing but 
not used consistently by him, between biopower and biopolitics, 
whereby the former could be defined (rather crudely) as the power 
over life and the latter as the power of life to resist and determine an 
alternative production of subjectivity.148  
So we have here in the clearest terms possible, the interpretation of Foucault by Hardt 
and Negri, albeit one which they detect only in ―in what seems like asides or marginal 
notes‖.149  What they propose, again not without significant controversy, is a nascent 
Foucault (a sort of Foucaultian Grundrisse or Political Treatise), a speculative 
alternative to the established reading. Their point is not to be overly ‗philological‘, but 
creative. In so doing they revisit the notions that: (1) the familiar modern mode of 
Power is mutating from the disciplinary capacity to administer or produce life to 
expanded or generalized postmodern control biopower (or better, ‗bioPower‘): and, (2) 
this new form of biopower does not comprehend frontal opposition or dialectics, only 
the affirmative constitutive capacity of power within and against it, the exercise or 
praxis of which it called ‗biopolitics‘ or ‗biopoliticla resistance‘.  Biopolitics is then the 
privileged site for the production of subjectivity, both within and against, the circulation 
of biopower. We have called kairòs that unique point in which such a subjectivity is 
created in the present. In this chapter we argued that APEC might be one such 
instance, a properly biopolitical event.  
 
D. Conclusion 
I began this chapter arguing that APEC is an excellent example of what Hardt and 
Negri grasp in Empire as the emergence of a new formal Constitution. In APEC, we 
have a group of self-described ‗Pacific Rim economies‘ from three continents bound by 
                                               
148
 n 2 above at 57.  
149
 Ibid. 56. 
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economic, trade and business interests (and quite explicitly, not political ones). Recall, 
the formal Constitution of Empire is, according to Negri, representable schematically as 
a loosely pyramidal structure, in which organizations like APEC appear near the top, 
frequently above individual States. In this chapter I have considered the occasion of 
the APEC summit in Vancouver, inclusive not only of its neo-liberal ideological 
coordinates, but its totalizing conflation of police and sovereign Power, law and politics, 
private and public, as illustrative of new theoretical and practical difficulties which 
constitutional theory must be capable of engaging with if it is to take seriously the basic 
breakthroughs associated with Hardt and Negri‘s Empire. 
The events surrounding the APEC summit in 1997 should not be permitted to sink into 
the gauzy past. In the thirteen years since the APEC imbroglio many of the questions it 
raised remain largely unanswered. This is true despite the national scandal it provoked 
and the extent to which it might be said to have been a harbinger of things to come. It 
is also true that despite high profile allegations of political interference, police 
misconduct and conflict of interest depicted in the Hughes Report, the findings now 
seem rather less shocking.  The events portended by the so called ‗APEC Affair‘ spoke 
to certain unsettled questions which have since re-emerged in a variety of ways. Both 
at subsequent meetings of neoliberal capital hosted by the Government of Canada like 
the 2001 Summit of the Americas in Quebec City as well as the various G-7, G-8 and 
G-20 summits hosted in other Canadian cities over the last decade. At each of which, 
protesters have mobilized with various forms of direct action and been met with mass 
arrests and violence. Nowhere more spectacularly than at the recent 2010 G-8/G-20 
Summit in Toronto.150  
The suggesting therefore is that we might look at the events surrounding APEC as an 
opening onto the current epoch and the particular form of constitutional dynamics 
which characterize it, in other words, as a glimpse at the contemporary morphology of 
Empire, both as a formal representation and a material reality.  
                                               
150
 Over ten thousand protesters converged on the G-20 security perimeter in Toronto in June 2010, 
hundreds were arrested detained and injured. Again, the issues of police power, excessive use of force 
and protester Charter violations arrived in the bourgeois media. In this case violence by the self-
described Black Bloc anarchist group against commercial and corporate targets as well as public and 
private property sufficiently irritated Toronto Police Chief Bill Blair sufficiently to describe all militants as 
terrorists. In what can only be described as the eternal return of the same, we see key elements of the 
APEC Affair revisited on an even grander stage 13 years later. 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/g8-g20/toronto/standoff-ends-in-downtown-
toronto/article1620135/singlepage/; 
http://www.globaltoronto.com/Independent+review+ordered+into+police+conduct+during+summit/32
41994/story.html. 
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No Canadian can forget the video footage of Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
(CBC) cameraman Robb Douglas who, at the centre of the most perfect Debordian 
spectacle, found himself and his camera indiscriminately pepper sprayed on the 
National (CBC‘s cross-country evening news broadcast).151 Again, all of this was quite 
alarming then, it is now commonplace.  
APEC was also a few short years before the ubiquitous camera phone immediately 
uploadable to youtube (which not so tangentially, has again redefined how it is we 
imagine the distinction or non-distinction between private and public life) had become a 
fixture. On the evening of November 25, 1997, Canadians learned that a security 
perimeter had been erected around the UBC summit site at the Museum of 
Anthropology. It was clear that the access road along Southwest Marine Drive for the 
delegates‘ motorcades had been cleared of student protesters (materially/corporeally 
of their bodies) and their signage (immaterially/intellectually of their politics). These two 
facts may have disturbed some and not others, depending on their ideological 
proclivities and their attitude toward so called ‗civil disobedience‘. What was clear for all 
to see however was that students were corralled and arrested. Canadians were also 
treated to the footage of their Prime Minister scoffing at questions on the matter. When 
asked his thoughts on the pepper spraying of students, he famously quipped (making 
one of his trademark verbal puns), ‗pepper, I put it on my plate‘.  
In the days and months which followed the APEC Affair, Canadians were kept 
appraised of investigations of rumoured political interference with the RCMP. As such 
they were constantly reminded of the law-bound nature of police Power.   
Again, although this type of police conflagration with protesters at summits of neoliberal 
capital are today commonplace, so much so that we are largely inured from them when 
we see them in the media, they were at the time quite new. The Prime Minister‘s early 
and highly dismissive comments on the matter ultimately captured the imagination of 
the Canadian media and its parliamentarians for several years. The best critical legal 
scholars like Bakan and Pue ask the right question. How can we explain how an 
‗apathetic‘ student body became so suddenly radicalized? What, in other words, had 
caused students to channel their energies into the anti-globalization struggle and its 
critique of neo-liberalism in such a militant fashion?  Unfortunately, this is never 
satisfactorily answered. Nor is the more precisely jurisprudential question of how UBC 
                                               
151
 Beginning with the iconic video CBC video footage of Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Staff 
Sergeant Hugh Stewart, later nicknamed “Sergeant Pepper” by protesters and media, indiscriminately 
spraying the crowd behind the security perimeter n 5 above. 
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became a ‗Charter free zone‘ on the occasion of the APEC Summit.152 It has not been 
my intention to present an answer to these questions although I have hopefully carved 
out some paths for future research of this type. 
                                               
152
 Here again the cross-section of essays published in the Pue edited anthology n 3 above both hits and 
misses the point a representative manner.  
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Chapter V - „Mega-Constitutional Politics‟  
If nothing else were wrong with legal politics I would still oppose it for its 
fundamental dishonesty. As dishonest politics, it is, in effect, doubly 
dishonest. It goes one better the ordinary expected dishonesty of 
conventional politics in the central pretence that is not politics at all, in 
other words, that power has nothing to do with it. In order to accomplish 
this, legal politics disguises itself as interpretation and then takes us 
through a maze so complicated that we lose track of what it was we 
were actually talking about in the first place. The next thing we know, 
we start talking as if politics did not exist, as if nobody was deciding 
anything at all, as if the personal impartial law was doing all the 
deciding. 
M. Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada 
(1994)
1
 
 
The Constitution is more than a written text. It embraces the entire 
global system of rules and principles which govern the exercise of 
constitutional authority. A superficial reading of selected provisions of 
the written constitutional enactment, without more, may be misleading. 
It is necessary to make a more profound investigation of the underlying 
principles animating the whole of the Constitution, including the 
principles of federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of 
law, and respect for minorities. Those principles must inform our overall 
appreciation of the constitutional rights and obligations that would come 
into play in the event that a clear majority of Quebecers votes on a clear 
question in favour of secession. 
Supreme Court of Canada, Succession Reference (1998)
2
 
 
Today liberalism tends not even to be able adequately to represent the 
elites. In the era of globalization it is becoming increasingly clear that 
the historical moment of liberalism has passed.  
M. Hardt & A. Negri, Multitude (2005)
3
 
 
If there is something which has been burnt out by this brief century, it is 
democratic representation. An infinite number of specific, historical, 
elements come together to define this crisis in its bare materiality. 
A. Negri, ‘Postmodern Global Governance and the Critical Legal Project’ 
(2005)
4
  
 
 
                                               
1
 M. Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: Thompson, 1994) 
xi.  
2
 Re Secession of Quebec *1998+ 2 SCR 217, 240 (“the Secession Reference”). 
3
 M. Hardt & A. Negri, Multitude (London: Penguin Press, 2005 273. 
4
 Ibid. 40. 
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A. Introduction 
The last chapter (Chapter IV) examined aspects of the formal and the material 
C/constitution of Empire in student protests which erupted at the Asia Pacific Economic 
Community (APEC) summit held at the University of British Columbia in November of 
1997. This chapter continues with a related, but slightly different line of inquiry. Part of 
its aim is to begin conceptualizing the multitude as a form of collective subjectivity 
which operates within and against Empire, and then to construct a Canadian case 
study capable of elucidating it. However, the formulation of the problem in this chapter 
differs from the one in the preceding chapter insofar as it does not highlight one 
singular event, but rather presents a series of related events linked together in what 
has already hardened, surprisingly quickly, into a distinct periodicization of Canada‘s 
contemporary constitutional history; one which is widely known to Canadians by the 
name of ‗mega-constitutional politics‘.5  
This chapter treats period of ‗mega-constitutional politics‘ as a narrative bookended by 
two high profile and widely commented upon exercises of the Supreme Court of 
Canada‘s distinctive reference power pursuant to s. 53 of the Supreme Court Act. A 
provision which gives the Supreme Court authority to render advisory opinions on 
questions referred to it by the Federal Government.  It is almost exclusively used in 
relation to questions of constitutional law: ―the Governor in Council may refer to the 
court for hearing and consideration important questions of law or fact… [and when 
such a reference is made]…it is the duty of the Court to hear and consider it and to 
answer each question so referred.‖6 In this chapter we examine two very high profile  
                                               
5
 This phraseology is employed by Canadian political scientists, jurists and media to refer to the period 
of federal-provincial negotiation and popular consultations between patriation and the defeat of the 
Charlottetown Accord (1982-1992) see P. H. Russel, ‘The End of Mega Constitutional Politics in Canada?’ 
in K. McRoberts and P. Monahan (eds), The Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum, and the Future of 
Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 211-221 (in the political science context); P. 
Oliver, ‘Canada, Quebec, and Constitutional Amendment’ (1999) 49 University of Toronto Law Journal 
519 (in the legal context). Ran Hirschl uses the similar term ‘mega-politics’ which he defines in a way 
which I find non-objectionable and equally applicable to ‘mega-constitutional politics’, albeit in a more 
general and not specifically Canadian sense, as “the transfer to the courts of contentious issues of an 
outright political nature and significance.” R. Hirschl, ‘The Judicialization of Politics’ in K.E. Whittington, 
R.D. Kelemen, G. A. Caldeira (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008) 120. See also 123 in the same describing the contemporary tendency of governments in 
multiple jurisdictions to rely increasingly “on courts and judges for dealing with what we might call 
‘mega-politics’: core political controversies that define (and often divide) whole polities.”  
6
 Supreme Court Act, RSC, 1985 c. S-26.  
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usages of the reference power in Canada‘s recent past: (1) In Re Resolution to Amend 
the Constitution (1981) (‗the Patriation Reference‘)7; and, (2) In Re Secession of 
Quebec (1998) (‗the Succession Reference‘).8  
The Supreme Court of Canada‘s jurisdiction to hear reference questions is a relatively 
sui generis one not common to other jurisdictions in which federal and provincial 
governments are permitted to refer relatively speculative questions to the Court. In this 
case, relative to the constitutionality of proposed legislation before it has been 
enacted.9 In the 1981 Patriation Reference the court was asked to rule on whether the 
Federal Government was permitted to proceed with a constitutional amendment 
unilaterally, and if not, what type and/or level of consultation and/or approval from the 
provincial legislatures was required to do so.10 In the 1998 Succession Reference, the 
court was asked to issue an opinion, once again prospectively, on Federal 
Government‘s legal obligations in the event of unilateral declaration of independence 
                                               
7
 (1981) 1SCR 753. The Trudeau government joined with several of the provinces asking the Supreme 
Court of Canada, in anticipation of patriation, whether, and if so, to what degree, provincial consent was 
required to relay a proposed constitutional amendment package to (the old imperial) British Parliament. 
The Court held that although there was no legal provision addressing the question as matter of political 
conventions a “substantial degree” of provincial consent was required. However, it explicitly added, 
political conventions were not enforceable legal obligations. The province of Quebec’s follow up 
question as to whether its consent was required to meet the “substantial degree” threshold did not find 
its way into the Supreme Court of Canada’s docket until after the British Parliament enacted the Canada 
Act rendering the question moot in the extreme. Undaunted, the Court answered the question anyways, 
holding that a substantial degree of consent had indeed been achieved, thereby preventing the strange 
spectre of an ‘unconstitutional constitution’. See Re Objection by Que. To Resolution to Amend the 
Constitution [1982] 2 SCR 793 (the Quebec Veto Reference); P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada 
(Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 4
th
 ed, 2006) 24. 
8
 The Succession Reference n 2 above.  
9
 See Supreme Court Act n 6 above. Many comparable common law jurisdictions refuse to permit their 
highest appellate course to issue advisory opinions. For a comparative overview of various jurisdiction 
and their treatment of the ‘political questions’ doctrine and the constitutionality of the reference power 
see Hirschl n 5 above at 124-125. 
10
 n 7 above. The Trudeau government joined with several of the provinces asking the Supreme Court of 
Canada, in anticipation of patriation, whether and to what degree provincial consent was required to 
relay a proposed constitutional amendment package to the imperial Parliament at Westminster. The 
court held that there was no strict constitutional law governing the matter, but “as a matter of 
convention” a “substantial degree” of provincial consent was required. Crucially, it also made the point 
that there was however no enforceable legal obligation (for convention is not a species of law) on the 
Federal Government to consult. The province of Quebec’s follow up question as to whether its consent 
was required to meet the “substantial degree” threshold did not find its way into the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s docket until after the imperial Parliament at Westminster had enacted the Canada Act making 
the question moot in the extreme. Nevertheless, in its usual fashion, the Court took up the question. 
Not surprisingly, it answered in that a substantial degree of consent had indeed been achieved without 
Quebec, thereby preventing the strange spectre of what would have been an, as Hogg so aptly puts it, 
an ‘unconstitutional constitution’. See the Quebec Veto Reference n 7 above and Hogg n 7 above at 24. 
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by a province. 11 In both cases, the central province in the drama is Quebec.  In what 
follows, the objective is to scratch the surface of this story a little.  
B. The irresolvable (?) dialectic between the French and English language 
in post-Charter Canada 
We might trace the organizational dialectic between French and English Canada, or 
Quebec and ‗the rest of Canada‘, to the competition between France and Britain for 
hegemony in North America in the seventeenth an eighteenth century, to the 
subjugation of the French language and the Catholic religion in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, or to any number of sociological or historical sources. As will 
be seen the next chapter (Chapter VI), this old ‗two Nations‘ theory of Canada is in 
itself entirely imperialist and exclusionary insofar as it presents in its duopoly the 
essence of the European expulsion of Indigeneity from history.  
The dialectic, between nationalist French and federalist English Canada, or Quebec 
and the rest of Canada, is not adequate. How, for example, does one explain in the old 
language of ideology, that the most hard line federalist Prime Ministers in recent 
history, Trudeau and Chrétien were French-speaking Quebeckers?   
In the narrative construction of events taken to comprise the period of mega-
constitutional politics, the distinction between the federalist and the nationalist 
formulations is at play in the formal sense, but they do not track class or ethnic lines. 
So much so that in the recent Canadian election, the social democratic New 
Democratic Party (NDP) made first time historical inroads in Quebec to eviscerate both 
the Liberal (federalist) and Bloque Quebecois (nationalist) alternatives.12 This is 
perhaps not to say the old dialectic is defeated, but rather that it is not possible to 
readily predict it as a form of normative science.  
To make sense of all of this, it will first be necessary to peek through Canada‘s recent, 
or post-Charter, constitutional history, a history which quite self-consciously and even 
                                               
11
 The Succession Reference n 2 above at 240.  The court held no unilateral declaration of independence 
by a province (hypothetically Quebec or any other) would be legal under Canadian Constitutional Law or 
International Law. Nevertheless it also held that a mandate for good faith negotiations between a 
provincial and the federal government could be earned on the basis of a ‘clear majority’ in favour of a 
‘clear question’ on succession in a province-side referendum. The court then went further, holding that 
such (still quite hypothetical) negotiations, should they be legally required, would then be subject to 
four ‘unwritten rules’ or ‘constitutional conventions’: (1) “the rule of law”; (2) “federalism”; (3) 
“democracy”; and, (4) “respect for minorities”. All of which the court styles as a whole 
‘constitutionalism’. 
12
 There are 308 seats in the House of Commons, a threshold of 155 seats is required to form a majority 
government, in the 41
st
 Parliament of Canada as decided by the election of May 2, 2011 the distribution 
of seats is as follows: (1) Conservative, 166; (2) NDP, 103; (3) Liberal, 34; (4) Bloc Quebecois, 4; (5) 
Green, 1.  http://www.elections.ca/scripts/ovr2011/default.html 
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splendidly, at least for some, began on April 17, 1982, the date upon which the Queen 
proclaimed the Constitution Act in Ottawa in the presence of onlookers and officials 
thereby triggering the event known as patriation.13  
Patriation 
April 17, 1982 marked the event of patriation.  However, even historical beginnings are 
also culminations, or better, nodes along pre-existing temporal trajectories. It would 
therefore be dangerous to treat this event in splendid isolation from its historical 
precursors. Acknowledging this, one might imagine a vast temporal regress which 
would lead us all the way back to September 12, 1759 when British General James 
Wolfe defeated his French counterpart, General  Louis-Joseph Marquis de Montcalm 
on the Plains of Abraham, thereby solidifying the rule of the British Crown over what is 
today Quebec. Viewing that as too remote, we could, in the alternative, halt our 
historical regress at the very date on which Canadian historians usually rest, July 1, 
1867. July 1, 1867 is Canada‘s constituent event, at least its first foundational moment 
as a sovereign state.  
Or perhaps, if we are looking for foundational moments entailing the complex 
relationship between French and English Canada, we might equally convincingly return 
to October 16, 1970. The familiar date with which this thesis began, and which 
coincides Prime Minister Trudeau‘s evocation of the War Measures Act in response to 
the kidnap of Quebec Minister of Labour, Pierre Laporte, and British Trade Envoy, 
James Cross, by the Front de libération do Québec (FLQ) (see generally Chapter I s. 
i). Alternatively, we might simply trace the historical trajectory leading to patriation to a 
much more proximate event and far more explicitly juridical one on September 18, 
1981 - an event which preceded the date of patriation itself, April 17, 1982 by six 
months, but which nevertheless contained in its DNA the epoch to follow.  
On September 18, 1981, the Supreme Court of Canada held, in a complex split 
decision addressing multiple questions from the Federal and Provincial Governments, 
that the Federal Government had the power to convey a constitutional amendment 
package overseas to the old imperial Parliament at Westminster, which until Canada 
had adopted its new amending procedure, was still required by virtue of a final, albeit 
largely symbolic, dominion era holdover, to approve what would effectively be an 
                                               
13
 Constitution Act 1982 (Sched B to Canada Act 1982 (UK), c. 11) (enacting the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”). For archival footage of Prime Minister Trudeau’s nationally 
televised speech in which he articulates the legal and political meaning of patriation, no doubt drawing 
on his background as a constitutional lawyer see 
http://archives.cbc.ca/politics/constitution/clips/13264/. 
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amendment to its own 1867 British North American Act establishing Canada as a 
dominion. Although there were significant dissents on ancillary questions, the justices 
were however unanimous that political convention required consent from the provinces 
for the Federal Government to refer any amendment package to the imperial 
Parliament at Westminster with any degree of legitimacy. However, it also held that 
conventions are unenforceable by a court of law because they are strictly political and 
not legal. Hence, they exist in limbo, recognized by the Court and the Constitution but 
not enforced by it.14  
Confused? This was perhaps how the Canadian public felt when they were treated, for 
the first time, to Supreme Court of Canada‘s ruling televised nationwide. Trudeau who 
was at the time, in his usual aloof and impertinent manner, overseas, left then Justice 
Minister Jean Chrétien to respond to reporters on his behalf. Reached in South Korea, 
Chrétien related, the Prime Minister was relieved, if not emboldened by the decision.15    
Let us recall, Trudeau, the very same Prime Minister who faced down the FLQ over a 
decade earlier. He saw in light of the Supreme Court‘s decision an endgame in sight. 
When he returned to Canada he offered the nine provincial Premiers, save Quebec‘s 
nationalist Premier Renée Lévesque, a compromise. The compromise was as follows: 
Support the amendment package and the patriation project and get a provincial ‗opt 
out‘ clause from certain of the less ‗fundamental freedoms‘ guaranteed in the Charter.16 
The premiers of the nine provinces, other than Quebec of course, agreed and the 
amendment package was conveyed to the imperial Parliament at Westminster which 
duly rubber stamped it.17   
                                               
14
 n 8 above.  
15
 A first in Canadian history, for archival television footage, commentary and an interview with then 
Justice Minister Jean Chrétien see http://archives.cbc.ca/politics/constitution/clips/6043/.  
16
 The nine provinces other than Quebec used the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision finding a 
convention that substantial provincial consent was required for amendment to secure two key 
concession from the Federal Government, both of which significantly weakened the amendment 
package as originally conceived by Trudeau and Chrétien: (1) the s. 33 ‘override’ clause in the Charter; 
and, (2) the s. 38(3) ‘opt-out’ clause. The override clause is also sometimes known as the 
‘notwithstanding clause’ because it permits provinces to enact legislation, declared as such, for a fixed 
period of five years, to “operate notwithstanding a provision included in s. 2 or ss. 7-15 of this Charter.” 
The ‘opt-out’ clause permits a province to ‘opt out’ of any proposed amendment to the Constitution 
which would derogate from its legislative authority or jurisdiction see Hogg n 7 above at 25, 68, 79. 
17
 Albeit with some navel gazing regarding its colonial past and the Crown’s paternalistic obligation to 
Aboriginal peoples who took their case right to the doors of Westminster, massifying as it were, a single 
line in Desmond Morton’s authoritative words is telling: “British politicians wrestled briefly with the 
residue of colonialism, undeterred by native protesters.” D. Morton, A Short History of Canada (Toronto: 
McClelland & Stewart, 2006). By way of legal technical precision it is important to emphasize the basic 
mechanics of patriation which meant that for any future amendment to be completely Canadian and 
Canadian alone, the UK Parliament had to enact the Canada Act, 1982 (UK) to trigger the coming into 
effect of the Constitution Act, 1982 (Canada) (thereby passing sovereignty symbolically across the 
                   140 of 242 
Despite seriously damaging the relationship with Quebec City, the Trudeau 
government proceeded to patriation with much fanfare. Deep wounds were to persist 
and to flare dramatically in the coming decades. Nevertheless, when English speaking 
Canadians refer to the patriation of the Constitution, they are proud, nostalgic and 
patriotic. For English Canada and federalists in Quebec it was a final phase in 
Canada‘s institutional becoming (and certainly not, as in Quebec nationalist quarters, a 
sign of the fundamental illegitimacy at the heart of the state).   
To understand the particularity of the legal scientific view of some of these questions 
there is probably no voice more authoritative than that of Peter Hogg.  Hogg describes 
the 1982 ‗patriation‘ of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter ‗the 
Charter‘)18 as ―a major achievement, curing several longstanding defects in the 
Constitution of Canada.‖19  Hogg also tells us, equally authoritatively, the term 
‗patriation‘ is a uniquely Canadian coinage from which he infers several very much 
overlapping features: (1) ―autochthony‖ or the requirement that ―a constitution be 
indigenous, deriving its authority solely from events within Canada…‖ (2) ―Termination 
of imperial authority‖; and, (3) ―autonomy‖ of amendment power within the legislative 
competencies of the provincial and federal governments.20 Without overly dissecting 
this definition, the impression is of a major historical break with the colonial past and an 
assertion of Canadian sovereignty in the formal Constitution.   
What is perhaps most revealing is Hogg‘s rendering of the Constitution as a defect-
ridden object set on the road to repair with patriation. A Negri-inspired approach cannot 
unflinchingly embrace such a conceptualization.  Instead, it demands that we consider 
whether the narrative of ‗mega-constitutional politics‘21 which we take to begin with 
patriation in 1982 and extend for nearly two more decades until the 1998 decision of 
                                                                                                                                         
Atlantic at the highest level of formal abstraction). This entire schematic was divined by the liberal legal 
scholars and lawyers in the Trudeau Government and the Chrétien Ministry of Justice which quite 
brilliantly, reshaped the Constitution of Canada to force the imperial Parliament to well and truly 
emphasize: “No Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after Constitution Act, 1982 comes 
into force shall extend to Canada as a part of its law…” The Canada Act, as much as it was a final (?) 
severance of the old colonial bond, was also the Charter’s implementation instrument, “*a+n Act to give 
effect to a request by the Senate and the House of Commons of Canada” to have the Constitution Act, 
1982 (Canada), which appears as Schedule B to Canada Act 1982 (UK), become the new Constitution of 
Canada.  At this moment there was a form of kabuki in which sovereignty was (re)circulated but 
nevertheless remained reassuringly very much within the recognizable template of the past. It is for 
instance no coincidence that Canada retains the Queen as head of State and does not recognized itself 
as a republic.  
18
 n 13 above.  
19
 Hogg n 7 above at 69.  
20
  Ibid. 57-62. 
21
 See n 5 above. 
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the Supreme Court of Canada in the Succession Reference, might not be grasped 
quite differently.  
Some alternative formulations of the very recent past 
The objective here is to move decisively beyond the narrative departure point of 
patriation as a potent symbol of Canada‘s passage from national infancy to maturity 
toward a consideration of patriation as having broader significance in what might just 
as easily be interposed as Canada‘s passage from modern to the postmodern epoch. 
Or, more generally its passage from the form of sovereignty associated with the 
modern State to the one associated with Empire.  To arrive at this formulation however, 
we must examine very closely what Hogg and others, including even some of the more 
progressive constitutional theorists writing on the Canadian situation tend to overlook, 
or sometimes even cover over (occasionally with a vaguely self-congratulatory 
rhetorical flourish).22  Namely, the most crucial question of all: how, if at all, does the 
formal retrenchment of constitutional rights reliably translate into social cohesion or is 
this even the desired effect? Or perhaps better, how, if at all, can the material and the 
formal c/Constitutions, be said to exist in a (re)productive rather than purely 
determinative relation? 
I pose these types of questions not to suggest that formal retrenchment of 
constitutional rights in the way that it is conceived by the hegemonic Canadian debate 
between nationalist and federalists, is necessarily without benefits; but rather, to raise 
the possibility that the net detriments of Charter constitutionalism may be as 
incalculable as the net benefits. To reformulate things in a still more Hardt and Negrian 
fashion, it might be said that if the multitude is to be grasped as a species of 
constituent power, with both a material heft and an ontological intensity, it will be 
because it demands it.  Because it carves itself out from the material constitution and 
develops a counter-hegemonic subjectivity from the bottom up. Refuses, in other 
words, as a species of the usual elite-driven reform or judicial politics for an exercise of 
constituent power, a constitution power which subverts and refuses the formal 
Constitution rather than demanding its reform- we might also say here that the 
multitude is the subjectivity which presents itself as the immanent and unmediated 
force which cannot be contained in any formal metaphysics of the Constitution. If we 
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were to arrive at such a point we might longer be able to regard the Charter as having 
purely emancipatory implications. Instead, we might begin to view it at as modern 
hangover, a representational and mediatory apparatus increasingly ill-suited to carrying 
out anything other than an ever more expansive normative science of the Constitution. 
In other words, a way of proceeding with matters which is, if not simply uninteresting, at 
least distinctly a-critical and thoroughly de-ontological.23   
To think about Canada‘s period of mega-constitutional politics in a properly Negri-
inspired register, we must differently conceptualize the existing narrative.  Recall, there 
are already several key narrative signposts between the event of patriation, and the 
1998 Succession Reference24  which conventionally comprise the epoch (1982-1998). 
These include, most notably, the failed 1987 Meech Lake25 and 1992 Charlottetown26 
Accords as much as the near victory of Quebec separatists (49.4 percent in favour, 
50.6 percent against) in the 1995 referendum on Quebec sovereignty.27   
The Supreme Court of Canada‘s decision in the Secession Reference,28  binds these 
already very much interlocking narrative events. One which is characterized, as Hogg 
so tellingly formulates it himself, by an impulse to resolve or otherwise cure lingering 
defects in the existing story (namely, Quebec‘s exclusion). Moreover, the concept of 
‗mega constitutional politics‘,29 implies the existence of a bygone era of lower-stakes 
constitutionalism, a normal, non-emergency or non-crisis historic-temporality in which 
lower level more routine constitutional politics prevail, is the departure point for any 
discussion of the post-Charter epoch.  
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At a broader level of generality in this thesis the need arises to consider whether mega-
constitutional politics might march in relative lockstep with the ever-expansive, socially 
subsumptive and hyper-inclusive rationality of Empire; or, alternatively, whether it 
represents a manifestation of an older, even anachronistic rationality rooted in 
modernity. In either case however, it is the enigmatic figure of the multitude which must 
be brought into the analysis in order to move beyond the standardized construction of 
the formal Constitution, as object of knowledge or prediction.    
C. Defining mega-constitutional politics 
Perhaps more than anything, the enigmatic quality of the multitude lies is its capacity to 
resist the totalizing rationality of constitutionalism, or what Hardt and Negri describe as 
―a decentred and deterritorializing apparatus of rule.‖30 Multiple narrative flashpoints 
occur in the period of mega-constitutional politics, between the 1982 patriation and the 
Succession Reference. None are more crucial than the 1991 Charlottetown Accord, 
which, like the 1987 Meech Lake Accord before it,31 sought to secure Quebec‘s still 
outstanding assent to the Charter.  
The Charlottetown Accord amendment proposal differed from the earlier Meech Lake 
Accord in that it added an immensely wide-ranging and expansive set of proposals 
responsive to grievances expressed by the provinces, aboriginal peoples, women and 
ethnic minorities as well as a variety of other ‗Charter‘ and aspirational ‗Charter 
Canadians‘.32 Perhaps not surprisingly, after the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord33 
in a popular nation-wide referendum, mega-constitutional politics morphed into mega-
constitutional crisis.  
By the time of the Supreme Court of Canada‘s decision in the 1998 Secession 
Reference, the country was recovering from a palpable sense of shock and anxiety 
arising from the near literal breakage of the polity in the 1995 referendum on Quebec 
sovereignty. An anxiety which the Court, as emphasized in the epigraph, 34  set out, 
quite systematically, to calm by way of an insistence that the Federal Government 
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would have an obligation to enter into good faith negotiations with the government of a 
province with a mandate to negotiate succession from its electorate. Provided that 
mandate was established on the basis of a ‗clear question‘ and a ‗clear majority‘ in a 
province-wide referendum.35  Having spelled out these basic criteria to trigger a good 
faith obligation to negotiate, the Court went on to specify what is meant by good faith 
negotiations. In so doing, it outlined four ‗fundamental‘, albeit ‗unwritten‘ and hitherto 
‗conventional‘ principles of Canadian ‗constitutionalism‘: ‗federalism‘, ‗democracy‘, ‗the 
protection of minorities‘ and ‗the rule of law‘. 36  
My argument is that the Supreme Court‘s calming and systematizing instinct was a 
logical outgrowth of the broader post-Charter narrative of the radical inclusion and 
integration, rather than exclusion or excision, of difference. One which I argue, like its 
persistent rhetorical commitment to the rule of law, dovetails with the basic logics 
inhering to Empire and the postmodern form of sovereignty which it represents.  
A mutation in the form of sovereign Power 
To grasp this it is necessary to begin reading Negri well before Empire. Recall, in the 
sixties and seventies, Negri had already begun to observe a mutation in the form of 
sovereign Power which began in his native Italy with the postwar Constitution (see 
generally Chapter II). He described it as the passage from the ‗rights‘ to the ‗social 
State‘.37 In this transition, Negri suggested, political and economic, as much as private 
and public rationalities and forms of Power, were increasingly interpenetrated and 
overlapping.  I argue that in the Succession Reference we find an extraordinarily 
sophisticated next step in this very same tendency. Not easily grasped in the familiar 
language of legal formalism or legal positivism, the Succession Reference moved 
directly into what had previously been the gauzy extra-legal terrain of political 
convention. In so doing, it radically unified at least two broad sources of authority. 
Strikingly, writing on the limits of the hegemonic forms of legal science in his native  
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Labor of Dionysus (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994) 23-51, 28-29. Written a few years 
after Negri’s formative ‘Labour in the Constitution’ (1964), 53-136  in same, in which he had argued that 
the recognition of labour in the formal Constitution, had at its effect not freedom or emancipation, but 
subsumption of labour’s productive power (see generally Chapter II s. ii, iv-v). The essay on Keynes 
identifies labour as “a dynamic element with the system”, which, by way of its radical subsumption not 
only to capital, but to sovereign Power itself, could in some way offer an immanent critique of the 
formal Constitutions’ insistence on the determination of the material one “in the form of *social+ 
planning”.  
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Italy in 1964, much of what Negri suggests might usefully be said of the Canadian 
situation in 1998:  
Juridical science has accelerated the process of the unification of 
sources, and thus it has been receptive – sometimes despite itself – to 
the tendency of the movement of social reality...We could give the 
period of juridical positivism the label, adopted from political 
historiography, of the ‗the era of security‘ – secure faith in the social and 
political presuppositions of the of the ordering certainty in the present 
perfection, or if you like, the indefinite perfectibility of the juridical 
system. Hegel and Kant, in two difference cases, are the guardian 
spirits of the era. The so-called problem of sources, then, is born not 
before but after the construction of the system and is related to the need 
not to found the system but rather to define it in a conclusive way. It is 
not insignificant to recall here that the unity of the bourgeois scientific 
world remained formal and ideological until the development of the 
factory-society brought science within the realm of capital. As a result, 
the system prefigured its own material substrate and the sources and 
the sources were defined by the arrangement, not only in the obvious 
sense that every system defines its own productive mechanism, but 
rather in the sense that such a mechanism was adopted only because it 
was functional to the preconceived interest of the system...To pose it in 
extreme terms, the system seemed to invent the sources...We should 
look more closely at these sources. Are they within the system, or can 
they no longer be found, or can they be found everywhere? Material and 
formal sources, internal and external sources, written and unwritten 
sources, primary and secondary, immediate and mediate, legitimate and 
illegitimate, legal and customary, and so forth: the confusion crowns the 
position of the problem on the system....It is useless to try to make the 
foundation of the system appear as a problem while at the same time 
you try to locate it within the system itself. At this point the most dignified 
way out is still the classic exit of idealist philosophy: make jurisprudence 
the foundation of right.38  
I have reproduced this quotation at some length for its centrality to the arguments put 
forward in this chapter and this thesis. For Negri, ―the crisis of positivism‖ is the first 
and most crucial symptom of the passage from the rights to the social State. 
Nevertheless, it is ―at the same time a restructuring or a positive reworking of 
positivism in the context of the constitution of the social State...‖39 Or elsewhere, the 
setting in which ―[t]he conditions of the sovereignty of law disappear, and at the same 
time the juridical world is completely redefined.‖40 Toggling back to the Succession 
Reference, we might say that what Negri is after is well captured in the Succession 
Reference. In which, much like the referendum politics which precipitated it, we can 
grasp at virtually every level in what Negri understands to be the hegemonic rationality 
as much as the subsumptive quality of the social State: 
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In the social State, the specific modes of the maintenance and 
production of right as norm and plan of development will therefore be 
modes of the composition of social dissent and consent. This is the new 
positivity of right that must therefore make itself adequate to the 
movement of the social body, where juridical command makes sense 
only as a mapping of social contestation and a determination of the 
guide to the mediation between contestation and the necessity of 
development. The search for this type of consensus, as the mediation of 
dissent and development, becomes increasingly urgent. The efficacy of 
right can be guaranteed only in a vast realm of consent, and the validity 
of right is merely the synthesis of command and consent. The 
production of right is a process of continual synthesis, of continuous 
mappings of consent and continual mediation with the needs of 
development. The juridical ordering extends itself increasingly further 
covering more and more of society.41 
Although referring in this passage primarily to the inclusion of labour in the Constitution 
and the role of labour legislation in the social State, Negri is also very much addressing 
the changing nature of right in the social state more broadly. Even the emergence of an 
idea of right in which the direct formation, command and control of the material 
substratum of ‗society‘ is placed or better, subsumed under the sign of Capital. Over 
subsequent decades, Negri would revisit this type of formulation in a variety of ways. 
Nowhere more directly and conclusively than nearly fifty years after ‗Labour in the 
Constitution‘ in the 2005 ‗Postmodern global governance and the critical legal project‘, 
an essay in which Negri poses the following question at a global scale: 
What is happening? Why is it – for this is precisely the paradox – that 
the efficacy of the constitution grows weaker and weaker to the point of 
extinction at the very moment in which the constitutional production of 
‗juridicity‘ [giuridicità] extends its cover into life ever more increasingly, 
directly arranging [disponendo] subjects and objects therein?42  
Here the language of biopolitics is obviously present in a way it was not in Negri‘s early 
essays in the sixties. Nevertheless, some of the themes Negri had examined and some 
of the conceptual experimentation he had begun decades earlier, would continue to 
radiate across his texts over the subsequent decades. It is therefore no surprise to find, 
in a critique of contemporary critical legal realism, delivered in a paper before an 
Anglo-American critical legal audience in 2001, nearly a year after the publication of 
Empire, a series of points which Negri had already made much earlier. What unites 
Negri‘s thought over these many decades is a searing critique of bourgeois 
constitutional science. One in which a legal form or rationality is extended further and 
further across the social terrain. The result of which I argue, at least in Canada, has 
been to handover some chunk of sovereign Power to the judiciary itself. This is 
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nowhere more obvious in Canada than were the court is permitted, pursuant to its 
statutory reference jurisdiction, to make more speculative interventions into the political 
realm.  
D. The reference power and the collapse of the law/politics binary 
S. 53 of the Supreme Court Act gives the Supreme Court authority to give advisory 
opinions on questions referred to it by the Federal Government.  It is almost exclusively 
used in relation to questions of constitutional law: ―the Governor in Council may refer to 
the court for hearing and consideration of important questions of law or fact… [and 
when such a reference is made]…it is the duty of the Court to hear and consider it and 
to answer each question so referred.‖43  In most jurisdictions the rendering of advisory 
opinions is not permitted, particularly in common law jurisdictions which tend to shy 
from hearing anything other than live disputes between specifically denominated 
parties involved in a specific factual, rather than merely hypothetical, dispute. It is on 
this basis that the High Court of Australia has refused to return advisory opinions.44  In 
the US, the refusal to render advisory opinions is consistent with the limitation of the 
jurisdiction of all federal courts (including the Supreme Court) to ―cases and 
controversies‖.45  
The Succession Reference 1998 
Although the Supreme Court began the Succession Reference by confirming its 
already clear jurisdiction pursuant to s. 53 of the Supreme Court Act, it went a step 
further holding bluntly that the consideration of speculative question of constitutional 
politics was in no way incompatible ―with its appellate jurisdiction‖.46 At first not a 
tectonic shift, just a confirmation of the court‘s basic and quite unique role within the 
Canadian constitutional order.  However, upon closer examination, it reveals well 
beyond the formal apparatus of s. 53 of the Supreme Court Act, just how completely 
the political and the legal had come to overlap in post-Charter Canada.  
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After being re-elected for a second time in 1997, with a specific mandate from English 
Canada and federalist Quebecers still reeling from the near victory of Quebec 
nationalists two years before, voters gave Chrétien‘s Liberal Government a new 
electoral mandate to deliver on its campaign promise to set the bar high for any future 
unilateral declaration of independence by Quebec. Chrétien, the old federalist 
warhorse, who it will be recalled, had himself been the Minister of Justice and Attorney 
General in the patriation era Trudeau government, led his own government in posing 
the Supreme Court three questions in 1998:  (1) Under the Constitution of Canada can 
the government of Quebec effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? 
(2) Can the government of Quebec effect the secession of Quebec from Canada 
unilaterally under international law? (3) In the event of conflict which law would take 
precedence?  The answer to the three questions came in the form of a majority 
decision penned by then Chief Justice Antonio Lamer (himself a Trudeau era 
appointment). It can be summarized as follows: (1) and (2) were answered in the 
negative and it was therefore not necessary to answer (3).  
Having found that the Government of Quebec could not unilaterally declare 
independence under the ‗Constitution of Canada‘ or ‘International Law‘ the court‘s 
decision was lauded by many for simply diffusing the possibility of any successful 
unilateral declaration of Quebec from Canada.47 The court‘s decision would then take 
shape in the Federal Government‘s drafting of what would subsequently become the 
Clarity Act, 2000.48 Pursuant to the guidelines set for it in Chief Justice Lamer‘s 
decision, Parliament drafted the act to clarify the terms of the Federal Government‘s 
obligation to negotiate with a secessionist province in the event of a future referendum. 
The decision also gave direction any future nationalist government in Quebec (or 
hypothetically any other province) as to how it would be expected (if not required) to 
conduct itself in negotiations with its federal counterpart on the basis of any future 
referendum mandate from its electorate. In response to the judgment, there were 
those, predictably, who bemoaned it as the ultimate invasion of political autonomy and 
juridical overstepping imaginable.49  
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Four our own purposes, what is perhaps most telling about the judgment is the manner 
in which the court answered the first question as to whether or not the ‗the Constitution 
of Canada‘50 permitted, in the absence of any written provision explicitly disallowing it 
(and it is usually the case in the common law tradition that the law permits what it does 
not proscribe), succession of a province from confederation.  From a Negri-inspired 
perspective this presents a fascinating study of the limits of the formal Constitution.  
Recall the definition of the formal Constitution, which is developed earlier in Negri‘s 
thought, and repeated in the preface to Empire as ―the written document along it its 
various amendments and legal apparatuses.‖51 Here, insofar as the written document 
did not provide the rule of its own application, the legal apparatus, this time in the form 
of the court and the Supreme Court Act, stepped into the breach to resolve the 
impasse by resort to four unwritten foundations of Canadian constitutionalism: (1) 
‗federalism‘; (2) ‗respect for minorities‘; (3) ‗democracy‘; and, (4) ‗the rule of law‘.52  
Which together, it held, grounded a legal obligation on the Federal Government to 
negotiate succession with the Government of Quebec (or any other province 
hypothetically), if it could satisfy the requirement of presenting a referendum mandate 
garnered in answer to a ‗clear question‘ with a ‗clear majority‘ in favour of succession.   
Pointedly not carving out a supervisory role for itself or stipulating precisely what 
numerical value reached the required threshold of a ‗clear majority‘ nor indeed what 
verbiage was required for a ‗clear question‘, the court took some small symbolic steps 
to recognize some continued  form of political autonomy. But, by stipulating that 
negotiations would have to be carried out respect to the four ‗fundamental‘ unwritten 
principles of Canadian ‗constitutionalism‘,53 the court signalled its increasingly central 
role in shaping political as well the juridical outcomes.  Or better, of radically blurring 
the boundary between the two. As such, the court‘s use of unwritten constitutional rules 
to create positive constitutional obligations went far beyond prior precedents.  
Particularly the Patriation Reference, in which the court had been far more capacious 
in recognizing the existence of unwritten conventions (which it explicitly held were 
exclusively ‗political‘ rather than legal).54 Much critical attention has therefore been 
focused on the court‘s broadening of its role in this way. I disagree however with the 
position of prominent Canadian constitutionalists, such as Hogg, who argue that the 
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Supreme Court could, or ought to have, made the same findings as it did without resort 
to unwritten constitutional principles. I find this position to be illustrative of the most 
severe form of legal scientism and gravitate instead towards what I present as an 
alternative, Hardt and Negri-inspired, treatment of the matter.  
Crisis 
At the heart of this reading is the sense of crisis which predominated throughout the 
period of mega-constitutional politics preceding the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in the Succession Reference.  This crisis manifests itself at several points of 
intensity between patriation and the Succession Reference over a period of sixteen 
years (1982-1998).  Most recently, in a near referendum victory for Quebec separatists 
in 1995 which turned what had been a crisis of representation into a more existential 
crisis of sovereignty. A referendum victory for Quebec separatists would have been a 
complete repudiation of the Canadian legal order from a significant portion of its 
population over what is a massive chunk of its landmass. Including the extraordinarily 
crucial commercial and transportation hub provided by the Saint Lawrence sea way 
and contiguous land bridge between Ontario and the Atlantic provinces to the east of 
Quebec.   
This material as much as formal crisis would have played itself out, but for, a less than 
one percent of Quebec voters who hesitated to pull the trigger on the 131 year old 
confederation and voted narrowly to remain Canadian.  To make matters more 
complex however, particularly for Canadians outside Quebec, English speaking 
Quebecers, allophone immigrants, Aboriginal peoples and other constituencies within 
Quebec less than enthusiastic about the idea of Quebec sovereignty, were suddenly 
nervous and looking to Ottawa for leadership.  What they would find in the years which 
followed however was that it was not only the Federal Government and the English 
speaking provinces, but the Supreme Court itself which faced a crisis of legitimacy in 
Quebec.  So much so, that the Quebec Government refused to participate in the 
Succession Reference pleadings thereby necessitating the appointment of amicus 
curiae (rather than the Attorney General of Quebec, as would usually be the case), to 
argue, that the Constitution of Canada would have no role to play in the aftermath of 
the referendum victory and that International Law supported a unilateral declaration of 
independence by Quebec after a plurality of votes were cast favour thereof. Which 
would indeed logically be the argument the Government of Quebec would have 
presented had it chosen to participate. However it pointedly did not. 
Interestingly, just as the entire reference procedure was looking to become an exercise 
in absurdity, particularly insofar as Quebec, the central player in the drama, was 
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protesting matters with its absence, things would soon change and the decision, once it 
had been rendered, would ultimately carry a great deal of weight. Even grudgingly in 
some of the hardest of Quebec nationalist circles.55 Over a decade later, it would 
indeed seem that the Succession Reference managed, through creative and broad 
ranging judicial intervention, to calm the waters somewhat. Presumably however 
anything would have been a notch down in the level of intensity arrived at in the ‗close 
call‘ of the 1995 referendum.  Which was, no doubt itself a reminder of earlier 
memories going back to the violence of 1970 October Crisis (see generally Chapter I) 
and a comparatively more recent referendum in 1980.56  
By the time matters arrived before the Supreme Court of Canada in 1998, had the 
court stuck solely to the terms of the written constitution or formal Constitution, its 
legitimacy would have been unlikely among separatist Quebeckers. Quebec did, after 
all, harbour serious grievances and had dissented from the patriation. And, as any 
student of Canadian politics knows, Quebec also perceived itself, as the referendum 
results had shown, rightly or wrongly, as the victim of two recent rounds of failed 
attempts at reform. I am referring of course to Meech Lake in 1987 and Charlottetown 
in 1992.57 In the Succession Reference however, the court gets involved to break the 
political deadlock. In so doing it goes further than it has ever gone in giving attention to 
social, historical and political circumstances, in other words highly ‗extra-legal‘ 
considerations.58  
I return repeatedly to the question of so called ‗extra-legal‘ sources because I think it is 
illustrative of the broader form of logic which inheres to Empire. Among Canadian 
constitutionalists, Hogg is again the leading exponent of the view that the Supreme 
Court risks illegitimacy by invoking unwritten rules to ground positive legal 
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obligations.59  There are others such as Walters who go further to argue that ‗extra-
legal‘ or ‗unwritten‘ sources have a venerable history in the common law doctrine of lex 
non scripta. In other words, in the notion shared by Coke, Blackstone, Hale and other 
common law jurisprudes which insist, in the natural law tradition, that all written norms 
are underpinned by deep rooted unwritten norms which transcend the limits of the 
written word. Nevertheless, even by this standard, the Succession Reference itself is 
quite aptly described as ―a paradigmatic case of extra-ordinary interpretation.‖60  Let us 
examine it a bit further while continuing to develop its relevance as a potentially 
unexpected instantiation of the form of Power associated with Empire.  
Of written and unwritten c/Constitutions 
Leading constitutionalists, jurists and public lawyers, like Hogg, recognize the basic 
distinction between countries without a written constitution such as the US and those 
like the UK (and Canada, at least until patriation) in which there is an unwritten or 
ancient rather than written or modern constitution.  In the case of countries lacking a 
written constitution Hogg and Zwibel note that it is relatively easy to adopt Dicey‘s 
definition of constitutional law as ―all rules which directly or indirectly affect the 
distribution and exercise of the sovereign power of the state.‖61Martin Loughlin a 
leading public lawyer in the UK calls this droit politique.62  
In countries such as Canada or the US, Hogg and Zwibel describe constitutional law in 
terms of adjudication revolving around the written rules of the constitution, no doubt, a 
basic formalist and legal positivist baseline. However, they make allowance for the 
practical critiques that this might be a myopic focus on judicial review of the written 
constitution. A focus which represents only small portion of the manner in which the 
governmental power is exercised – to this end, they allow that Parliamentary customs 
and conventions may properly be considered part of the constitutional law -- a sort of 
small juridical nod to what is effectively a legal pluralist ethos. Nevertheless they 
express misgivings about the court‘s usage of unwritten principles and distinguish them 
from customs or conventions which ―do not even prescribe rules of behaviour that can 
be applied by public officials and institutions.‖63   
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Importantly, any attempt to move away from the text is given direction from the 
preamble to the Charter itself which states that Canada is founded on principles that 
recognize ‗the supremacy of God and the rule of law‘.  As noted by Hogg and Zwibel, 
this language came to the Canadian constitutional order when the Charter was 
adopted as part of patriation in Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982.64 The closest thing 
which Canada had to a written constitution prior to that was the confederation era 
British North American Act, 1867. Which stated that Canada had a constitution ‗similar 
in principle to that of the United Kingdom‘, a provision subsequently interpreted by the 
Supreme Court to include recognition of ‗the rule of law‘. 65 In all cases, however, Hogg 
insists, the Supreme Court should not invoke preambular language ―on the same plane 
as a direct provision of the constitution.‖66  
The Problem with Hogg and Zwibel‘s formalistic objection is that it shackles the 
creativity of the court and prevents it from responding to questions of legitimacy and 
crisis by drawing an arbitrary distinction between preambular language and ―direct 
provisions.‖  This goes back perhaps more to the fundamental questions of constituent 
and constituted p/Power than it does to the more obvious, and I argue less interesting 
dialectic between strict and purposive forms of legal interpretation. Can a preamble, in 
other words, be distinguished from the enumerated clauses which follow it in the formal 
written text of the Constitution? Can it be grasped as more direct expression of 
constituent power, a temporal desire, rather than a temporally closed legal order? 
These are perhaps at least the type of more Negri-inspired questions we might be 
tempted to ask in place of the usual ones.  
No doubt any pragmatic and left leaning constitutionalist will gravitate, usually for 
principled reasons, to a purposive over a strict interpretive approach. This is the 
standard critical left or critical realist move. However, it misses much of what might be 
most important by leaving the question here. Nevertheless, while it might be worth 
examining this type of argument in some other context it is not necessary to open it 
further in this one. Instead it should suffice to say that there is a potentially alternative 
interpretation of the Succession Reference available. One which is hinted at in how the 
court articulates federalism, respect for minorities, democracy and the rule of law, all 
unwritten or conventional rules it combines as a species of ‗constitutionalism‘,67 a 
formulation which is itself nothing less than a movement from unwritten or ancient 
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constitution into the written or modern Constitution and then back again, by way of 
juridical interpretation.  
Once the old unwritten constitution is acknowledged explicitly in this way, what 
concerns more established constitutionalists like Hogg is the foundational boundary 
between law and politics. A boundary which they quite clearly believe, not unlike most 
conventional public lawyers, must be zealously guarded in the Constitution and the 
Public Law. On the other side of the Atlantic, Martin Loughlin makes a similar argument 
insisting that Public Law or what he styles in French, droit politique, functions to 
safeguard the autonomy of the political from legal intervention as much as does submit 
it to the Rule of Law. 68  This gatekeeping role is a reflex in the leading English 
language constitutional scholarship insofar as its practitioners are used to residing in 
the conceptual abyss between law, as normative science and politics as praxis of 
government.  
Relative to the Succession Reference in particular, Hogg and Zwibel argue that the 
court could have kept political and legal rationalities appropriately separated and 
achieved the same substantive results (namely, of establishing a formal legal 
framework for any future succession of the province of Quebec from confederation)  
without explicitly invoking ‗the rule of law‘ (in other words, that the court ought to have 
been more sparing in its rhetoric and not have introduced unnecessary conceptual 
baggage). Hogg and Zwibel however clearly agree with the holding that the democratic 
principle must be balanced against the protection of minority rights – therefore 
requiring negotiation (presumably rather than violence or prolonged stalemate, both of 
which would be undesirable in the extreme). They however see no reason to extend 
beyond the formal Constitution in achieving the desired end (which would be, one 
presumes, some abstract notion of social cohesion).  
Recall, the formal Constitution is the written text, the modern Constitution. By fixing on 
what are effectively its minutia, its technical lacunae, its interpretation, application and 
instrumentalization, Hogg is able to retain his role as high priest of Canadian 
Constitutional Law without really signalling the novelty of the Succession Reference 
and perhaps more broadly the period of mega-constitutional politics it culminated. 
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Nevertheless, his argument is instructive as an entry point into the shifting sands 
beneath the formal Constitution of Canada at the closure of the period of mega-
constitutional politics in 1998. 
E.  Crisis in the conceptual hegemonies of the autonomy of the political 
and the rule of law 
More than anything, the period of mega-constitutional politics, including the nearly two 
decades between decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the 1981Patriation and 
the 1998 Succession Reference, is characterized by the strange, and at times total, 
interpenetration of the legal and the political. 69 This is a tendency captured by critical 
legal realist Michael Mandel in the title of his excellent monograph, The Charter of 
Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (1994).70  
Recall, the reference power is itself enjoyed by the Supreme Court of Canada in way 
which is not by the US Supreme Court, itself constitutionally barred from hearing 
anything other than live ―cases and controversies‖.71 The ultimate suggestion in this 
chapter has been that the Supreme Court of Canada‘s extraordinarily wide-ranging 
reference power might itself be a way of grasping the legal/political binary and how it 
dissolves into a specified Canadian iteration of Empire. This avenue of analysis 
continues the one presented as the crisis of the called arising in 1997 APEC Affair (as 
canvassed in the first case study, Chapter IV). In both the APEC Affair and in the 
Succession Reference in particular, it is the law-bound quality the political (in other 
words the intersection of ‗the Rule of Law‘ and ‗the autonomy of the Political‘) which is 
central most.  
No doubt there are many variations of Hobbesian or Schmittian thought which are 
popular today for their willingness to insist on the possibility of decisively asserting the 
autonomy of the Political against the Rule of Law, or at least allowing the necessary 
assertion of political autonomy where unilateral or unconstrained political decision is 
required (usually in what is conceived of as an emergency or crisis). A tendency 
celebrated by some72 and moderated by others.73 There are also liberal normative 
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theories which celebrate the rule of law as the only bulwark against political excess and 
argue for its neo-Kantian generalization and expansion across the globe.74 There are 
also those who critique the limits of such a reinvigorated idealism.75 If this neo-Kantian 
approach was dominant in the nineties, the neo-realist one was dominant in the post 
9/11 years to follow. We have yet to see which formulation will predominate in the 
years to come.  By the time Hardt and Negri write Multitude they will make a fairly 
convincing argument that both the neo-Schmittian realism attributable to neo-
conservatives and the  neo-Kantian idealism of neo-liberals,  tend now to coexist, often 
in strangely mutually reinforcing ways, as bourgeois modalities in Empire.76 
In the 1998 Succession Reference, unlike the 1970 October Crisis (see generally 
Chapter I), it is ‗the Rule of Law‘ which is asserted to constrain an assertion of political 
autonomy, either by nationalist forces in Quebec or federalist ones in Ottawa. In 1970, 
the War Measures Act (see generally Chapter I) was used to suspend the Constitution, 
to carve out an exception from the rule of law, not expand its rationality or broaden its 
authority as in the Succession Reference. The oscillation between these two 
tendencies, particularly insofar as they mark the difficulties of distinguishing between 
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the legal and the political in the contemporary epoch, is among the hallmarks of 
Empire.  
If the period of mega-constitutional politics is bookended on either side by two crucial 
invocations of the reference power, first in the 1981 Patriation Reference,77 and second 
in the 1998 Secession Reference,78 it is because in both instances, the Supreme Court 
of Canada is structurally required to stabilize the line between the legal and the political 
in a way which is increasingly responsive to how Empire itself is instantiated across the 
very same social terrain. Before continuing with a consideration of how this plays out, 
we ought stop for a moment to take note of Hogg‘s assertion that there is ―no general 
separation‖ between ―the judicial and the two political branches‖, which, of course, 
makes sense insofar as the legislative and executive branches are necessarily fused in 
the Westminster system of Government (which Canada has inherited from the UK). 79 
And yet, recall, s. 53 of the Supreme Court Act explicitly provides ―the Governor in 
Council may refer to the court for hearing and consideration important questions of law 
or fact.‖80  
The question would therefore seem to be: how can a political question be referred to 
the judiciary unless it is decider of the Political (at the same time as it is the paragon of 
the Rule of Law)? Herein lays the strangeness of a reference power. Over the years it 
has been used by the Federal Government in cases of very politically contentious 
legislation and has proved itself quite useful indeed.81 All ten provincial legislatures 
have now enacted similar legislation granting reference jurisdiction to the highest 
appellate court in the province with an automatic right to appeal without leave to the 
Supreme Court of Canada.82  
Because the Supreme Court of Canada does not, like its US counterpart, have to 
restrain itself to the hearing of live cases and controversies; and, because the 
Canadian Supreme Court is, despite the explicit wording of s. 101 of the Constitution 
Act, which describes it as ―a general court of appeal for Canada‖, capable of becoming, 
upon the exercise of its reference power, something else entirely,83 it is given the 
latitude to step into the political breach in a way most courts (in other comparable 
                                               
77
 n 7 above. 
78
 n 2 above. 
79
 Hogg n 7 above at 214. 
80
 n 6 above.  
81
 This uniquely Canadian willingness to exercise a reference power began with the Privy Council’s 
decision in A-G. Ont. v. A.-G. Can. (Reference Appeal) [1912] AC 571 and was upheld by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the post-patriation epoch in the Succession Reference n 2 above.  
82
 Hogg n 7 above at 250. 
83
 The Supreme Court of Canada confirmed this n 2 above at 230.  
                   158 of 242 
jurisdictions) are not.84 So much so, that it is duty bound to answer the question put 
before it. It does not even have the sometimes convenient excuse of the US Supreme 
Court to refuse adjudication of ‗political questions‘.85 This does, of course, not mean 
that it must answer the questions put to it. If a question is not yet ripe, the facts 
underlying have become moot, it is too vague, or it is persistently ‗not a legal question’, 
the Supreme Court of Canada remains free to decline to hear the reference. However 
all of these formulations are immensely mutable and the tendency has therefore been, 
at least in the latter half of the twentieth century, not to decline jurisdiction on any of 
these grounds.86  
Flashback: The Patriation Reference 1981 – the beginning and the end of a 
narrative? 
A year before the adoption of the Charter in 1982, the Patriation Reference came 
before the Supreme Court of Canada. The circumstances were in some ways 
analogous with those which present themselves nearly two decades later in the 1998 
Succession Reference. In both cases, the Federal Government was reeling after 
having failed, unilaterally to solve a problem politically. In the pre-patriation era by way 
of agreement between the provincial legislatures and federal parliaments on an 
amendment package for the imperial Parliament; and, in the post-patriation era, by way 
of a failure to foresee the degree of nationalist sentiment in Quebec after it had been 
effectively left out of the constitutional fold.  
In 1981 after the Federal Government of then Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau had failed 
to secure the consent of the provincial legislatures to his draft amendment to the 
Constitution, in the Constitution Act, 1982, as it would later become, the government 
turned to the Supreme Court and the reference power. Here, the political branch was 
faced with an impediment to its will and looked to the judicial branch for resolution, as it 
had done before and as it would do again in 1998.87  If in 1998, the Federal 
Government looked to the Supreme Court for guidance as to the nature and quality of 
any negotiations it might enter into with a province wishing to secede, in the Patriation 
Reference,88 the Federal Government‘s purpose was to ascertain whether it could 
proceed with the required constitutional amendment in the absence of provincial 
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consent. To make the first move, as it were, unilaterally. Unilateral moves signify 
assertions of political autonomy and of sovereign Power in the clearest possible terms.  
They are therefore quite excitable matters.  
The Patriation Reference, predictably, saw the provinces argue that no possible 
unilateral move to amend the constitution would be legal. In a complex judgment, the 
majority of the Court held (7-2) that there was no definitive legal requirement for 
provincial consent. At the same time however, it held, albeit by a slightly narrower 
majority (6-3) that there nevertheless was a constitutional convention that a 
―substantial degree‖ of provincial consent would be required for any amendment 
touching on provincial interests.89 In a prelude to the dramatic instantiation in the post-
Charter Succession Reference, the Supreme Court looked beyond positive law, formal 
law or strictly constitutional law to convention or unwritten rules for increasingly specific 
direction about the nature and quality of majoritarian and constitutional democracy in 
Canada.  
Commenting on the extent to which the Patriation Reference would amount, 
retrospectively at least, to an immense blurring of the legal and political spheres 
converging in Canadian politics in the latter part of the twentieth century, Bakan, 
Borrows, Choudhry et al, write authoritatively: ―the decision has been credited with 
forcing the federal government and the provinces back to the negotiating table, 
because although the Court acknowledged the legality of the unilateral federal move, it 
effectively declared that such a move would be politically illegitimate if not illegal.‖90 
Canadians can certainly be forgiven for asking if there ever was any real difference. As 
if to make the political quality of its entry into the fray even more explicit, the court 
would hold, a year later in a retaliatory reference initiated by the Government of 
Quebec, that there was by no convention requiring Quebec be included for any finding 
of a ―substantial degree‖ of provincial consent. This case became known as the 
―Quebec Veto‖ decision and was much maligned in Quebec Nationalist circles.91  
In each instance the very essence of the epoch of mega-constitutional politics is 
distilled. First at its opening, in the Patriation Reference and the Quebec Veto 
decisions which would continue to hang over Canada in the decades after patriation, 
and later, at its closure in the Succession Reference. Between these two historic poles 
we find certain repeating facts. Having been a non-signatory to the Charter, the 
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Government of Quebec, would be aggressively wooed by the Federal Government.  
This was as true of Trudeau‘s Conservative successor, Brian Mulroney, a friend of 
Regan and Thatcher‘s personally and ideologically, but also an extraordinarily talented 
thoroughly bilingual retail politician from Montreal, as it was for Chrétien when he 
returned the Liberals to power in 1993.  
Once the Charter had been adopted the entirety of the political establishment in 
Canada both centre right and left, would fundamentally embrace patriation as a part of 
Canada‘s narrative of progress. Yet, there was always the question of Quebec, and the 
existential possibility of Canada‘s dissolution on the horizon, one which Trudeau had 
attempted to resolve by way of patriation and which Mulroney would stake his 
government trying to forestall and avert.  
Faced with this ongoing crisis, Mulroney bargained twice on a strategy to bring Quebec 
into the constitutional fold. First in the Meech Lake Accord and second in the 
Charlottetown Accord, both debacles, both species of reformism which collapsed, 
whether because they were elite-driven as in the case of Meech or due to exhaustion 
and scepticism as in the case of Charlottetown. Mulroney stepped down from the 
Prime Ministership and his Conservatives were eviscerated by the Chrétien-led 
Liberals in 1993.  
The intensification of Quebec separatism and the changed post-1995 situation 
Between its election in 1993 and the scare of the 1995 referendum, the new Chrétien 
government (which included some of the most hard line Quebec federalists in Ottawa, 
led by Chrétien himself, who was like Trudeau before him, very ill disposed to the 
nationalist impulse in his home province) failed to foresee that the nationalist spirit in 
1980 had not waned. It had strengthened and hardened. Overly focused on the 
immense failures of the Mulroney government in pacifying Quebec‘s nationalist leaders 
by way of reform, and of the Canadian electorate‘s rebuke for it, the new Chrétien 
government turned its attention to matters other than constitutional politics. For the first 
time, a government in Ottawa was willing to say that for the foreseeable future further 
representation or recognition of Quebec as a ‗distinct society‘ or a ‗nation within a 
nation‘, was very unlikely to be forthcoming.92  
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Foreclosing on reopening reform, and proceeding largely to ignore the constitutional 
question outright, the new government began a series of deep deficit cutting and 
austerity measures. It did so, ironically, because it found itself in a similar situation as 
the centrist Obama Administration would find itself after the Bush years in the US. In 
both cases, the prior administration, a self-described conservative one, had been on a 
spending spree and incurred massive long term structural deficits. In the case of 
Canada, Chrétien and then Finance Minister Paul Martin decided to attack the deficit 
earlier rather than later.  This is no doubt one of the reasons that Canada has 
managed to avoid the fate of its US and European allies, including Italy, which are 
today on the brink of bankruptcy. At the time, perhaps surprisingly, this was not an 
entirely unpopular move among English Canadians. It certainly did not help in the more 
social democratic and Keynesian Quebec however.  
By 1995 Quebec looked set for a nationalist breakthrough and the Federal Government 
was caught flat footed focused more inwardly on the country‘s finances than outwardly 
on its legitimacy.93 In fact, the Chrétien government‘s decision not to appease Quebec 
nationalists or reopen reform led to predictable results: yet another Quebec referendum 
on sovereignty. One which, like its predecessor in 1980, which Mordecai Richler 
described as posing a ‗notoriously mealy-mouthed‘94 question, asked Quebeckers if 
they wished for the province to enter into a ‗sovereignty-association‘ with Canada. All 
of this however, in Quebec referendum politics is resolved mysteriously by way of that 
strange gap filling void that is meaning. Which is, at least in this rare case, was still 
somehow stunningly clear: separation from Canada - yea or nay? 
When they were voting, Quebecers knew themselves to be contemplating whether to 
authorize the provincial government to claim a mandate for negotiations with Ottawa 
aimed at removing the province from the federal architecture of Canada, in other words 
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from its formal Constitution and its existing social contractual metaphysics. Whatever 
the specific details of currency, citizenship and territorial contiguity, their vote was a 
step in the direction, one way or another, toward or away from, Quebec‘s nationalist 
aspirations. Unlike the pre-Charter 1980 referendum which had been resolved quite 
anti-climatically by 59.56 percent majority against succession to 40.44 percent in 
favour thereof, the 1995 referendum, with its equally mealy-mouthed question, asking 
voters if they wished to grant the provincial government a mandate to make ―a formal 
offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership‖ saw a much closer 
outcome.  This time a razor sharp 49.4 percent in favour and a near identical 50.6 
percent against.95  
F. Resolving the crisis of referendum brinksmanship: the quest for legal 
certainty? 
Faced with these numbers, the Chrétien Government returned to the polls to seek a 
mandate from Canadians to move forward with what would become the Succession 
Reference and eventually the Clarity Act. 96 Having received a second majority from 
Canadian with a mandate to do just this, the newly re-elected government asked the 
Supreme Court of Canada in simple terms whether the Constitution of Canada 
permitted a declaration of unilateral succession by one province (a question which is in 
no way explicitly asked or answered by the text of the formal Constitution). It also 
asked whether there was any right to self-determination under International Law, a 
whole new dimension, which might ground the legality of a hypothetical unilateral 
declaration of independence by a province. Finally, it will again be recalled, a third 
question was asked as to whether Canadian or International Law would take 
precedence in the event of a conflict between a federal and a provincial government 
about the legality of succession.97  
It was necessary for the Federal Government to ask all of these questions because the 
complex amending formulas contained in Part V of the 1982 Constitution explicitly did 
not contemplate unilateral succession of one province from confederation. Why after 
all, would it contemplate its own dismemberment?98 It is, of course in the nature of any 
                                               
95
 The second Quebec sovereignty referendum was held October 30, 1995. The question presented to 
voters (in an arguably inverted and disingenuous manner) centred on whether the National Assembly 
(the Legislature of Quebec) should be given a mandate to make “a formal offer to Canada for a new 
economic and political partnership.” The first Quebec referendum was held in 1980 and asked voters, in 
an equally obtuse fashion, to grant the Provincial Government a mandate to negotiate “sovereignty-
association” with the government of Canada. See Hogg n 7 above at 73.  
96
 n 48 above.  
97
 n 2 above. 
98
 J. Bakan, J. Borrows, S. Choudhry, et al n 91 above at 451-452 authoritatively glossing the interplay of 
the s. 38(1) ‘general amending formula’ or the ‘7/50 rule’ which applies to all provisions in the 
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formal Constitution that it imagines itself as infallible. However, it is also an elementary 
rule of the common law that what the law does not explicitly forbid, it permits. In this 
case, perhaps predictably for some, the court was sanguine answering both the first 
and second question in the negative and therefore in declining to answer the third. 
Nevertheless, in the Secession Reference, as much as the earlier Patriation 
Reference(s), the court‘s willingness to wade into the legal fray is obvious and again 
the subject of much consternation among writers and commentators.  In both the 1981 
and 1998 references, the question of constitutional convention or unwritten law is the 
primary vehicle by which the court makes its logico-semantic moves. I emphasize this 
because it points to the limits of the formal Constitution and to the immense exigencies 
of the material constitution which makes demands on it from below.  
Constitutional conventions or ‗unwritten‘ principles are frequently a mechanism for 
avoiding irresolvable confusion between the legal and the political rationalities. To 
illustrate the importance of all this, we can look to an immense volume of constitutional 
law scholarship on the question of their proper relation.99 To see a fundamental 
confusion which lurks below the surface we can however look to some of the confused 
language with which leading Canadian Constitutional Law textbooks treat the question. 
Hogg, who is, once again, the leading authority, writes,  
[c]onventions are rules of the constitution that are not enforced by the 
law courts. [citing Dicey as first among the authorities on this questions] 
Because they are not enforced by the law courts, they are best regarded 
as non-legal rules, but because they do in fact regulate the working of 
the constitution, they are an important concern of the constitutional 
lawyer.100  
                                                                                                                                         
Constitution unless otherwise stipulated in subsequent sections of Part V. Part V stipulates for a lower 
threshold of amendment requiring only the Federal Parliament and the Legislatures of 2/3 of the 
provinces having a minimum of 50% the total population of Canada, this is the default rule and is subject 
to a variety of procedural, time constraint, opt out privileges etc. pursuant to ss. 38(3), 39(1)-(2), 40 & 
42. S. 41 contains a ‘unanimity procedure’ (for any changes to the office of the Queen, Governor 
General, Lieutenant Governors, minimum number of seats each province is permitted in the House of 
Commons, the bilingual status of the country, the composition of the Supreme Court or the amending 
formula itself. This is somehow the heartland of sovereignty and it is not easy to unsettle. Finally, there 
are several more permutations: s. 43 ‘bilateral procedure’ in which consent to amendment affecting 
only one province requires only the consent of effected province; s. 44 ‘federal unilateral procedure’ 
(permitting unilateral amendment by Parliament in relation to functions or powers which are uniquely 
its own); s. 45 ‘provincial unilateral procedure’ (another homology permitting unilateral amendment by 
a Provincial Legislature of its own Constitution insofar as it is not in relation to functions or powers 
which it shares with other provinces or the Federal Government).  
99
 See Hogg n 7 above at 21, fn. 10.  
100
 Ibid. 
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As if to clear up the confusion, Hogg continues ―[w]hat convention do is to prescribe the 
way in which legal powers shall be exercised.‖101 Strange addenda insofar as he has 
just told us those conventions are ‗non-legal‘ rules which nevertheless ‗regulate the 
working of the constitution‘. He does not of course say that they are political rules.  In 
fact, the implication is that they are customary and therefore not political in the modern 
sense, really a throwback to the pre-political or ancient constitution. In their more 
critical alternative to Hogg‘s Constitutional Law textbook, Bakan, Borrows, Choudhry et 
al, write something else altogether. While conventions are ―not laws in the strict sense 
of enforceable rules‖ they are nonetheless ―part of the Canadian constitutional 
order.‖102 For the uninitiated all of this would seem very much contradictory and 
nonsensical. However it is not, it is an attempt to make sense of a very complex 
meeting place between rationalities which are inherent to both the material as much as 
the formal c/Constitution of Empire, to both the political as much as the legal.   
Much ink has been spilled asking the question: are conventions law? And, if not, what 
are they? These sorts of questions engage late twentieth century jurisprudential debate 
insofar as it is becoming increasingly plain, that profoundly political questions are 
creeping into the legal order. This notion itself is of course not new. It found itself 
articulated in the pens of critical legal realists throughout the latter decades of the 
twentieth century. In the Canadian context we have seen this tendency most clearly in 
what Michael Mandel styles the post-Charter ‗the legalization of politics‘.103 Although 
Negri has not, to my knowledge, engaged with a critical legal audience in Canada, he 
has done so in the UK, in the course of which, he endorsed the basic ethos of the 
critical legal project while at the same time worrying over its tendency to preserve or 
simply reverse dialectical configurations rather than escape them altogether. To make 
this point, he has emphasized as much as the increasingly non-existent fault line 
between the legal and the political,104 the even more fundamentally porous one 
between the private and the public.105  
G. The refusal of certainty and the crisis of the public/private as much as 
the legal/political binaries: the subjectivity of the multitude and project 
of the common as antidote 
The breakdown of the public/private distinction has marched in relative lockstep, at 
least in Canada‘s post-Charter epoch with the more high profile breakdown of the 
political/legal distinction understood to enter into crisis in the period of mega-
                                               
101
 Ibid. 
102
 n 91 above at 4. 
103
 See generally n 1 above. 
104
 Empire n 30 above at 307, 309. 
105
 Ibid. 141, 188-189, 301. 
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constitutional politics (1982-1998). An equally strong case can perhaps even be made 
that during this time the Supreme Court of Canada was forced to respond to an ever 
more complex overlap in private and public rationalities as much as it was legal and 
political ones. Liberal feminist scholars like Patricia Hughes are often best attuned to 
this tendency. Writing on the lead case of R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery (1986) 
(hereinafter, Dolphin Delivery),106 she frames the matter thus: ―how the Charter is 
applied breaks down the barriers between private and public, through the Charter 
values doctrine, and the importance of understanding the particular relationship 
between the public and private sphere in any given case.‖107  The ‗Charter values‘ 
doctrine points to the need to maintain Charter-like norms even in the realm of private 
relations between citizens. To make the absolute blurring and intermixing of public and 
private rationalities clearer, she adds in a pragmatic accent, ―[t]he Court‘s decisions 
with respect to which entities or conduct falls within subsection 32(1) do not make it 
easy to determine which entities are ‗government‘ and which are not.‖108  
                                               
106
 [1986] 2 SCR 573. Dolphin Delivery revolved around a labour dispute between scab workers and a 
striking union over the constitutionality of an injunction against ‘secondary picketing’. The Court held 
that the trial court’s jurisdiction to order injunctive relief was not subject to Charter scrutiny insofar as 
the interests involved were exclusively matters of private law. And therefore within the lacunae of 
common law rules and obligations about which the Charter had no interest whatsoever: “the Charter is 
intended to apply only to public bodies or, put another way, private actors owe no constitutional duty to 
other private actors.” Nevertheless, Dolphin Delivery rapidly became an important case for critical 
constitutional theorists because the formal holding of the majority was difficult to balance against 
obiter distinguishing the Court’s general obligation to “apply and develop the principles of the common 
law in a manner consistent with the fundamental values enshrined in the constitution,” among them 
that private parties owe a duty of care. 
107
 P. Hughes, ‘The Intersection of Public and Private Under the Charter’ (2003) 52 University of New 
Brunswick Law Journal 201, 207. In the post-Dolphin case law, Hughes argues, the steady expansion of 
the Charter or Charter-like liability tests adopted into the common law of tort, contract, property and 
other fields of private law is striking. Ibid. 207.  She emphasizes the following decisions: Hill v. Church of 
Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 SCR 1130 (finding a reverse onus on the claimant who alleges common 
law infringements on Charter rights, nevertheless permitting that such a claim is possible); Local 558 v. 
Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd. [2002] SCC 8 (describing,  again in obiter, a private party 
litigation as “a ‘Charter values’ case). What Hughes documents with extreme clarity is perhaps not 
unlike what Mandel has called ‘the legalization of politics’, albeit from a different angle. Here, the 
boundary becomes increasingly difficult to draw between ostensibly private and public spheres of life as 
much as economic and political rationalities. In every case the law is elevated to in some way provide 
(needed) mediation between the two. Again, this is grasped by Hughes when she writes, “how the 
Charter is applied breaks down the barriers between private and public, through the Charter values 
doctrine, and the importance of understanding the particular relationship between the public and 
private sphere in any given case.” To make the absolute blurring and intermixing of public and private 
rationalities clear, she adds in a pragmatic accent, “*t+he Court’s decisions with respect to which entities 
or conduct falls within subsection 32(1) do not make it easy to determine which entities are 
‘government’ and which are not.” 
108
 Ibid. 209 citing cases in which the distinction between private and public power is inscribed by way of 
ever greater degrees of legal technical contortions see eg McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 SCR 
229, 266 (holding the Charter applied to a university insofar as it was “performing a governmental 
objective” but not insofar as it was of concern only to “non-governmental entities created by 
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In the crisis of the relation between private and public, perhaps as between the political 
and the legal, the formal Constitution has run up against a serious impediment. It 
constantly seeks an outside which no longer exists (thus the need for more and more 
complex resort to the ‗unwritten principles‘ in the field of public law and to the Charter 
itself in the field of private law). The result for the formal Constitution is a crisis. 
Particularly insofar as the contemporary form of life which it hopes to represent is no 
longer really interested in performing according to the old rules set for it. It refuses 
prefabricated subjectivities by subverting them from within. The multitude refuses 
private as much as public expropriation of the common. From here, perhaps we can 
say that the common is a total obliteration of the private/public binary, a refusal of its 
language and logic. But really it is an immanent critique of it.  
To grasp the origins of this reading its barest essentials in Negri‘s intellectual 
formation, we can trace a line directly back from the very recent Commonwealth to The 
Savage Anomaly‘s much earlier pronouncement: ―that in Spinoza there is a profound 
refusal of formal considerations of the constitutional process: The limits are forces; the 
bounds of Power (potestas) are defined by powers (potentia).‖109 Here, the 
public/private binary, like the legal/political one, is really just a circuit of productive 
antagonism, through which both forms of power (power/Power) constantly surge. In 
every case, the multitude is the subject and the constitution of the common is its only 
telos. Here, the hegemonic formulation of the binary itself is finally subverted. This idea 
repeats itself throughout the trilogy with Hardt. In the next chapter I hope to present it in 
greater detail.   
Prior to doing this, it remains crucial to emphasize the degree to which the common‘s 
very conceptual formulation, implies line of flight from the rigid dichotomy between 
private and public as much as the legal and the political. Returning to some of the 
departure points in The Savage Anomaly and Negri‘s subsequent treasure trove of 
essays on Spinoza,110 the recent Commonwealth clarifies this at some length (once 
                                                                                                                                         
government for legally facilitating private individuals to do things of their own choosing without 
engaging governmental responsibility”).  
109
 A. Negri, The Savage Anomaly (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008) 206. 
110
 A. Negri, ‘Reliqua desiderantur: a conjecture for a definition of the concept of the democracy in the 
final Spinoza’ in T.S. Murphy (ed.) A. Negri, Subversive Spinoza n (Manchester: University of Manchester 
Press, 2004) 28-58; A. Negri, ‘Democracy and eternity in Spinoza’101-112 in same. In both essays, Negri 
schematizes some of the central arguments in his earlier The Savage Anomaly. First by presenting his 
own admittedly speculative, but nevertheless rigorous, reading of Spinoza’s unfinished Political Treatise. 
A reading in which presents the posthumously compiled draft as a firm step beyond the more widely 
interpreted and known Ethics and Theologico-Political Treatise (Negri made the same move relative to 
Marx in Marx Beyond Marx, preferring the speculative and unfinished Grundrisse over the established 
Capital Volume I in particular). In Spinoza’s Political Treatise Negri catches as glimpse, not only of an 
immanent critique of the social contractual modality, but of an affirmative alternative to it 32-33  : 
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again, in largely Spinozian terms).111 Here, Hardt and Negri‘s treatment of the common 
is directly relevant to our reading of the Canadian critical literature in the post-Charter 
epoch insofar as it builds on the concept of the multitude understood to be missing in 
both the Succession Reference, with its recourse to unwritten principles, and in the 
more day to day interpretation of which spheres of life are given Charter protection. A 
typically formalistic line of inquiry in which the legal scientific ‗interpretation‘ and 
‗application‘ of specific Charter provisions takes up all the oxygen. 
If I have suggested that mega-constitutionalism speaks to the total integration of 
political and legal rationalities, not only in reformist procedures and referendum drama, 
but also more generally across the terrain of post-Charter Canada, it is not to suggest 
that there are not very significant economic crosscurrents at play as well. Economic 
rationalities coexist and most importantly, radically intermingle even sometimes over 
determining, political and legal ones. The destabilization of the private/public 
organizational binary is of a similar nature.   
H. Conclusion 
Beyond the by now quite banal truism that ―there has been a continuous movement 
throughout the modern period to privatize public property‖, Negri has long considered 
the reasons, not only for the demise of the Keynesian welfare state (the late modern 
social state), but for the continuation, even expansion, of the normative science and 
de-ontological philosophy which purported to correspond to it as much as its 
predecessor (the high modern rights state).  
                                                                                                                                         
“...we can say, then, that social contract theory is in general a theory of the absolutist State, whereas 
the rejection of the theory, or its usage in terms that exclude the idea of a transfer of Power represents 
the  republican traditions that are polemical when confronted with any ideology of representative 
government and any statist praxis of alienation....the presence of social contract theory in the Tractatus 
Theologico-Politicas (in certain way it is almost unnoticed, it’s possible effects unrecognized, a tribute to 
the hegemonic currents of the century) nevertheless limits the possibilities of a radical innovative 
orientation. [citation omitted]. In the Political Treatise, on the other hand, corresponding to the absence 
of the contract there is a complete freedom of theoretico-political development...Right and politics have 
nothing to do with the negative and the dialectical essence of contrarianism; their absoluteness 
participates in and reveals the truth of action.” Or even, the material constitution of reality. In 
‘Democracy and eternity in Spinoza’ at 101-102, 105, 110, Negri directs his attention toward this very 
“constitution of reality” as a philosophical question and as a democratic praxis of the multitude. In so 
doing, he gives some hints as to how his own reading of Spinoza converges with that of Matheron and 
Deleuze in particular.  He also suggests a broader and more serious break with Heideggerian ontologies 
which he presents as a reactionary or negative inversion of the dialectic, rather than its surpassing or 
subversion of it.  
111
A fact which is overwhelmingly obvious from the first pages of the book in which Hardt an Negri 
explicitly pose Spinoza against thinkers as varied as his contemporary Hobbes and the much later Hegel 
(as much as to the twentieth century Heidegger) see eg M. Hardt & A. Negri, Commonwealth 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard Belknap, 2009) 52-53 (Spinoza contra Hobbes); xiii-xiv, 180-181 (Spinoza 
contra Heidegger). For more frequent pairing of Spinoza, if not explicitly then conceptually, contra Hegel 
and the Hegelian critiques of Empire see Multitude n 3 above at 225-227, 395 fn 46-47. 
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Hardt and Negri‘s argument today is, in effect, that both the rights and the social state 
have been combined and spread across the globe in the amalgam of sovereign Power 
and Capital called Empire.  The result, I have suggested in this chapter, is that 
wherever the formal Constitution, imagined as the science of mediation between the 
legal and political as much as public and private, is interposed, it is as a reaction to a 
crisis of representation, something which even the best and often most progressive 
Canadian constitutionalists do not consider, even as a possibility. 
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Chapter VI - An affirmative alternative: toward an Indigenous 
ontology of constitution 
To the extent that identity theories are political, they are about power 
and oppression…Cultures that locate identity in a politics of ideas, e.g. 
those belonging to Greek thought, tend to colonize other cultures, and 
rule politically oppressive states... 
A. Waters, ‘Ontology of Identity and Interstitial Being’ (2004)1  
 
Why do we continue to stumble and resist and deny when it comes this 
Aboriginal role in Canada? The most obvious answer is that we don‘t 
know what to do with the least palatable part of the settler story. We 
wanted the land. It belonged to someone else. We took it. 
J. Ralston Saul, A Fair Country: telling truths about Canada (2008)
2
 
 
The dominant forces of modernity encounter not mere differences but 
resistances. 
 
M. Hardt & A. Negri, Commonwealth (2009)
3
 
 
 
A. Introduction 
In this final substantive case study, we examine: (i) the constitutive ontology of 
Canada‘s Aboriginal people (whose participation in the global struggle of Indigenous 
people joins them to the Chiapas and other Amerindian examples more familiar to 
readers of Hardt and Negri‘s trilogy and the literature surrounding them4); and, (ii) the 
argument that between the Aboriginal and the European imagining of the constitutional, 
there is something other than a conventional dialectic in which the Indigenous is 
radically ‗outside‘, ‗excluded‘ or ‗other‘ to the Constitution.  From here, I will consider 
                                               
1
  A. Waters, ‘Ontology of Identity and Interstitial Being’ A. Waters (ed) American Indian Thought 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2004) 153-170, 154. 
2
 J. Ralston Saul, A Fair Country (Toronto: Viking, 2008) 27, 64. 
3
 M. Hardt & A. Negri, Commonwealth (Cambridge MA: Harvard Belknap, 2009) 69. 
4
 Negri’s work prior to his collaboration with Hardt rarely contained significant treatment of Indigenous 
questions and his attention to matters of interest to postcolonial scholars was either peripheral or 
hinged on the broader struggle against Capital and the State form (as articulated in a largely European 
register). This would change in Empire, which outlines its solidarity with major postcolonial figures from 
Fanon to Said and Spivak to Bhabha. Some postcolonial commentators and reviewers received this 
poorly insofar as it appeared to them that Hardt and Negri had cited these authors without developing 
their ideas other than as a means of supporting their own central arguments (for my summary and 
response to this line of critique see Chapter III, s. D). Hardt and Negri clearly absorbed this critique 
insofar as the subsequent volumes of the trilogy, Commonwealth in particular, contain an enhanced and 
deepened engagement with both postcolonial and Indigenous themes. On the question of Indigeneity 
specifically see J. Rabasa, ‘For Empire’ in 13 Rethinking Marxism 3/4 (2001) 8-16; J. Rabasa, ‘Negri by 
Zapata: Constituent Power and the Limits of Autonomy’ in T.S. Murphy & A.K. Mustapha (eds), The 
Philosophy of Antonio Negri: Resistance in Practice (Vol. I) (London: Pluto Press, 2005) 163-204. 
                   170 of 242 
whether the Charter might in fact be graspable as something other than a machine of 
radical and constant integration. But instead as a form of constant production, the 
production of man by man: homo faber.  
This chapter brings together Hardt and Negri‘s theorization of what they describe as 
‗Indigenous ontology‘ in Commonwealth with a selection of critical literature in the field 
loosely denominated as Canadian ‗Aboriginal Law‘. Consistent with the broader 
methodological approach underpinning this thesis, it does not rely exclusively on 
‗primary sources‘ of legal authority, whether formal constitutional texts, legislation, case 
law or other forms of positive law. Instead, its emphasis is on the ‗secondary‘ or critical 
literature itself. 
The 1999 Nunavut5 and Nisga‘a6 Agreements (granting hitherto unprecedented 
autonomy to the Nunavut and Nisga‘a peoples over their land, resources and cultural 
heritage, to the extent such things can be administered) as much as the long line of 
Supreme Court of Canada case law in the eighties and nineties connecting the 
breakthrough pre-Charter decision in Calder v. A.G.B.C. (recognizing for the first time 
the outlines of a possible ‗Indian title‘)7 to a series of other post-Charter decisions 
delineating the scope and limits of Aboriginal peoples‘ newly recognized section 25 and 
35 Charter rights.8 This narrative culminated in a legal decision much as did the one 
                                               
5
 Constitution Act, 1999 (Nunavut), SC 1998, c. 15, Pt. II (enacted pursuant to s. 44 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982 and granting wide-ranging autonomy and self-government powers to the Nunavut peoples 
over the previously federally administered eastern portion of Canada’s vast, resource rich, North West 
Territories).  
6
 Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, 1999 (BC), S.B.C. 1999, c. 2 (a treaty and land rights claims pursuant to ss. 
25&35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 grating wide-ranging autonomy and self-government power to the 
Nisga’a peoples over the Nass River Valley area in northwest British Columbia). See generally 
Constitution Act 1982, Schedule B to Canada Act 1982 (UK), c. 11) (enacting the new Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms) inclusive of s. 25 stipulating that no Charter provisions shall “be construed so as 
to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal treaty or other rights and freedoms” and s. 35 recognizing 
the existence and legitimacy of existing Aboriginal rights generally. 
7
 Calder v. A.G.B.C., [1973] SCR 313, 328, 346-347 (an early precedent rejecting the patently racist view 
of Indigenous peoples as having ‘rudimentary and incomplete’ legal systems ‘wholly without cohesion’ 
and incapable of grounding any claim to land: ‘...the fact is that when the settlers came, the Indians 
were there, organized in societies and occupying the land as their forefathers had done for centuries. 
That is what Indian title means.’). 
8
 R. v. Guerin, [1984] 2 SCR 335, 378 (dampening immediate post-Charter optimism of an expansive 
reading of Aboriginal treaty rights holding that ‘Indians’ right in the land were obviously diminished’, 
despite continuing ‘rights of occupancy and possession’ by the common law ‘principle of discovery’ 
justifying Canada’s ‘ultimate title in the land’ and confirming a paternalistic relation in which the Crown 
owes a fiduciary obligation or ‘trust like’ relation to Aboriginal peoples); R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 
SCR1075, 1097, 1103 (further dashing post-Charter hopefulness holding ‘...there was from the outset 
never any doubt that sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed the underlying title, to such lands 
vested in the Crown’); R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507 (raising expectations of a new opening 
holding that Aboriginal rights recognized by s. 35(1) of the Charter do indeed include a variety of 
practices and modes of existence forming a crucial part of the cultures of Aboriginal peoples at the time 
of first contact, albeit short of outright title and to be determined based on a ‘morally and politically 
defensible conception of rights’ incorporating ‘both *Common Law and Aboriginal Law+ legal 
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canvassed in the preceding chapter. If Canada‘s period of ‗mega-constitutional politics‘ 
was somehow concluded by the Succession Reference in 1998, its period of Aboriginal 
Law expansion reached a similar high point in Delgamuukw v. A.G.B.C. in which the 
Supreme Court recognizes oral testimony on equal footing with written evidence to 
ground Aboriginal land claims.9 All of this is not simply to remind readers of the 
obvious. Namely, that on many occasions during the same period there were militant 
forms of direct action taken by Aboriginal peoples, about which equally much has been 
written, particularly relative to the 1990 Oka Crisis10 and the 1995 occupation of 
Ipperwash Provincial Park (both of which have some overlaps with mobilization of the 
multitude presented in Chapter IV),11 but to focus instead on the basic conceptual 
building blocks which permit Canadian constitutionalists to develop what is 
denominated as ‗Aboriginal Law‘ both as a field of knowledge and legal technical 
intervention.  
Rather than revisiting the already well-trodden terrain of literature addressing key 
cases in the subfield of Aboriginal Law, my purpose in this chapter is to look to the 
treatment of Aboriginal Law as a disciplinary subdivision of the broader field of 
‗Constitutional Law‘. One which is interesting insofar as it brings together legal and 
political theory as well as philosophy and anthropology in a variety of innovative ways. 
                                                                                                                                         
perspectives’, ‘traditional *oral or written+ laws or customs are those things passed down, and arising 
from the pre-existing culture and customs of Aboriginal peoples’ but nevertheless ‘directed towards the 
reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown.’).  
9
 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010 (placing oral evidence on an equal plane with 
documentary evidence in cases involving the assertion of Aboriginal rights). 
10
 In the spring of 1990 militant members of the Mohawk Nation residing on the Kahnawake reserve in 
Quebec protested a plan by land developers and the municipality of Oka to build a golf course on the 
site of what  they maintained was an ancestral burial ground by setting up a barricade blocking the 
Mercier Bridge connecting Oka to the major highways serving the city of Montreal. On July 11
th
 at the 
request of the Oka Mayor, Quebec Provincial Police (the Sûreté de Québec) intervened and exchanged 
gunfire with militants resulting in the death a police officer. The conflict then radicalized with Mohawks 
expanding their claim into a nationalist register and culminated in then Quebec Premier Robert 
Bourassa asking the Canadian Armed Forces to intervene in the standoff. The barricades came down 
without any final resolution in the early fall of the same year see generally, M. Baxendale, C. MacLaine & 
R. Galbraith, This Land Is Our Land (Montreal: Optimum, 1990); G. York and L. Pindera, People of the 
Pines (Toronto: Little, Brown & Co., 1991); A. (T.) Alfred, Heeding the Voices of our Ancestors (Toronto: 
Oxford University Press, 1995); http://www.histori.ca/peace/page.do?pageID=343.  
11
 In the fall of 1995 radicalized members of the Chippewas of the Kettle and Stony Point First Nations 
occupied Ipperwash Provincial Park. Events culminated in a standoff between Ontario Provincial Police 
(the OPP) and an unarmed Stoney Point militant, Dudley George shot by a police bullet. After the defeat 
of the Conservative Government almost a decade later, the subsequent Liberal Government 
commissioned an official inquiry into the matter. Its report was released in 2007 and found that there 
had been significant police error and misconduct, as well as racist comments made by former Ontario 
Premier Mika Harris at the time events were unfolding. The Provincial Government subsequently 
returned the disputed land to the Chippewas of the Kettle and Stony Point First Nations (after a two 
year transition period the park was turned over to the exclusive control of the First Nation in May in 
2009). See generally, P. Edwards, One Dead Indian (Toronto: Stoddart, 2001); 
http://www.histori.ca/peace/page.do?pageID=344; 
http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/ipperwash/report/index.html.  
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Some of which might in some way speak to the Hardt and Negrian conceptual horizon. 
Particularly what Hardt and Negri denominate in Commonwealth as Indigenous or 
‗Amerindian ontology‘.12 Stated differently, my purpose will be to consider the potential 
nexus between what is understood by Canadian legal and political theorists as 
‗Aboriginal Law‘ and what Hardt and Negri describe as ‗making the common‘ as much 
as ‗being in common‘.13 James Youngblood Henderson approaches this concept in his 
major monograph First Nations Jurisprudence and Aboriginal Rights in which he 
presents a species of ―First Nations knowledge and jurisprudence‖,14 within which is 
grasped, a constitutive theory and praxis ―organized around four insights: the insights 
of the covenants of creation, embodied spirits, implicate order, and dynamic 
transformation.‖15  
 
B. Indigenous Ontology: what is it? 
In what Henderson calls ‗the covenants of creation‘ there is an imagining of a creative 
force, a ―Life-Giver or Creator‖ which, rather than being defined by a ―unity in the way 
suggested by Judeo-Christian religion as a universal being or transcendent person, 
contrasted with the earth and life forms on earth‖ is characterized by a force immanent 
to nature.16 Here, there is total convergence ―between being, goodness, and nature.‖17 
Rather than taking shape in the form of a religious covenant, like the one between God 
and Abraham or a secular social contract such as the one envisaged by modern 
bourgeois thought between ‗the Sovereign‘ and ‗the People‘, what is grasped here is a 
―covenantal relationship to the land as being ‗on loan‘ from the great Spirit‖. Crucially, 
this relationship is based not on the grant of Lockian ownership interests, but on a 
legacy of ―[l]anguage, teaching, prophecies, ceremonies, rituals and protocols‖.18 It is in 
other words a form of collective intelligence as well as a cultural bounty, an immaterial 
as much as a material common(s). We can find a similar notion in Commonwealth, in 
which Hardt and Negri describe the common as the product of ―[i]ntellectual, 
communicative, and affective means of cooperation‖. All of which are immanent to 
being, created in ―productive encounters themselves‖ and impossible to direct from any 
imagined or real ―outside.‖19  
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 n 3 above at 124. 
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 Ibid. 123. 
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 J.Y. Henderson, First Nations Jurisprudence and Aboriginal Rights (Saskatoon: University of 
Saskatchewan Press, 2006) 129. 
15
 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. 130. 
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 Ibid.  
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 Ibid. 140. 
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Taking a closer look, what is presented by Henderson as First Nations jurisprudence, is 
something quite apart from the familiar social contractual imagining of 
constitutionalism: 
In the contract, individuals are drawn into a vertical relations with 
the figure of authority and not horizontal relations with others like 
them. An individual can never produce the common, no more than 
an individual can generate a new idea without relying on the 
foundation of common ideas and intellectual communication with 
others like them. Only a multitude can produce the common.20 
A second insight which Henderson attributes to First Nations jurisprudence is the 
notion of ―embodied spirits‖ as a form of constitutive capacity which is never closed, 
always open and creative:  
Although Aboriginal people view the realms of spirit as eternal, those 
realms are in a continuous state of transformation...All these forces can 
change their shape, form, or content; but collectively they create the 
force called life. This insight is consistent with the scientific view that all 
matter can be seen as energy, shaping itself to particular patterns.21  
Here again, we can grasp several elements of constitution which dovetail nicely with 
Negri‘s theory of constitutive ontology, both as developed in collaboration with Hardt 
and on his own. First, in terms of the question of the constitution of time, or better, the 
open time of constituent power (constitution) rather than the closed or historicized time 
of constituted power (Constitution),22 and, second, in the imagining of the multitude as 
a corporeal subjectivity which constitutes the common.  
Henderson‘s third axiom of a potential First Nations Jurisprudence, the concept of 
‗implicate order‘ might present a further degree of coincidence with what Hardt and 
Negri describe in Commonwealth as Indigenous ontology. Here again, we pick up on 
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 Ibid. 303. 
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 Ibid. 136.  
22 This notion has a pedigree in Negri’s thought before his millennial collaboration with Hardt see ie A. 
Negri, Insurgencies (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) 2, 41-42, 48, 198, 232 (treating 
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routine...”; A. Negri, The Constitution of Time in Time for Revolution, (London: Continuum, 2003) 84-86, 
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affirms ‘its continuing validity and therefore its universality by superimposing the fixity of an eternal 
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the necessity of removing the collective dimension and the productive autonomy of time, of temporal 
being, because their emergence means antagonism.”)  
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familiar themes. Namely, the constitutive quality of language and its intersection with 
corporeality and life:  
What the sounds of the language contain is the great flux, eternal 
transformation, and an interconnected order of time, space, and 
events. [citation omitted] With this fluidity of verb phrase, every 
speaker can create new vocabulary ‗on the fly,‘ custom-tailored to 
meet the experience of the moment, to express the very finest 
nuances of meanings...Through unique word-endings, languages 
divide the world into the animate (breathing) and the inanimate 
(non-breathing), or what is intrinsically respected and not. In 
English this process or experience can be described as the 
implicate order.23 
The implicate order points to the constitutive quality of a linguistic common, its 
Wittgensteinian dimensions. There is also some degree of confluence with the type of 
philosophy which Deleuze and Guattari famously describe in What is Philosophy? as 
the invention of concepts.24  This complex nexus of crucial ideas can perhaps be 
usefully fleshed out in an Indigenous register what Henderson describes it as ―the 
interconnected order of time, space and events‖. Here, the ontological dimension of 
Hardt and Negri‘s thought and its intersection with a potential First Nations ontology of 
constitution becomes increasingly plausible. To grasp it, it is instructive think of what 
(Hardt and) Negri call kairòs. Kairòs is the opposite of chronos or ―the linear 
accumulation of time‖. It is, in other words, not the realization of a particular telos but 
instead the ―moment when the arrow [of time] is shot by the bowstring‖. Kairòs, Hardt 
and Negri tell us, speaks to the action which is constitutive of events materializing in 
time and space and arising from an ―accumulation of common and cooperative 
decisions‖. It presents a ―moment of rupture or clinamen that can create a new world‖.  
Or better, ―a new constitutive temporality‖ which inaugurates ―a new future‖.25  
Insofar as kairòs, which means in ancient Greek, a ‗just or opportune moment‘ or ‗time 
of God‘26 (Negri‘s usage here suggests this meaning rather than the more obvious 
theological concept of destiny). It might be suggested that kairòs is precisely that which 
overpowers any predetermined outcome to define itself within the intelligent mind and 
body of the archer. This has a certain resonance in Henderson‘s formulation of a 
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 n 14 above at 144-145.  
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 I make this assertion advisedly in light of Negri’s recent comment on What is Philosophy?  in interview 
with Cesare Casarino see C. Casarino & A. Negri, A Conversation on Philosophy and Politics (Minneapolis: 
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Hardt, contains an overwhelming tendency to treat philosophy as the invention, reinvention, production 
and reproduction of concepts.  
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 M. Hardt & A. Negri, Multitude (London: Penguin, 2005) 357.  
26
 A. Negri & R. Scelsi, Goodbuy Mr. Socialism (London: Serpent’s Tail, 2008) (orig. pub. 2006) 243. 
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potential ‗First Nations Jurisprudence‘, particularly insofar as he develops the idea of 
implicate order.27 A notion which points to the extent that Aboriginal languages are 
capable of shrugging off the hegemonic constructions of modern constitutional 
philosophy and science, or at least subverting them from within, of generating and 
sustaining an immanent critique. 
What a potential First Nations Jurisprudence offers then is something other than the 
dominant historicized representation of the Constitution of the State. Henderson 
reinforces this reading in the Cree word, ê-miciminitômakahki, a transitive verb/noun 
which again points to the ―interconnected order of time space and events‖ and is better 
able than any European construction to grasp the dynamic quality of being. What is 
crucial here is the materiality of language itself, its capacity to produce or constitute the 
real (rather than its usual hegemonic western or European function of representing or 
mediating the real).This is equally what is grasped by Henderson as the distinction 
between ―the animate (breathing) and the inanimate (non-breathing), or what is 
intrinsically respected and not.‖ If we can imagine the constitution of the common as 
something which is breathing and animate, whether in its formulation as the natural 
environment (inclusive of man and beast) or in its formulation as a communicative and 
ideational realm (as an intellectual one), we can begin to see how the constitution of 
the State might be decentered, even viewed as inanimate, dead, closed or reactionary 
in comparison.  
 
Constitution as transformation or mutatio 
The fourth and final dimension of what Henderson calls a First Nations Jurisprudence 
is ‗dynamic transformations‘. Here again, the confluence with what Hardt and Negri 
describe as the constitution of the common, in both its linguistic and corporeal, 
representational and material dimensions, is striking. Once more, the analysis passes 
through Wittgenstein and the distinction between the affirmative act of constituting 
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 Commonwealth n 3 above at 165. See generally A. Negri, Kairòs, Alma Venus, Multitudo in M. 
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(which is fluid without being flimsy) and the negative finality of what is already 
constituted (which is mystificatory in the extreme): 
We should highlight two aspects of Wittgenstein‘s operation. First, 
by grounding truth in language and language games, he removes 
truth from any fixity in the transcendental and locates it on the fluid, 
changeable terrain of practice, shifting the terms of discussion from 
knowing to doing. Second, after destabilizing truth he restores to it 
a consistency. Linguistic practice is constituent of truth that is 
organized in forms of life: ‗to imagine a language means to imagine 
a form of life.‘ [citation omitted] Wittgenstein‘s concepts manage to 
evade on one side individual, haphazard experience and, on the 
other transcendental identities and truth, revealing instead, 
between or beyond them, the common. Language and language 
games, after all, are organizations and expressions of the common, 
as is the notion of a form of life. Wittgensteinian biopolitics moves 
from knowledge through collective practice to life, all on the terrain 
of the common. [citation omitted]28 
Similarly, in Henderson‘s language:  
First Nation jurisprudence is preoccupied with changes. Because of 
the embodied spirits, life forms are always capable of overcoming 
all of the conditions or determination of their existence...The insight 
that all life can grow beyond the limits of its own existence 
structures the languages, perception of the earth, and stories. 
Aboriginal languages focus on the flowing order of movements and 
irregularity of existence without attempting to structure then into a 
normative explanation or order.29 
A variety of crucial points are evident here beyond the obvious (albeit absolutely 
central ones) of change and dynamism. All contain significant overlaps with (Hardt 
and) Negri‘s theorization of constitutionalism as something other than the science of 
‗the Constitution‘ of ‗the State‘ (‗Constitutional Law‘ as species of political or legal 
science) and the de-ontological (usually liberal) normative philosophy of social 
contract to which it has come to correspond in the hegemonic strain of western 
modernity (albeit not without various weak social democratic, communitarian or 
‗egalitarian‘ permutations).  
 
C. Problematizing ‘Aboriginal Law’  
In the central part of this chapter, the convergence between what Hardt and Negri 
describe in Commonwealth as ‗Indigenous ontology‘ and what Henderson styles in 
the Canadian context as ‗First Nations jurisprudence‘ is further examined. As are the 
contours of a potentially broader relationship between what can be styled 
‗Indigenous ontology‘ and what is called ‗Aboriginal Law‘. Aboriginal Law is treated 
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 n 3 above at 122. 
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(relatively uncontroversially) as an interdisciplinary subfield in which political and 
legal theory combine, sometimes alongside anthropological approaches, to examine 
the ‗traditional‘ or ‗customary‘ laws of Indigenous peoples, both autonomously and 
as objects of ‗recognition‘, ‗accommodation‘ or ‗integration‘ by (Constitutional, 
Administrative, Criminal, Family and other fields of) Canadian Law.  
My argument is that there is a marked tendency in the literature to confuse so called 
‗Aboriginal Law‘ with Indigenous ontology in a way which tends to obscure an 
interesting distinction between them. One which tracks what Hardt and Negri 
describe as ‗hypermodern‘, ‗postmodern‘ and ‗altermodern‘ forms of rationality.  
 
Distinguishing between forms of modernity: hyper, alter, post (and anti) 
In what follows, I draw upon Commonwealth insofar as it explicitly locates itself in the 
vein of an emerging ‗altermodernity‘. Altermodernity is introduced both as a way of 
breaking the modern/antimodern dialectic and as an alternative to the two dominant 
late twentieth century modernisms of the (more or less) critical left, ‗hypermodernism‘ 
and ‗postmodernism‘.30  Hardt and Negri associate hypermodernity with the project to 
renew or otherwise fulfill the promise of the modernity, as exemplified by largely neo-
Kantian and cosmopolitan renaissance in the intellectual milieu of the nineties which 
saw ―no break with the principles of modernity but rather a transformation of some of 
modernity‘s major institutions.‖31 For its part, postmodernism is treated as a 
breakthrough insofar as it ―marks a much more substantial rupture‖ with modernity and 
its core elements, a rupture, which is alternatively celebrated or lamented by 
postmodern authors depending on their ideological proclivities. 
Although Hardt and Negri allow that the postulation of a postmodernity remains 
essential to elucidate the ―historical break that presents new conditions and new 
possibilities in a wide variety of social fields: on the economic terrain, for example, with 
the reorganization of relations of production in the emergence of the hegemony of 
immaterial production; and on the political terrain with the decline of structure of 
national sovereignty and the emergences of global mechanisms of control‖,32 they 
insist things cannot be left at that.  The postmodern break must now, Hardt and Negri 
write, be surpassed, particularly insofar as it does not alone offer an affirmative 
alternative to the modern epoch which it so effectively describes in its twilight. This is 
what Hardt and Negri mean when they describe the term ‗postmodernism‘ as carrying 
an undesirable degree of conceptual ambiguity. It fails to suggest what might be 
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imagined in the aftermath of modernity other than its simple negation. In other words, 
what might be beginning rather than ending.33  
Commonwealth steps into this breach.  A ambitious task which it undertakes in three 
interrelated and mutually reinforcing steps: (1) a ―philosophical and historical‖ analysis 
of ―the republic, modernity and capital, each of which is treated as an obstruction and 
corruption of the common‖; (2) a ―political and economic analysis of the contemporary 
terrain of the common‖; and, (3) a consideration of ―the current state and potential of 
the multitude‖ alongside ―a reflection on the contemporary possibilities for revolution 
and the institutional processes it would require.‖34 At each stage, the constitution of the 
common is developed as an alternative to both the public rationality of the State and 
the private rationality of Capital. This formulation is altermodern rather than post, hyper 
or antimodern insofar as it presents an alternative formulation within and against 
modernity, which is neither its dialectical negation nor its structural opposite but rather 
its immanent critique.  
Henderson‘s imagining of First Nations jurisprudence, as much as similar and 
related constructions by other noted Aboriginal Law scholars, like Borrows, whose 
recent book, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution,35 points to a similar set of 
propositions, share much with what Hardt and Negri describe in Commonwealth as 
Indigenous or ‗Amerindian ontology‘ (itself a species of altermodern rationality).36 
The difficulty, however, is that even among those, like Henderson and Borrows, who 
are creative and progressive there is little interest in radically reinventing the 
broader field of Constitutional Law. Reformists will of course respond incredulously: 
why should there be? Perhaps a serious reformism is as worthwhile or more than a 
speculative radicalism. I do not know. However, as long as Aboriginal Law is a 
subfield of Constitutional (and Administrative, Criminal, Municipal and a vast variety 
of other areas of) Law, the question must be posed.  
My point here is perhaps more than anything about what any so called ‗Aboriginal 
Law‘ inherits from its parent, ‗Constitutional Law‘ is plain: an unshakable, deference 
to the Supreme Court and the Constitution. Or what I have called, following Hardt 
and Negri‘s definition in Empire a deferral to ―the formal constitution, the written 
document along with its various amendments and legal apparatuses‖. Which, in 
contra distinction to ―the material constitution, that is the continuous formation and 
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ref-formation of the composition of social forces‖,37 revolves exclusively around de-
ontological questions of normative science. 
What renders ‗Aboriginal Law‘ as a species of Constitutional Law at the highest level 
of generalization is that it tends to employ a legal pluralist ethos and methodology to 
address the question of Indigeneity in a way which, although well intended and 
based on a progressive impulse, is a poorly formed instrument for the liberation of 
the common. To remark on the Eurocentric imagining of ‗the Constitution‘, ‗the 
State‘ and ‗the Law‘ as productive categories, representations or structures of 
meaning, is really only the beginning. Unfortunately, Canadian Aboriginal Law 
scholars tend to vacillate between a hypermodern fortification of the dominant 
discourse (hypermodern insofar as they seek to augment or deliver on the promise 
of Enlightenment in an updated and improved manner) or antimodern negation of it 
(insofar as they seek to negate or reverse its balance, hence the sometimes strange 
attraction between subaltern peoples and the premade subjectivity of the noble 
savage).  
To make matters more complex however, there is also a very real postmodern 
dimension to Aboriginal Law. This is nowhere more obvious than in the hybrid or 
combinatory construction of the field. At the highest level of generality all of this is 
patently obvious in the foundational conjunction of ‗Aboriginality‘ and ‗Law‘ itself. It is 
in this basic hybridity which Aboriginal Law can be said to be a postmodern as much 
as it is hypermodern. Aboriginal Law is, after all, nothing if not the postmodern 
blurring of the boundary between Indigenous and European forms.  
Few contemporary Canadian thinkers pick up on this subtle point better than John 
Ralston Saul, whose monograph, A Fair Country,38 describes Canada as a ‗Métis 
civilization‘, as neither purely European nor purely Aboriginal People. Although this 
phraseology is not without its descriptive usefulness, it takes for granted the idea of 
Canada itself (inclusive of the State, Constitution and Law to which it corresponds). 
The same is true of jurists like Borrows who critiques the idea of Canada as bi-
juridical (French Civil and English Common Law) jurisdiction and instead proposes it 
simply as a multi-juridical (Civil, Common and Indigenous).39 The difficulty in each 
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case is that Canada is treated as a conglomerate of ‗Nations‘ housed within a 
broader ‗State‘ on what is effectively a European template. What may be elided in 
these types of otherwise progressive idioms is the real subsumption of the 
Indigenous to the European. Or even the possibility that the contemporary Canadian 
legal order may in fact not be moving along a progressive telos toward a truly 
accommodative ethos in which all its imagined founding peoples are placed (on 
anything other than a purely formal or representationally) equal footing.   
 
The (hegemonic?) narrative of Aboriginal Law  
Ultimately, this chapter is written on the basis of the belief that more sober scrutiny and 
critique is required of the increasingly dominant, even hegemonic, legal pluralist current 
in Canadian constitutional thought, one which broke into the mainstream a decade and 
a half ago with James Tully‘s Strange Multiplicity in which he (not unlike Negri, albeit to 
somewhat different and less radical effect) combines Wittgenstein‘s language theory 
and Indigenous thought to reconsider the field of constitutionalism. Perhaps what 
distinguishes Tully most obviously from Negri is the logico-semantic frame he employs. 
One which permits him to describe the central conundrum of constitutionalism only in 
terms of the politics of identity or ‗cultural recognition‘ in which ‗identity‘ and ‗culture‘ 
are ―aspectival rather than essential: like many complex human phenomena, such as 
language and games...‖40 This is only part of the way toward what Hardt and Negri are 
driving at and it tends to slip into the sort of discourse theory and identity politics Hardt 
and Negri warn against in Commonwealth.  
Tully relies heavily on Bill Reid‘s iconic sculpture, The Spirit of Haida Gwaii. A sculpture 
in which Haida cosmology is presented as a potential alternative to the social 
contractual metaphysics in which what is constituted is not, as in western thought a 
unity or a singularity, but as in Indigenous thought, a common and a multiplicity. It is 
still however not fully coincident with the Araweté cosmology drawn upon by Hardt and 
Negri in their incorporation of Viveiros de Castro‘s reading in which ―perspective is not 
a representation‖, ―Becoming is prior to Being‖ and ―the relation to alterity is not just a 
means of establishing identity but a constant process: becoming-jaguar, becoming 
other‖.41 Certainly, the Haida cosmology highlighted by Tully is one in which things are 
―not always as they appear‖ and our ―habitual forms of recognition are often stultifying 
forms of misrecognition that need to be upset and reversed...‖42 However, in the post-
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Charter era generally, and the field of Aboriginal Law specifically, it is Tully‘s brand of 
Indigenized legal pluralism and dialogic recognition-based constitutionalism which has 
increasingly found its way into the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada. As 
such, it has largely been de-radicalized, even subsumed. 
This is nowhere more obvious and explicit than in the celebrated judgment of Chief 
Justice Beverly McLachlin in Haida Nation v. British Columbia (2004) in which she held 
that ―[t]he honour of the Crown requires that these [Aboriginal] rights be determined, 
recognized and respected [emphasis my own].‖43 Or earlier in R. v. Mitchell (2001) in 
which she wrote ―aboriginal interests and customary laws were presumed to survive 
the assertion of [Crown] sovereignty, and were absorbed into the common law as 
rights...‖44  
It is on the basis of these types of judicial constructions, which are often lauded by 
commentators, many of whom celebrate the language of recognition, reconciliation 
and absorption without adequate critical reflection, that Ralston Saul has been able 
to describe the Supreme Court as among Canada‘s most progressive institutions, 
one which is ahead of the curve or otherwise leading the way in the fair and just 
treatment of Aboriginal people.45 Or that Borrows is able to treat Chief Justice 
McLachlin‘s language in Haida and Mitchell as a ―strong endorsement of the need to 
determine, recognize, and respect Aboriginal rights in Canada‖46 (seemingly 
forgetting his earlier assertion, that ―we must jettison stereotypes that imply the 
ancient legal traditions of Indigenous people are static‖47).  
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D. Toward the constitution of the common: possibilities and limits in 
‘Aboriginal Law’ 
By way of summary, if we take Henderson‘s conceptualization of a ‗First Nations 
jurisprudence‘, Borrows ‗Indigenous Constitution‘48 , or Tully‘s ‗Strange multiplicity‘ 
seriously, we find an increasingly influential current in Canadian constitutional 
theory. One which is nevertheless not adequately radicalized insofar as it: 
(1) Treats ‗Aboriginal Law‘ as a disciplinary subset of ‗Constitutional Law‘ 
(implying an unbreakable link between the two and the ultimate 
subordination of the former to the latter); and,  
(2) Collapses an intersubjective, dialogic and recognition-based ethics, with 
what Hardt and Negri style ‗Indigenous ontology‘ in a way which privileges 
the former and occludes the latter). 
Productive antagonism 
Tully, particularly where he evokes Bill Reid‘s iconic sculpture, The Spirit of Haida 
Gwaii, as a template for an Aboriginal constitutionalism (something which he posits 
in terms of negotiation and collaboration) has an unfortunate tendency to slip into 
dialogic and recognition-based descriptors.  However, his imagining also points to 
elements of what Negri might describe as productive antagonism. In this sense, the 
canoe paddled by members of the Haida pantheon depicted in the iconic sculpture, 
is at the same time a representation of ―the common place where the vying and 
squabbling endlessly goes on‖ and a vehicle for forward movement and dynamism 
arising from the combination of productive difference and common purpose.49  
 
Becoming rather than being 
We find another crucial element of what Hardt and Negri theorize as the constitution 
of the common in Henderson‘s description of First Nations jurisprudence as 
―sociable‖ and communicative, revolving ―around ‗becomings‘ rather than ‗beings,‘ 
what happens as opposed to what is.‖50 The same can be said of Borrows, who 
describes the Inuit notions of ―Piliriqatigiinniq (working together for a common 
cause)‖, “Ikajuqatigiiniq (assistance and cooperation without barriers)‖ and 
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―Qaujimautittiarniq (information sharing)‖ as among the central notions of the Inuit 
legal tradition.51  
 
An altermodern common? 
In his Peace, Power, Righteousness (2009),Taiaiake Alfred, a non-jurist political 
theorist, grasps the juridico-political intersection of the Indian better than most. He 
also defines the project of Indigeneity as one which is defined by something very 
much akin to what Hardt and Negri call altermodern rationality, a philosophy which 
is ―neither derived from the Western model nor a simple [antimodern] reaction 
against it‖.52 For Alfred, this means looking across and between the infinite 
multiplicity of Indigenous peoples to ―identify certain common beliefs, values, and 
principles‖, ―an intellectual, social, and political movement that will reinvigorate those 
values, principles, and other cultural elements that are best suited to the larger 
contemporary political and economic reality.‖53 Or elsewhere, a form of ―dynamic 
interaction‖ which ―cannot be replicated or properly expressed by a single person 
‗objectively‘ studying isolated parts of the reality‖ but is instead the product of a 
collective intelligence and cooperative effort.54 
 
The corruption of the common and the domestication of Indigenous ontology 
(the risk of subsumption) 
What is grasped, with an at least partially Indigenous lens, is a glimpse at the 
constitution of the common rather than the usual Constitution of the State. If Tully is 
among the first to move in this direction, many have since followed suit. So much so 
that this approach has become increasingly ubiquitous, even commonplace. It is 
perhaps no coincidence that Bill Reid‘s iconic sculpture, The Spirit of Haida Gwaii, 
which Tully so heavily relied upon as a heuristic device in Strange Multiplicity, 
originally appeared in the courtyard of the hypermodern (Trudeau commissioned 
Arthur Ericson designed) Canadian Chancery in Washington and today graces the 
back of Canada‘s twenty dollar bank note. Worse, a massive facsimile of The Spirit 
of Haida Gwaii is also the first thing which greets arriving passengers to the arrivals 
concourse at the Vancouver International Airport. In both cases, there is a sense 
this potent symbol of the common has not only become iconic, it has been 
domesticated and robbed of whatever may have been its earlier more radical 
potential. This is why its insertion into the deterritorialized non-space of Empire (for 
                                               
51
 n 35 above at 103.  
52
 n 3 above at 113. 
53
 T. Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).  
54
 Ibid. 14.  
                   184 of 242 
what is an Airport breezeway or paper bill if it is not this?55) strikes us unremarkable. 
Of course it is there, we say to ourselves, it is Canadian. 
What Hardt and Negri present in Commonwealth as the constitution of the common 
and describe as a species of alter rather than either hyper or postmodern 
constitution, is approached by certain innovative Indigenous thinkers such as Alfred, 
at least in insofar as they offer Indigenous concepts as viable alternatives to the 
―endless references to the ‗market,‘ ‗fiscal reality,‘ ‗Aboriginal rights,‘ and ‗public 
will‘‖56 as much as other ―European concepts‖ such as ―taxation, citizenship, 
executive authority, and sovereignty‖.57 Many of which are retained, even 
augmented, in hypermodernity, critiqued in postmodernity (without the proposition of 
an alternative) or simply crudely negated or reversed in various forms of antimodern 
thought.   
Approaching the constitution of the common as an alternative, Alfred describes as 
―perhaps the only pan-Indian commonality‖ or only ―common elements of the 
indigenous tradition‖, the notion that ―[i]deas transform when they make the journey 
from the mind of one person into the collective consciousness.‖58 In Commonwealth 
Hardt and Negri write: ―An individual can never produce the common, no more than 
an individual can generate a new idea without relying on the foundation of common 
ideas and intellectual communication with other. Only a multitude can produce the 
common.‖59 This would seem a very significant convergence which points toward a 
definition of the common which can already be understood to exist within the 
present Canadian situation. 
 
Where we have come from and where we are going 
For Hardt and Negri, the constitution of the common rather than the modern State is 
the only political project which can today be contemplated as a radical or even 
progressive one. Having passed from modernity to postmodernity through the 
crucible of the Charter, Canada, like any State, is wholly within the broader 
productive networks of Empire. Nevertheless it retains many of its characteristics 
insofar as it, like any state, may or may not coincide with dual or even multiple 
nations beneath its formal apparatus.  
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Left-leaning theorists and commentators at least will agree Canada is itself possible 
to justify, if at all, by some versions of the ‗3 nations theory of confederation‘ or what 
John Borrows calls its ‗multi-juridical legal culture‘.60 Ralston Saul calls its hybrid or 
‗Métis civilization‘. The idea here would be of a culture founded on biological as 
much as an intellectual miscegenation (also of one which is triadic rather than purely 
binary, dialectical or dyadic, and by extension, a very Negrian formulation). It means 
the old imagining of Anglophone and Francophone Canada (as emphasized in the 
case study presented in the preceding chapter, Chapter V) is displaced. Not only by 
the realities of multiethnic and multilingual immigration, but by the earlier and pre-
existing claims of Canada‘s Aboriginal, Indigenous or ‗First Nations‘ peoples to the 
land itself. This is the postcolonial reading and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, it 
has made its way, quite literally, into the formal language of the Constitution 
(Charter ss. 25, 35).61.  
Increasingly over the last three decades, Indigenous peoples have seen their claims 
borne out by both Supreme Court jurisprudence and in the exponential growth of 
treaty, self-government and autonomy negotiations between Canada‘s Aboriginal 
peoples and all levels of the Provincial and Federal Governments.62  All of this has 
been observed upon endlessly. What has not however been adequately theorized is 
what it might mean other than as a series of simple culminations of prior struggles.  
 
E. The Constitution of the common 
One of the crucial findings of the research underpinning this chapter lies in the 
critical convergence between Negri‘s constitutive ontology, his imagining of the 
collective subjectivity of the multitude and its project of constituting of the common, 
and that of the sui generis (and this is the precise phraseology used by the Supreme 
Court of Canada) quality of Aboriginal Law.63 What is sui generic in the Aboriginal 
claim to constitutional autonomy is its praxis and strategy of exodus or escape, its 
Deleuzian qualities. Canada‘s Aboriginal people are no longer, if they ever were, 
looking for further integration into the Charter, but rather to the possibility of a 
constitutive project marked by Indigenous ways of being. It is here that Canada‘s 
Aboriginal people, both in their institutional and governmental (and Negri does not 
deny these things exist and matter), as well as their ethical and philosophical 
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contributions to Canadian thought, have sought to resist or escape sovereign 
Power, first in the modern colonial epoch and now in the postmodern transition to 
Empire. 
What the Supreme Court of Canada has quite rightly captured as the sui generis 
quality of Aboriginal ‗customary law‘, particularly its framing of questions of 
‗sovereignty‘ and ‗property‘,64 might help elucidate and concretize what is grasped by a 
Negri-inspired theorization of the constitution of the common in particular. The same 
can be said of treaty claims which open up the possibility of: (i) an immanent critique of 
the social contractual metaphysics upon which the Charter (like all ‗Constitutions‘) 
relies; (ii) an alternative praxis of ontological constitution (one marked by innovation, 
contingency and openness rather than order, determinism and historic-temporal 
closure); and, (iii) a generalized confounding of the public/private binary upon which 
modern constitutional rationality relies. Here, at some distance from reformist and 
sovereignty dialectics of ‗mega-constitutional politics‘ (as presented and in the 
preceding Chapter V), we are faced with the non-dialectics of immeasurability and the 
refusal of formal representation. Both of which characterizes the immanence of the 
multitude as much as the democratic quality of its project, again, the constitution of the 
common.  
 
The basics of a Negri-inspired alternative: materialism, immanentism and 
antagonism 
We have considered how the hegemonic language of modern constitutionalism begins 
to crack under the immense pressure of an insistent Indigenous ontology. An ontology 
which asserts the autonomy of the common against all formations of public as much as 
private Power and interposes itself as an immanent critique of, and exodus from, 
Capital and the State and their cooperative duality (the dual corruption of the common 
by private and public expropriation, or Empire, at least at its highest degree of 
generalization). Here, Aboriginal strategies of self-government and treaty negotiation in 
post-Charter Canada might be said to coincide with Negri‘s constitutive ontology of the 
common insofar as both are premised on the autonomy of the social rather than the 
autonomy of the political. Again, this productive intersection of Negri‘s theorization of 
the common and its instantiation in recent real and symbolic victories of Canada‘s 
Aboriginal peoples might be instructive. But it is one which risks being misunderstood if 
it is not carefully grounded in Negri‘s materialism. 
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For Negri, materialism begins with a simple triad: Machiavelli-Spinoza-Marx. It is posed 
as something of an alternative to, and an immanent critique of, the transcendental and 
de-ontological triad grasped in the hegemonic triangulation of Hobbes-Rousseau-
Hegel. In order to properly understand this as something other than a strangely 
recreated dialectic it is necessary to stress the question of immanence. The materialist 
and ontological elements exist within and against modernity.  They are not species of 
external critique or neutral science.  
The stance of being against and opposite is no longer really possible here. It is only 
possible to imagine being enmeshed with and indeed of the same stuff as everything 
else. This is at the most fundamental level, what it means to be a materialist. Yet, 
things cannot be understood in this way and left at that. What must also be grasped is 
the (re)productive, rather than determinative, quality of social ‗antagonism‘ itself.65 
Again, at the most basic level this is understood by Tully‘s example of Bill Reid‘s The 
Spirit of Haida Gwaii. However, Negri takes things a step further to pose the matter of 
social antagonism in an explicitly anti-dialectical fashion (to insist constantly that while 
the dialectic, self and other, same and different, is productive only of teleological 
closure and determinism, a more free flowing social antagonism is productive of the 
common).  
Operating in the background of all these formulations is a concept more precisely 
delineated in other European languages: in German, Macht/Vermögen, in French, 
pouvoir/puissance, in Italian, potere/potenza and in Latin potestas/potentia. In each 
case, the first half of the binary is grasped as command, domination, rulership or 
imperium; and the second half as capacity, potential, strength or resistance. In his 
translation of The Savage Anomaly, Hardt renders this distinction by way of 
capitalization, ‗Power‘ in the case of potestas and ‗power‘ in the case of potentia. 66   
Tully‘s un-capitalized reference to ‗the people‘ as a non-descript base unit upon which 
diversity unfolds reveals much. As does his similarly uncritical usage of terms like 
‗reform‘ and ‗recognition‘, all of which require some form of organizational binary or 
dialectic to be understood. Although he perhaps closes the door to making the fulsome 
transition from ‗the state of being-in-common‘ to that of ‗making the common‘, which 
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Hardt and Negri insist upon,67 Tully‘s contribution to Canadian constitutional theory is 
closer to what Hardt and Negri envision than most. Even closer however is Ralston 
Saul, who describes Canada as ―a Métis civilization‖. 68   
In Ralston Saul‘s analysis of Canadian constitutional history, we find the striking 
assertion that ―the idea of egalitarianism that we have today is far closer to that of 
seventeenth- or eighteenth-century First Nations than it is to [European] newcomers of 
that period.‖69 Or elsewhere, ―the broad reality was an integrated First Nations role, 
central to the shaping of this country, which went on for twice as long as Canada has 
existed as a Confederation.‖70 Ralston Saul suggests this hybridization extends to the 
linguistic as well as the cultural common:  
Here [in Canada] our sense of both languages [French and English] 
has been subtly shaped by Aboriginal assumptions. I‘m referring to 
our practical use of these languages but equally to the 
philosophical, ethical and metaphysical...For example, we struggle 
endlessly with the concept of sovereignty. Why? Because the 
concept we are searching for is not part of the Western tradition. 
We are after is an indigenous idea with which we have centuries of 
experience. The Mohawk call it tewatutowie. It is all about being 
able both to help yourself and to look at yourself: ‗Sovereignty is 
harmony achieved through balanced relationships.‘ This is very 
different from the England-U.S. English meaning of the France 
French meaning. In the European tradition, sovereignty is built 
around all sorts of rigid legalistic implications defining borders and 
the application of laws...Yet it is this European sense that 
dominates our universities, our standard legal theory and our civil 
services...Why are we so eager to use this European intellectual 
approach?71  
Eschewing the notion of the nation-state (or perhaps more precisely ‗the Nation-State‘ 
and sovereign Power) in its standard modern formulation, one which is more European 
and less Indigenous than the Canadian one (at least according to Ralston Saul who 
emphasizes instead that ―the Mohawk idea of how things should be done – harmony 
achieved through balanced relationships – seems much more accurate that the linear, 
carefully measured, theoretically rational assumptions of common or civil law‖72), we 
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are on what Commonwealth might understand as thoroughly altermodern terrain.  
Unfortunately, collaborative, cooperative and communicative forms of constituent 
praxis so frequently traced to Indigenous peoples as alternatives within and against, or 
immanent to, modernity, are too often mistakenly rendered in dialogic or 
communitarian vocabularies. This is a trap which virtually all the thinkers of Canadian 
Aboriginal Law profiled in this chapter fall into to varying degrees. At the same time 
however, as we saw in the first part of this chapter, the best literature does tend to 
grasp, in Indigenous cosmologies in particular, a variety of profoundly ontological 
modes of addressing the constitution of the common.  
 
F. Toward a radical critique of the status quo ante: beyond ‘Aboriginal 
Law’ as discreet subset of ‘Constitutional Law’? 
In this more generous way of thinking, ‗Aboriginal Law‘, even when it is translated and 
mediated, made representational in the Charter or otherwise subsumed, remains vital 
insofar as it at least contains the potential to push Canadian constitutionalism onto a 
totally different axis. Here, Canada‘s modernity, its historiography since the arrival of 
Europeans on its shores, as much as its more recent, post-Charter historiography is 
marked by what Ralston Saul calls a ―tendency to run society as an ongoing 
negotiation‖.  Although he comes as close as any, particularly Tully, to sliding into the 
language of discourse theory, he, again quite like Tully, self-corrects by emphasizing 
the extent to which Aboriginal imaginings of law ―delight in complexity‖ in a way which 
is inconsistent with the positivistic legalism and procedural archaism of the sort which 
dominates in the European or American models.73 He links this back with some of the 
themes developed in the proceeding chapter which presented then post-patriation 
narrative of ‗mega-constitutional politics‘ as a symptom of Empire: 
When [then Prime Minister] Pierre Trudeau first introduced his 
Charter of Rights, many felt it had a U.S.-European liberal air about 
it. In other words, it tended toward legalistic views of equality and 
individualism, which in countries such as France and the United 
States have produced an unexpectedly formalized class system. By 
the time the negotiations over the Charter were finished, its 
imported liberalism has been buried in a purposely unresolved 
tension between individuals and groups. Since then, the Charter 
decisions of the courts have anchored that Canadian reality ever 
more deeply in how we function....The fascinating missing piece in 
all of this is the original concept for the Canadian approach...The 
most obvious origins in Canada are Aboriginal. Again, the 
newcomers – the francophones from the seventeenth century on, 
the Scots from the late seventeenth but increasingly the eighteenth 
century on and the German religious minorities from the eighteenth 
century on – all settled here in difficult, isolating circumstances and 
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made their way thanks to the First Nations and later the Métis. 
Their relationship evolved over time, often for the worse. But it was 
a slow evolution, a matter of centuries. Ways of relating to the other 
and ways of doing things settled in, became habit, became 
culture.74 
Ralston Saul is of course not the first to emphasize the degree to which European 
survival in what is today Canada was made possible only by the good will and 
collaborative efforts Aboriginal peoples. This fact has been verified in particular by 
anthropological and historical social science literature as much as more theoretical or 
philosophical texts.75 There are of course also legitimate questions as to whether 
Ralston Saul stumbles, in the same way as Tully and others, insofar as he relies on the 
old dialectic between individual and group and permits the idiom of ‗egalitarianism‘ to 
slide around imprecisely in his writing. The risk here is the familiar one which Hardt and 
Negri repeatedly warn against in Commonwealth. Namely, the tendency on the critical 
left to fall back to, even in their purportedly most radical formulations, an inquiry into 
the nature of ‗being-in-common‘ rather than process of ‗making‘ or constituting the 
common.76  
Nevertheless, Ralston Saul goes part way toward describing something akin to the 
constitution of the common insofar as he introduces the Indigenous notion of the social 
―as an inclusive circle that can be enlarged‖. Here again drawing on Indigenous 
cosmologies and customary law, we see the glimpse of a common which is haltingly 
asserting itself within and against the State, the Constitution and sovereign (public 
Power) as much as Capital (private Power). 77 This corruption takes the form of 
expropriation, accumulative and consumptive in the material sense and organizational 
and taxonomic in the formal sense. Here, the vacillation between the two forms of 
c/Constitution (or better, ‗constitution‘ as materialist praxis and ‗Constitution‘ as formal 
philosophy or science) are constant, so much so as to becomes the central irritant or 
antagonism which drives Canadian constitutional historiography.  
 
The problem of nationalism, the State and their continuing hegemony 
Since the 1998 decision of the Supreme Court in the Succession Reference,78 
souverainiste sentiment has not overtaken the headlines in Quebec. There have 
however been numerous developments involving the recognition, integration or 
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(perhaps ironically) the representation of ‗sovereignty‘ in relation to Aboriginal peoples, 
tribes and ‗Nations‘.79 Some of which take shape in Charter litigation and others in 
lengthy negotiated treaty settlements between Aboriginal peoples and the two levels of 
government (the Federal and Provincial Crowns).80  Even Ralston Saul, who is by no 
means an expert on Aboriginal Law, but instead a generalist philosopher and public 
intellectual, recognizes this fact and its centrality to Canada‘s recent history. Canada is 
more than an English/French hybrid; it is also more than a multicultural land of 
migrants. It is the home of a pre-existing and internally diversified Indigenous people. 
This is the only real axiomatic of ‗Canada‘.  Ralston is only the most recent to remind 
us of this. 
It is no surprise that Aboriginal Law scholars like Borrows and Henderson make this 
point with unparalleled rigor, both as a matter of formal Constitutional Law and as a line 
of inquiry approaching the constitution of common as much as the State. What is 
interesting however is that they do not give up on the possibility of configuring society 
as some sort of social contract, one which although potentially renegotiated by 
Aboriginal peoples, is nonetheless permitted to survive within the primary or 
hegemonic formulation of sovereign Power understood to exist in present day Canada. 
This fact alone necessitates the possibility of an even more forceful or radical critique.  
Ralston Saul offers one such possibility in his theory of hybridization: ―Canadians carry 
both the Aboriginal and the European tradition.‖ Capitalistic insofar as they contain the 
―Western Manichean drive‖ and yet proud of ―our non-monolithic society‖ and desirous 
of preserving its peace: ―of course, there are European liberal elements in our way of 
life, but our deep roots are here [in Canada] not there [in Europe]‖. Canadians are in 
other words, ―far more indigenous than liberal.‖81 While I very much doubt an assertion 
like this can ever be empirically tested, it is certainly an interesting and productive one. 
We all wonder about the ways in which European forms of sovereignty might indeed be 
undermined by Aboriginal ones insofar as they make their way, at least 
representationally, into Canada‘s formal legal arrangements and its constitutional 
architecture. In so doing, we must think about Ralston Saul‘s assertions that, (a)―our 
[Canadian] courts are far ahead of our political scientists, politicians and philosophers‖;  
and (b) post-Charter Supreme Court jurisprudence absorbs something of the 
―Aboriginal roots of Canadian civilization: egalitarianism, individual and group rights 
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and obligations, balanced complexity, reconciliation, inclusion, continuing relationships, 
minority rights.‖82  
Ralston Saul is of course correct that any account is wrought by a tension between a 
hegemonic ―description of Canadian history‖ which ―highlights key moments‖ such as 
1763 Royal Proclamation, the 1840 Quebec Act, the 1948 Durham Report, 
Confederation in 1867, etc. And, on the other hand, a counter-hegemonic 
historiography in which Canada is shaped by encounters between Aboriginal and 
European subjectivities and the intermixing of values which translate into, what he 
describes as the more communitarian, ‗egalitarian‘ or socialist democratic strains in 
Canadian statecraft and government:  
This is the shared foundation for equalization payments and single-
tier health care and public education. What I am describing here is 
not the technical footing of particular policies, but the origins of the 
mindset that makes them possible. I am making an argument about 
culture, not about mere instrumentalism...You can see it happening 
in three pivotal Supreme Court judgments—Guerin, Delgamuukw 
and Oakes.83 
First in Guerin,84 in which the Supreme Court recognized for the first time the ―the roles 
of consensus and of the oral‖ as admissible culturally relevant and persuasive 
evidence in relation to Charter claims by First Nations peoples. Second in 
Delgamuukw85 where ―the justices [of the Supreme Court] had in effect swept away the 
European concepts of progress‖ by positing the written as coequal with the aural, at 
least in evidence relating to prior occupancy of land as a matter of Aboriginal rather 
than merely the Common Law of property rights.86 Third in Oakes,87 which despite 
having nothing on the surface ―to do with Aboriginal questions‖, or Aboriginal Law in 
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the abstract, in actual fact heralded the increasing tendency for the Supreme Court to 
intervene in ever more assertive ways to protect the vulnerable from political excess.88  
Exemplifying Negri‘s ―counter-hegemonic conscience [coscienza antagonista]‖,89 
Ralston Saul insists that this tendency is not ―an expression of liberalism‖. Or even 
simply a repeat of the modern ‗Rule of Law‘ instinct, but something else entirely: ―all of 
this is the precise opposite of liberalism, with its notions of the autonomous individual 
versus the state, interest-based relationships, the autonomous market and the ethical 
force of commercial trade‖.90 Instead, ―these approaches are not derived in a line from 
the Euro-U.S. philosophy‖: ―they are born out of meeting between people with a 
philosophy built in this place over thousands of years and mixtures of people who were 
in essence fleeing the philosophy of Europe and the United States.‖91  
It is perhaps possible to say that Canada, in this way, shares with other ‗internally 
colonized‘ ‗white settler states‘ like Australia. This is perhaps why both Australia and 
Canada closed the twentieth century with a series of monumental appellate decisions 
pointing to what appeared to be certain very major changes in the common law 
traditions of both former British colonies. This was true particularly insofar as these 
decisions recognized for the first time, the formal validity of Aboriginal treaty rights, 
including some which had hitherto thought to have been extinguished by the assertion 
of Crown sovereignty. If in Australia the watershed moment came with the 1992 
decision of the High Court of Australia in Mabo v. Queensland,92 it came two decades 
earlier in Canada (still a full decade before patriation) in the Supreme Court of 
Canada‘s decision in Calder.93 A 1973 decision in which the colonial era representation 
of Indians as having ―rudimentary and incomplete‖ legal systems ―wholly without 
cohesion‖ and incapable of grounding any claim to land as bad law and affirming that 
Indian title existed on the basis of prior occupancy alone:  ―...the fact is that when the 
settlers came, the Indians were there, organized in societies and occupying the land as 
their forefathers had done for centuries. That is what Indian title means.‖ 94 
Despite its late break with brute colonial forms of racism in the Calder decision, the 
Canadian record is hardly impressive. Even the basic symbolic move of extending the 
franchise to Aboriginal people in Canada did not occur until 1960, a fully forty three 
years after it had been extended to women and well after it had been extended to 
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many immigrant minorities.95 The termination of the most blatantly racist and 
paternalistic provisions of the Indian Act were also a shamefully long time coming.96  
Nevertheless, by the time the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged in Calder that 
the Eurocentric mode of treating ‗the customs and culture of our original people‘ as 
‗rudimentary and incomplete‘ would no longer suffice in light of ‗present day research 
and knowledge‘, a corner had been turned.97  Yet, the ―present day research and 
knowledge‖ which the court so proudly relied upon to legitimize its judgment still treated 
Aboriginal peoples as objects of scrutiny and governance possible to administer via a 
mass of biopolitical data gathered from and about them, not only through the immense 
reach of the still persistently unabolished Indian Act,98 but through the intensification of 
the study of Aboriginal peoples and Aboriginal phenomena in social scientific fields as 
diverse as anthropology and public policy.  
 
Representation and recognition as horizon of formal Constitution  
By the time of patriation and the Charter which recognized Aboriginal rights in both 
abstract and relative terms,99 the legal ground had already shifted, at least formally, if 
not materially. The fact remains, however, the Supreme Court of Canada historically 
did not make it easy for the Aboriginal peoples to advance their claims. For all the 
supposed progress it heralded, the immediate post-Charter Guerin court treated it as 
obvious that Indian ―rights in the land‖ were ―diminished‖ by Crown assertions of 
sovereignty at the time of first contact. Something which the court counterbalanced 
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 Dominion Elections Act, 1900 SC c. 12 (restricting the federal franchise to the portion of the non-
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 n 6 above at ss. 25&35. 
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only vaguely with the acknowledgment that ―their [Indian] rights of occupancy and 
possession‖ might be ―unaffected‖100 in other ways.  If Guerin left a confused treatment 
of prior occupancy, the doctrine of discovery and other questions of title, or so the 
usual story goes, Sparrow101 was perhaps clearer, but still more discouraging. The 
Sparrow court declared ―there was from the outset never any doubt that sovereignty 
and legislative power, and indeed the underlying title, to such [alleged Indian] lands 
vested in the Crown.‖102  
After the first decade of Charter jurisprudence nevertheless, Borrows points to a 
growing consensus that ―it is factually apparent that at Canada‘s formation there was 
no first discovery on the part of the Crown that would justify displacing Indigenous 
law.‖103 At this point, at least in academic and critical commentary in Canada, no doubt 
heavily influenced by postcolonial sensibilities and a bourgeoning assertiveness of 
Indigenous people globally, would begin to reject the vestiges of the old common law 
doctrine of discovery in terms stronger than, if not at least approximating, those of the 
High Court of Australia in the Mabo decision in Australia. This pressure reached its 
highpoint in the 1996 Report of Canada’s Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 
which stated plainly that the doctrine of discovery is ―legally, morally and factually 
wrong‖ as the basis for any extinguishment of Aboriginal claims.104  
By 1990, the Supreme Court of Canada had already at least partially absorbed 
Aboriginal critiques and counter-formulations within the formal Constitution. This was 
particularly apparent in the Delgamuukw decision giving oral evidence of prior 
occupancy and usage of Crown land equal status with the type of documentary 
evidence hitherto unquestionably preferred by the Common Law.105 Yet another 
decade later in the 1999 R. v. Marshall,106 the Supreme Court of Canada reached a 
high water mark when it upheld the existence of ongoing treaty rights in Mi‘kmaq 
claimants relative to the province of Nova Scotia, at least insofar as they touched on 
traditional usages of the land at the time of first contact, in this case harvesting eels, 
but not necessarily post-contact activities like the large scale harvesting of wood. 
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G. Sharpening the distinction between Indigenous Ontology & Aboriginal 
Law 
Some acutely anti-nationalist postcolonial Indigenous scholars like Alfred are, even 
more than Tully, who is himself concerned about the structures of a continuing ‗internal 
colonization‘, interested in the way in which Aboriginal progress may have been 
exaggerated in the post-Charter era. Particularly insofar as it marked by the 
incorporation of colonial modalities into what are ostensibly postcolonial contexts: ―In 
this supposedly post-colonial world, what does it matter if the reserve is run by Indians, 
so long as they think like businessmen, behave like bureaucrats and are paid to carry 
out the same old policies?‖107   
It could be said that Ralston Saul, Albert, Tully and others speak to different and 
potentially clashing strains of Negrian thought. Namely, the crucial fault line between 
post-structural and neo-Marxist elements of his formation (one which is featured 
heavily in the critical literature on Negri and which underpins Italian intellectual 
experimentation in the latter half of the twentieth century, see Chapter II-III). In this 
case the distinction between post-structural imaginings of hybridity and neo-Marxist 
imagining of subsumption might be operative. One way to make sense of this is to 
return to Negri‘s consideration of the constitution of time whether as a European 
teleology of closure and resolution (in the settler states like Canada and Australia in 
terms of final treaty claim settlement and binding Supreme Court decisions) or as an 
Indigenous insistence on openness and irresolution (whether in terms of negotiation or 
struggle). Here, a thoroughly ontological line of inquiry is permitted to break what might 
otherwise be an apparent tension in Negri‘s thought, which as Hardt and Negri clearly 
realize in Commonwealth, has a peculiarly Indigenous dimension.  
It must be recalled here that the formal Constitution is for Negri nothing if it is not a 
technology for the closure of the time of revolution and the consolidation of sovereign 
Power. In other words, for the containment of the volatility and explosiveness of the 
material constitution in the order and finality of the formal Constitution, a point Negri 
makes quite plainly as part of his critique of bourgeois constitutionalism in Insurgencies 
and in a more abstract way in the earlier The Constitution of Time and the immediately 
post-Empire collection of essays, Kairòs, Alma Venus, Multitudo.108 Let us consider in 
this light Ralston Saul‘s suggestion that because Canada was carved out of the ‗new 
world‘ it was only peripherally on the model of the European Nation-State and therefore 
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 Note, the 1981 short monograph, The Constitution of Time and the post-Empire collection of three 
essays, Kairòs, Alma Venus, Multitudo were recently translated into English and published together 
inTime for Revolution n 22 above. 
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less a species of the hegemonic strain of western modernity than a dynamic productive 
relationship between totally intermixed singularities, one in which Aboriginal 
formulations of sovereignty and political life are increasingly present at the heart of 
Canada‘s constitutional order, its formal legal apparatus or Constitution.  
Both in terms of negotiated alterations to the Canada‘s distribution of sovereignty and 
its federal structure; we might think most recently here of the ―the Nunavut agreement, 
which in 1999 cut the Northwest Territories in half to give the Inuit a self-governing 
territory‖ or just as easily ―the Nisga‘a Agreement, which in 1999 established a new 
approach to First Nations settlements; and perhaps most strategically, the Supreme 
Court‘s 1997 Delgamuukw ruling, which introduced, or rather reintroduced, oral culture 
into the heart of Canadian Law.‖109 Having cited these specific constitutional nodes, all 
of which have a strongly juridical and formal components, Ralston Saul looks to 
Canadian historiography more generally to remark, again in keeping with his theory of 
hybridity, ―[t]he idea of egalitarianism that we have today is far closer to that of 
seventeenth- or eighteenth-century First Nations than it is to [European] newcomers of 
that period.‖110 Or elsewhere, ―the broad reality was an integrated First Nations role, 
central to the shaping of this country, which went on for twice as long as Canada has 
existed as a Confederation.‖111 The result which he describes is thoroughly 
altermodern, a savage anomaly in the constitutional history of modernity (or at least its 
hegemonic strain).  
 
Conscienza antagonista 
Ultimately the most progressive commentators on Aboriginal Law are those who go 
furthest to move beyond the de-ontological liberal normative horizon of the formal 
Constitution, whether from the legal (Henderson, Borrows), political science (Tully, 
Albert) or broadly philosophical (Ralston Saul) academies. These thinkers go some 
way toward cultivating what Negri calls conscienza antagonista.112 In our case, 
conscienza antagonista is largely coincident with the bringing of Indigenous ontologies 
to bear on a field which had until recently been framed in an almost exclusively 
positivist and scientistic logico-semantic frame. Where they fall short perhaps is insofar 
as their methodology remains case law driven. The risk here is to continue, perhaps 
without meaning to, a narrative of incremental progress, by way of representation, 
rather than one of revolution or reinvention by way of material constitution.  At their 
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best however, certain commentators are able to open up an Indigenous alternative and 
a properly immanent critique of the status quo ante. 
Ralston Saul can be understood to suggest that a conscienza antagonista has found its 
way into the post-Charter jurisprudence of the Supreme Court (which, ironically, would 
suggest that it is no longer truly counter-hegemonic and has been largely domesticated 
or subsumed). Or perhaps more precisely, that an analysis of key decisions by the 
Supreme Court furnishes evidence of his thesis that Canada is a ‗Métis Nation‘, one in 
which a mixed Indigenous and European hybrid. The risks here are myriad (and they 
are certainly not exclusive to Ralston Saul but shared by many commentators. The 
first, it is to exaggerate the penetration of Aboriginal ideas into the ‗the Constitution‘, or 
worse, to ignore the possibility that such an uptake might amount not only to formal but 
real subsumption of Aboriginal Law (which is already something quite apart from the 
Indigenous ontologies which inform it). 
One could of course ask what is doing the subsumption or the subsuming. The answer 
would be Constitutional Law, which like a variety of other fields of law, takes Aboriginal 
Law to be a subset, however broad, of itself.  At the most obvious level the risk is of 
uncritically contributing to a rhetorically repackaged colonialism (here, what Tully 
critiques as ‗internal colonialism‘, the limited political ‗autonomy‘ of Aboriginal peoples 
to live within thoroughly Eurocentric forms of ‗self-government‘, administrative and 
regulatory authority). Second, it is to treat language uncritically or as ideologically 
neutral in a way which Negri does not. This risk here is especially elevated in the 
thought of those like Ralston Saul and Tully who tend, advertently or inadvertently, to 
describe Indigenous ontologies in the register of communitarian or egalitarian political 
philosophy.  
Although many experts and commentators on Aboriginal Law grasp crucial distinctions 
between Indigenous traditions of governance, politics and law, particularly relative to 
the privileged concepts of sovereignty and property (public and private Power), few 
Aboriginal Law commentators or experts make the leap toward a more fully articulated 
theory of an Indigenous constitution. In this chapter I have also suggested that despite 
their immense erudition and progressive ethos, some Indigenous theorists of the 
Constitution and of the particularity of Aboriginal Law within and against it, are 
insufficiently attentive to the role of the counter-hegemonic intellectual in contesting or 
otherwise destabilizing the field in which they write. This is evident particularly insofar 
as few identify the constitution of the common as an explicit critique and alternative to 
the Constitution of the State. Whether as something entirely distinct or alternative to 
the accommodative stance of: (i) formal constitutional reformism (as addressed in 
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Chapter IV); or, (ii) nationalist competition (as addressed in Chapter V).   
 
H. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to consider whether or not, and to what 
extent, and within what limitations, Aboriginal Law scholars on multiple sides of the 
disciplinary divide might be said to produce a critique of formal Constitutionalism or 
even the proposition of an affirmative alternative consonant with what I have 
described throughout as a Negri-inspired reading of an Indigenous ontology of the 
common. The result has been mixed. 
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Chapter VII - Conclusion 
 
Let us finally recognise that this old, 20th century dualism is no longer 
tenable. ..... The logical form of the binary is unusable. 
A. Negri, ‘Postmodern Global Governance and the Critical Legal Project 
(2005)
1
 
 
In what manner could a material basis for law be brought within our 
grasp again? 
A. Negri, ‘Postmodern Global Governance and the Critical Legal Project’ 
(2005)
2
 
 
I wonder whether today there are politicians and lawyers who could 
actually set up, maintain, and develop a constitutional discussion. 
A. Negri, ‘Postmodern Global Governance and the Critical Legal Project’ 
(2005)
3
 
 
The common is the language spoken by the multitude, which is handed 
on, accumulated, and invented always anew – a process in which all of 
us participate. The method of legal science needs therefore to get 
evermore closer to linguistic community [comunità linguistitca] and 
retrieve the materialist and creative telos, which constitutes it. In this 
situation, law‘s grammar (which is to be rebuilt) will be able to bow 
before the word of liberation. 
A. Negri, ‘Postmodern Global Governance and the Critical Legal Project’ 
(2005)
4
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A. Bringing things up to date 
I began this thesis by considering certain convergences and divergences between the 
Italian and the Canadian situations in the sixties and seventies. Most of the analysis in 
the subsequent chapters has explicitly not however been comparative. Instead, it has 
involved scrutiny of some of Negri‘s key texts on the question, or better, the process of, 
what I have designated, in a Negri-inspired fashion, as ‗c/Constitution‘. In so doing I 
hope to have marked, however tentatively, a theorization of the very recent past, one 
which I intend not as a historicized imagining, or perfunctory periodicization, but rather 
as a (re)conceptualization of very familiar events which is put to work in a way which is 
potentially different, unusual or even provocative, but most of all productive in its own 
right.  
In this final chapter, my hope is to generate, in a forward motion or trajectory which 
leaps slightly beyond the instantiations of the Canadian situation in the latter half of the 
thesis (Part II: Chapters IV-VI) and the more plain presentation of a Negri-inspired 
theory of c/Constitution in the first (Part I: Chapters I-III), to consider not only the 
present situation or the contemporary iteration of the c/Constitution, but also what 
Negri, who is himself very much a living and productive author, might have us do. All of 
this however must somehow be carried out without artificially interposing at the end, 
through the back door as it were, a historicist or positivist reconstruction, a stages 
theory of history. To avoid such a crudely Hegelian teleology, we return, at a very 
general level, to the examples of Canada and Italy initially posed in the introductory 
chapter (Chapter I) in a manner which is more open ended than closed.  
As emphasized in the introduction (Chapter I), this thesis can be taken to make the 
basic argument that Canada, or Italy, or anywhere else for that matter, is today within 
the circuits of Empire. Empire subsumes earlier forms of state-based sovereignty. It 
does not destroy them but rather is a part of a mutation within them. It sets them to 
work and makes them productive. This has been, I hope, a major lesson of this thesis. 
However, the notion that the old State, both the high modern rights state as much as 
the twentieth century social state, coexist and comingle today with the form of 
sovereignty understood in Hardt and Negri‘s concept of Empire, is essential to all of 
this. Nevertheless, the situation is ongoing. It is therefore, like all situations, not from 
one moment to the next what it was. I hope this final chapter captures that fluid 
character of temporality as it cascades over the writer‘s capacity to determine matters if 
even in the smallest momentary of ways.   
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My point of emphasis on temporality here, my insistence that no strict peridiocization or 
stages theory of evolution should be permitted to reconstitute itself is purposeful. But it 
does not necessarily make my task in concluding this doctorate easier. Nor do many of 
the lines of inquiry which I have taken up in what was effectively a highly experimental 
and perhaps at times naïve reading of Negri by a non-Italian speaker who lacks formal 
philosophical training. Nevertheless, it is necessary to insist right up until the end that 
this thesis was intended as a legal theoretical conceptual experiment with merit to two 
potential readerships: (1) Canadian critical constitutionalists; (2) Negri scholars. Its 
project: the presentation and deployment of an experimental Negri-inspired language 
and logic of the c/Constitution.  
In this final chapter, which should perhaps, as a matter of structural homology conform 
with the first one (Chapter I), in which we looked to the Canadian and Italian situations 
in the sixties and seventies, in what I hope was a bringing of two comparable events 
(the kidnap murder of Aldo Moro by the BR and the similarly grizzly kidnap murder of 
Pierre Laporte by the FLQ). Both of these events launch a temporal arrow from which 
meaning is constituted. We can understand a similar interest in the constitution of time, 
particularly the constitution of the present, in what Negri calls ‗kairòs‘.5 Kairòs, as a 
concept of temporality of the constitution of time emphasizes the distinction between 
Negri‘s Spinozian ontology and the ultimately ‗reactionary‘ alternative he and Hardt 
attribute to Heidegger.6  The result of all of this for (Hardt and) Negri is to look at the 
present as a species of history in the process of being constituted but not yet fully 
there, nor ever so. Only this captures the productive element of temporality. Again, in 
this chapter I hope to pick up on and write within such a temporality in the 
contemporary Canadian and Italian situations.  
Harper & Berlusconi: birds of a feather? 
 
For Canada, the dominant political personality of the last several years has been Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper and his Conservative Party of Canada (‗the Tories‘). For Italy 
it has been Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and his Forza Italia. In both countries, 
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 A. Negri, The Porcelain Workshop (Lose Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008) at 97 (describing kairòs as “the 
instant of creation, the moment of potential (puissance) spreads on the edge of being, that is the 
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recent decades have seen the existence of a newly formed conservative parliamentary 
blocs or alliances which morphed into powerful new political machines marrying the 
centre and far right. In both countries, and perhaps many others, this arrangement has 
led to a series of stalemated and more or less stable minority or coalition governments. 
There has also been an extraordinary expansion of executive power in the Prime 
Minister‘s Office (the PMO) and the person of the Prime Minister himself, in Canada as 
much as Italy.  In both, there has also been a strident pro-American foreign policy 
abroad and sort of above the law bravado at home. The point however is of course not 
to compare the personalities of Mr. Harper and Mr. Berlusconi, any more than it is 
Canada and Italy specifically, as objects of inquiry. Instead, it is to unravel some of the 
tendencies which might be present in both countries; and, perhaps by extension, many 
others or even perhaps all others, in one way or another. And which, once again, 
correspond to the morphology of Empire.  
No doubt, Berlusconi, the showman, the bacchanalian, the epicure, has very little in 
common with Harper, the notoriously aloof and taciturn Alberta economist. Neither is a 
renowned statesman on the ‗international stage‘.  Mr. Harper blends in with the 
furniture and Mr. Berlusconi with the entertainment. Whatever their gaffs, however, is 
of little consequence. Both are proving to be political survivors who aren‘t afraid to play 
dirty. The result at home, whether Mr. Harper misses the photo op at the G-8 because 
he is in the loo, or Berlusconi acts the fool at a state dinner, is of very little 
consequence. In both cases, at a more general level, their cooperation with the sound 
functioning of Empire is apparent in virtually every move they make.  
Both Berlusconi and Harper have presided over the apparatus of the state in recent 
epochs in which political power, particularly executive power, interposes itself against 
the more democratic impulses of its own aspirational as much as formal Constitution. 
In Berlusconi‘s Italy this has meant the Prime Minister‘s suspension of corruption trials 
and investigations by assertion of executive immunity and his usage of a mass media 
empire to propagandize on his behalf.7 In Canada it has meant an endless opacity on 
questions of the Prime Minister‘s role within the Constitution.8  
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 For critical left summary and analysis of the contemporary situation in Berlusconi’s Italy see P. F. 
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In a strange and perhaps surprising way, it may even be correct to say that both 
Canada and Italy remain within the Bush template of Empire. This would at least seem 
to be the case relative to other parts of Europe and North America. Perhaps this is too 
strained however, we have seen the UK and Germany, as much Italy and Canada, 
continue to steer a more conservative course electorally. Certainly it is also true that 
Italy and Canada can be said to diverge today, once again, both with each other, and 
similarly located states, as much as they converge. Nevertheless, their convergence, 
as much as Canada and Italy‘s insistent presence at the margin, is telling. 
Some might still ask: can I seriously be presenting ‗the State‘ or the state form itself in 
this completely neutralized way? Or worse, re-introducing the margin at the end? 
Anticipating this line of critique I can only again say that I am obeying the necessary 
structural homologies required of a doctoral thesis.  In the first chapter, the Italian and 
Canadian situation in the sixties and seventies was presented. The thematic of 
terrorism in particular was given attention. The basic argument was simply that 
‗terrorism‘ was a phenomenon common to the Italian and the Canadian experience in 
certain very surprising ways (Chapter I, s. A-B). From here things became more 
complex because it was necessary to further introduce my reading of Negri before 
bringing it into conversation with the Canadian case studies presented in the latter half 
of the thesis (Part II: Chapters IV-VI). The next two chapters were therefore taken up 
with presenting a Negrian definition of c/Constitution over the period of several 
decades situated in certain key texts (Chapter II) and updated by Negri with Hardt in 
their English language collaboration (Chapter III).  
At the close of this thesis, we can perhaps return to the open questions, if not to 
answer them, then at least to acknowledge their persistence. In so doing, we also insist 
on the need to deal openly with a blockage between the second and third chapters of 
this thesis (Chapters II & III). Empire, insofar as it was co-authored by American 
Italianist Michael Hardt and written directly in English by both authors in a hitherto 
unseen or unfamiliar style, provoked a much larger English language audience than 
had Negri‘s prior texts (or at least a quite distinct variation on the audience who had 
already been digesting Deleuze and Guattarri‘s Thousand Plateaus). Its timeliness was 
also compounded by the fact that it was published at the pregnant interval between 
centuries at an outstanding level of conceptual innovation. A blend of hyper-analytic 
prose, clever polemic, poetic wordplay and old fashion evidence based argument. 
Neither a work of normative philosophy, a descriptive social science nor fictional 
species of ‗literature‘, and at the same time all of them (or at least an immanent critique 
of them). Empire demanded to be heard and it was. Widely reviewed, read and 
                   205 of 242 
commented upon outside of theoretical or philosophical circles it made a serious 
impression (see generally Chapter III, s. F). 
Perhaps the fact of Empire‘s novelty and originality combined with the shockwaves 
which circulated around the globe in the aftermath of 9/11 meant that much of the 
discussion on that book was arrested prematurely and still has yet to be fully 
developed. For the moment it is certainly worth reminding ourselves of the fact that 
Empire was so different than virtually any other recent philosophical or socio-political 
theoretical text on globalization or any of the contemporaneous treatments of the 
resurgent interest in the historical formation and decay of Empires. So different in fact 
was it from its peers, it made readers all the more interested in the authors‘ insights 
into events which were rapidly approaching.9  
Strangely, perhaps because the events of 9/11 intervened shortly after its publication, 
the full impact of Empire may have been somewhat diminished by the post 9/11 shift 
toward terror and the state of emergency. Or more generally, the shift from a neoliberal 
rights discourse to a neoconservative discourse of war, emergency and crisis. 
Nevertheless, the very recent publication of Commonwealth clarifies and augments 
much of what is said in both Empire and Multitude before it. It has thereafter 
specifically, perhaps even disproportionately shaped this thesis.  
The only reason to re-emphasize the obvious, namely the importance of Empire both 
as a major monograph of direct relevance to numerous disciplines, and as a concept, 
is to defend its relevance to a subversive reading of post-Charter Canadian 
constitutional history and theory. Something which I attempted, I fear not adequately, to 
develop in earnest in the latter half of this thesis. Because this is a conclusion however, 
and not an introduction to yet another thesis r, it does not make sense to overly 
belabour this point. I make it also knowing that for all their successes and failure, ups 
and downs, both Italy and Canada, like any wealth-maximizing corporations, can be 
judged largely insofar as they have prospered according to formal indicators which 
purport to represent a material reality - in this case, at least according to the usual (and 
by now rightly suspect markers of neoliberal capital): GDP, GNP, and etcetera.  I also 
acknowledge that the inadequacy of personality-driven comparison of Canadian and 
Italian Prime Ministers. The forms of corruption which are alleged against Mr. Harper 
                                               
9
 On the solidly neoliberal capitalist side of the equation see N. Ferguson, Empire (New York: Basic 
Books, 2002). For a more stylized and postmodern, but nevertheless glumly defeatist and sometimes 
too apolitical take on globalization see P. Legrain, Open world: the truth about globalisation (London: 
Abacus, 2002). On the more critical left anti-imperialist side of the equation see E. Hobsbawm, On the 
Edge of the New Century (New York: The New Press, 1999); E.M. Wood, Empire of Capital (London: 
Verso, 2003); and, C. Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire (London: Routledge, 2007). 
                   206 of 242 
are less notorious than those alleged against the Mr. Berlusconi. Both however, stand 
accused of abuses of power, of assertions of political autonomy which are surprisingly 
convergent.  
B. Unexpectedly similar trajectories of the Italian and the Canadian States 
in the first decade of the twenty-first century 
What might be meant by this or how it might attach to the Negri-inspired theory of 
c/Constitution depends on your perspective. It may be that some imagined coup 
against Empire carried off by George W. Bush and his henchmen had two surprising 
outliers in contemporary Italy and Canada.  Although this is unlikely in any strict sense, 
there is no doubt a sense in which Berlusconi‘s Italy and Harper‘s Canada bear the 
hallmarks of intensely conservative species of sovereign Power whose worst enemy is 
often outliers in the bourgeoisie itself. Divided at the top, between the instantiation of 
Empire which formulated itself in the nineties and the one which constituted itself in the 
first decade of the new century, on the basic tenets of sovereign Power and free 
market Capital, Empire experienced immense growing pains in the recently closed first 
decade of the twenty-first century.  
Without wishing to get side-tracked in what would be a highly speculative form of 
commentary,  it is perhaps fair to say that, the economic collapse and global recession 
of 2008 was, at least in part, a sign of an obvious realignment of capital somewhat 
away from the old Euro Atlantic zone toward a more Asian and Sothern hemispheric 
orientation.  All of this is not ra question of mapping territories or of carving it up into a 
renewed imperialist patchwork. But rather of thinking, like Hardt and Negri suggest in 
Empire, of the emperialist rainbow whose colors fade into one another and which, 
rather than strictly delineating structural limits, signal their porous quality. Under these 
conditions if we are to continue speaking of ‗Canada‘ and ‗Italy‘ as ‗States‘, which I 
have implied we can, we must also consider how ‗the State‘ itself might be specifically 
interposed within (or even against) Empire. 
We must ask, in other words, might the State itself be, at times if only strategically, 
understood as an immanent critique of Empire? Perhaps, but the basic formal 
architecture of the State is descended from the high modern rights State as much as 
the late modern social State (see generally Chapter V s. v). Empire is therefore as 
much as anything, a hybrid of the two formulations. The fear, from the beginning 
relates, whether the question be that of the rights and the social state, the formal and 
the material c/Constitution, or in the idiom of Empire and the multitude more recently, 
has always been the same. That of reconstituting or otherwise falling back into a 
dialectical configuration, I guarded against this tendency, I hope, not by abandoning 
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any conceptual dichotomies outright (to do so would not only have been impossible 
and incongruent with (Hardt and) Negri‘s conceptual apparatus, which itself does not 
suggest this step), but instead by emphasizing triadic as much as binaric formations in 
the trilogy. The three nodes of which provide the template for an alternative theory of 
c/Constitution: Empire, multitude and the common (as sovereign Power, constituent 
power and the collective form of (re)production).  
What Hardt and Negri articulate is the affirmative project of the multitude. Its capacity 
not only to resist or carve a line of flight from Empire, its refusal of the dialectic itself, 
but its capacity liberate itself from private as much as public expropriation and 
constitute a third conceptual tie-breaker in the common. This has perhaps been at the 
most general level, Negri‘s lifelong project, the liberation and constitution of the 
common. By suggesting, particularly in the latter half of this thesis, that the State has 
itself been subsumed to Empire and the forms of organization which it carries out in 
keeping with the evolving demands of Capital (which increasingly pressurize the 
political and the legal as much as the private and the public into overlapping realities), 
we take Hardt and Negri‘s concerns seriously. All of this is however linked back to the 
quite basic idea that Italy and Canada are particular species of, or permutations of, 
both the material and formal c/Constitution of Empire.  
Revisiting Italy and Canada as material and formal nodes of Empire 
 
Today, what we see in both Berlusconi era Italy and the Harper era Canada might be 
symptomatic of mutation within Empire which evolved over the last decade and which, 
in contemporary Italy as much as Canada (and undoubtedly further afield), has 
intensified and made more pronounced certain tendencies which were already latent 
within Empire over a decade ago. All of this has subsequently become difficult to 
unwind insofar as the historical trajectory taking shape at the end of the cold war in the 
nineties was derailed by the (unexpected?) events of 9/11 (see generally Chapter III s. 
iv in which I explain why I elected to privilege a largely pre-9/11 critical literature).  
Roughly a decade after 9/11, and over a decade since the publication of Empire 
immediately prior to it, let us look afresh at the facts. Drawing once again, not only on 
the Canadian but also the Italian situation, we might begin here with the capacity to 
wage war and to participate in international police actions designed to guarantee, 
protect and test Empire‘s global hegemony. Certainly, both Canada and Italy have 
seen a decade of enhanced military engagements abroad. At the time of writing, both 
Italian and Canadian jets are supporting and participating in the NATO led airstrikes in 
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Libya10 and both remain supporters and participants in the US and NATO-led War in  
Afghanistan. 11  Italy even contributed troops, albeit tokenistically, in the US-led Iraq 
War debacle.12 Canada, under its earlier Chrétien Liberal Government pointedly, did 
not.  In so doing, it aligned itself, surprisingly for some, with the ‗old Europe‘ of France 
and Germany rather than its traditional English-speaking allies in the US, UK and 
Australia. All of whom, like Italy, supported the US war effort more uncritically (deaf to 
the vociferous opposition of the multitude in city streets and squares). 
Beyond these telling historical footnotes about Canada and Italy‘s relatively minor roles 
in the military apparatus of Empire and its capacity to wage war across the surface of 
the globe, in other words, these very material contributions to Empire‘s bio(Power), we 
still cannot forget that today both Italy and Canada have strongmen Prime Ministers,13 
albeit of different sorts.  
                                               
10
 Both Italy and Canada are also part of an ongoing multi-state coalition participating in airstrikes 
against Libyan target pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1973. 
11
 Both Canada and Italy contributed troops to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) in Afghanistan from 2001 until the present pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1386. Italy 
has a forward operating base in the Herat Province. Canada concluded its recent combat operation in 
November of 2010 and handed control of its Kandahar base to its US successors (however it still retains 
a troop presence in the country for ‘support’, ‘training’ and other ‘non-combat’ operations). 
http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/canada/index.php; 
http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/italy/index.php. Overall military spending in 
both countries has also increased. In Canada see the Report of the Polaris Institute, ‘Its Never Enough: 
Canada’s Alarming Rise in Military Spending’ October 25, 2005. 
http://www.ipb.org/Canada's%20Alarming%20Rise%20in%20Military%20Spending.pdf (detailing the 
post 9/11 rise toward the end of the Chrétien and the beginning of the short-lived Martin Liberal 
Government and laying out a statistical comparison with Italy and other allies). See also from the 
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternative, S. Staples & B. Robinson, ‘More than the Cold War: Canada’s 
Military Spending 2007-2008’ online 
http://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National_Office_Pubs/2007/
More_Than_the_Cold_War.pdf (chronicling the an even sharper upsurge in military spending in the 
post-2005 Harper Conservative Government and laying out a statistical comparison with Italy and other 
allies). In Italy see F. Andreatta, ‘Italian Foreign Policy: Domestic Politics, International Requirements 
and the European Dimension’ (2008) 30 Journal of European Integration 1; P. Foradori & P. Rosa, ‘Italy 
and Defence and Security Policy’ in S. Fabbrini & S. Piattoni (eds) Italy and the European Union (London: 
Rowman and Littlefied, 2008) 173-188. Both offer a recent history and a subtle analysis of the 
Berlusconi Government’s strengthening bilateral relations with the Bush-led US in particular. 
12
 Italy contributed a 3000 troop contingent to the non-UN authorized US-UK-led War in Iraq. It began a 
phased withdrawal in 2005 largely as a result of immense domestic pressure and opposition. For a 
classical functionalist political science analysis thereof see S. Chan & W. Safran, ‘Public Opinion as 
Constraint Against War’ (2006) 2 Foreign Policy Analysis 2, 137, 141, 144-145, 150-151 (comparing Italy 
with Canada and its peers more generally). In a more theoretical register see generally D. Levy, M. 
Pensky, J. Torpey (eds) whose Old Europe New Europe (London: New Left Books, 2005) contains an 
anthology of essays which, taken collectively, are a new classic and an excellent summation of the post 
9/11 schism which opened up in ‘the West’ around the Iraq War.  
13
 I am not using the term ‘strongman’ here to refer to primitive or tribal society, but to an advanced 
western democracy. Not only in the sense of Weber’s charismatic leader, but in the sense of figure who 
combines the contemporary form of capital with that of sovereignty, of private with public power in a 
way which has very little to do with personal charisma.  
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Mr. Berlusconi‘s immense personal wealth is accrued in the most post-Fordist sector of 
the economy of all, media and entertainment, in which what is produced are subjective 
affects, usually pleasure, distraction or desire (sometimes ‗news‘ and ‗information‘ as 
subsets thereof). What might this mean? Mr. Berlusconi‘s personal business ventures 
provide the template for the form of production which is increasingly hegemonic to 
Empire.  No doubt, the shroud of corruption, arrogance and shamelessness which 
surrounds him in the conduct of his public and private affairs is however as notorious, 
or more, than his immense wealth.  Nothing of the sort can be said of the staid Harper 
who has few business interests and a private life that seems rather bland.  Once again, 
the personality driven comparison would seem to hit a dead end. By inserting the 
concept of Empire into the situation however we might reframe matters somewhat. 
Today, the problem for Empire would seem to be that Berlusconi‘s Italy is becoming 
less and less of a sideshow as the Italian economy falters alongside the rest of 
Europe‘s southern flank, dragging the continent further and further into crisis (or at 
least this is the narrative which is rapidly establishing itself in the bourgeois media at 
the time of writing).14 Canada is no problem for Empire. It is a boon. Harper secured 
and electoral majority and is now firmly in control of Parliament. Canada‘s economy 
has done very well relative to all its peers insofar as it its banking industry avoided 
collapse, its markets appears better regulated than its peers (in other words Canadian 
Banks do not carry unmanageable debt to asset ratios) and its natural resource cash 
imagines itself as unlimited.15  
                                               
14
 The offensive acronym ‘PIGS’ (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain) is often utilized in both media and 
academic commentary. The connotations are quite chauvinistic and show no small amount of bias 
toward northwest Europe in Brussels as much as Paris, Berlin and London. The acronym has sometimes 
been extended to ‘PIIGS’ (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) or more provocatively to 
‘PIIGGS’(Portugal, Italy, Greece, Great Britain and Spain). Here the idea becomes one in which the 
Franco-German axis is deepened and the broader European project permitted to experience its first 
existential challenge. Certainly, it is no coincidence that the citizens of PIGS (PIIGS or PIIGGS) have been 
at the forefront of the contemporary struggle between the multitude and Empire, at least in what 
remains of ‘the West’. For a summary of the economic situation written from a broadly bourgeois press 
in the English speaking world see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8510603.stm; 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/05/AR2010020504411.html. For an 
English language summary of the political situation written from a more radical youth-led perspective, if 
not from the street level , the blogosphere is now key and Michael Hardt is particularly active in it see eg 
http://legermj.typepad.com/blog/2010/12/the-collective-intelligence-of-the-movement-of-the-
movements-has-created-a-new-form-the-book-bloc-on-november-24-2010-it.html; 
http://news4europe.wordpress.com/2011/02/.  
15
 This has made Canada somewhat of a standout among its peers in the West and has caused it to be 
much lauded in global capitalist circles and the centre right financial press see eg ‘Don’t blame Canada: 
a country that got things right’ in The Economist May 14, 2009; ‘Canadians see better days ahead’ in The 
Wall Street Journal online edition June 27, 2011 at  http://blogs.wsj.com/in-
charge/2011/06/27/canadians-see-better-days-
ahead/?KEYWORDS=Canada+and+economy+and+banking+or+resources.  
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All of this goes well beyond the specific personalities of two Prime Ministers or the 
supposed structural soundness of either Canada or Italy‘s (imagined and real) 
economies. It is about a tendency, or a form of sovereign Power, which instantiates 
itself within Empire. It presents itself regardless of personality or ideology, we saw this 
first in the 1970 October Crisis presented in the introductory chapter (Chapter I) and 
second in the APEC Affair presented in the first Canadian case study (Chapter IV). 
Relative to the APEC Affair we asked, how was it that the office of then Prime Minister 
Chrétien, managed to insulate itself from judicial review arising from its apparent 
intervention with police power? The same question might be asked in Harper‘s Canada 
as much as in Berlusconi‘s Italy and indeed it is.16  
What is perhaps most strange is the way in which both Canada and Italy, at least in 
terms of their formal and material apparatus, resemble components of a Bush era 
template of Empire more than the contemporary Obama one.17 If, after the 2008 
economic crisis and US presidential election a minor leftward re-adjustment of liberal 
social as well as economic policy was felt globally it did not necessarily last. In fact, in 
Italy and Canada it never really came at all (the same is true elsewhere to lesser or 
greater degrees in Germany, France, the UK, all of which currently have right of centre 
governments).  
In 2005 Berlusconi was consolidating his position and more and more completely 
shirking judicial oversight, constraining the ‗independent‘ media and extending the 
tentacles of his own massive media empire.18 In Canada at the same time, the Liberals 
would be defeated by a resurgent Conservative Party led by Stephen Harper, who, for 
the first time in over a decade, returned the Tories to power. By 2005, things were 
rapidly lurching rightward in both Rome and Ottawa. Ironically, this occurred just at the 
time in which the second Bush administration was entering into its less strident post-
                                               
16
 n 7-8 above.  
17
 Both are determined ‘middle powers’ who can be quite calculated in their courtship of their American 
ally. In the Canadian context relations with the US hit a low since the tumultuous overlap of the Trudeau 
and Nixon years, in the first half of the 2000s during the final Chrétien years. The enmity between 
Chrétien and Bush was especially pronounced, particularly over Chrétien’s strident electioneering 
refusal to support the US in Iraq . With the election of the first Harper Government the relationship with 
the Bush Administration was greatly ameliorated. Nevertheless Canadians continued to believe in a 
widely circulated poll, in 2005, that the Bush Administration posed a greater threat to world peace than 
had Saddam Hussein. http://25461.vws.magma.ca/admin/articles/TheStar03Nov2006.pdf. On this 
period and the complex quality of the Canada-US alliance during it see A. Richter, ‘From Trusted Ally to 
Suspicious Neighbour: Canada-US Relations in a Changing Global Environment’ (2005) 35 American 
Review of Canadian Studies 3; P. Andeas, ‘The Mexicanization of the US-Canada Border’ (2005) 60 
International Journal 2, 449-46; K.R. Nossal, ‘Defence Policy and the Atmospherics of Canada-US 
Relations: The Case of the Harper Conservatives’ (2007) 37 American Review of Canadian Studies 1, 23-
34.  
18
 There have been a number of English books cataloguing the extension of Berlusconi’s tentacles into all 
realms of Italian society see eg n 7 above.  
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Rumsfeld second term and the US was beginning is halting correction in Obama. So 
much so that five years later Rome and Ottawa are both quite to the right of 
Washington. If this is not a sign that the old left/right binary cannot fully grasp the 
situation I do not know what is. 
If the centre left, albeit very much neoliberal and free trading, Chrétien Government of 
the nineties and early 2000s had distinguished itself by standing up to the 
neoconservative Bush administration, refusing to support its war effort in Iraq (although 
it did participate robustly in Afghanistan),19 the new Harper Government (2005-present) 
was determined to reset relations between the two countries. Reaching out in a 
solicitous manner to Bush before he was defeated by Obama, Harper, like John 
Howard in Australia, Tony Blair in the UK and Berlusconi in Italy, had few 
compunctions about close ties with the unpopular Bush Administration. He struck the 
absolute opposite tone of the stridently anti-Bush Chrétien.  During the period of 
overlap between the Harper and Bush years, the Harper Government would follow the 
model of countless others, Italy included, to ‗out America America‘. At home, this would 
mean derailing the Martin government‘s commitment to implementation of the Kyoto 
Treaty on Climate Change; and, doubling down on its commitment to North American 
missile defence.  
If for Italy it was the question of illegal migrants from North Africa which led 
Berlusconi‘s government furthest down the path to Lampedusa Island,20 it was for 
Canada the spectre of the enemy within, suspected terrorists, which triggered its worst 
excesses.  In certain very high profile cases, Canada permitted its citizens to fall into 
the hands of foreign governments known to torture, particularly where there was 
diplomatic pressure from Washington, for whatever reason, to see things go this way.21 
                                               
19
 n 12 above.  
20
 Lampedusa Island is a small sparsely populated Italian fishing island which lies between the peninsula 
and North Africa, it has for a long time been a magnet for economic migrants from Africa, many of them 
through thoroughfares in Tunisia and Libya. The boatloads of arrivals have accelerated in the aftermath 
of the Arab Spring in response to the inability of countries like Tunisia and Libya to provide haven for 
African immigrants from Somalia, Eritria and further afield. Berlusconi has responded stridently and with 
extraordinary lack of humanitarian impulse to the situation. Among his government’s policies have been 
the transport migrants from Lampedusa to Sicily and the mainland for warehousing prior to extradition 
see generally T. Kington,‘ Berlusconi Claims He Will Empty Italian Island of Lampedusa of Migrants in The 
Guardian online March 30, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/30/berlusconi-empty-
island-lampedusa-migrants. The heading of the Corriere Della Sera read as follows ‘Berlusconi Pledges to 
Clear Lampedusa in 2 or 3 Days: Premier Promises Tax Free Zone and Nobel Candidature [to the Islands 
local resident+” and citing his claim to have bought a villa on the island and to be interested in opening a 
casino. http://www.corriere.it/International/english/articoli/2011/03/31/clear-lampedusa.shtml. See 
also the Amnesty International Report of the same day: http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-
updates/thousands-stranded-appalling-conditions-italian-island-2011-03-30.    
21
 The two most notorious cases over the last decade have been that of Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen 
of Syrian origin who was detained while travelling through the US en route to his home in Canada and 
                   212 of 242 
In both Italy and Canada, the extra-legal quality of the so called global ‗War on Terror‘ 
made itself felt at the domestic as much as the international level. Surveying the very 
recent historical record, not only did both the Harper and the Berlusconi governments 
behave in a manner which was happily subservient to the Bush Administration, even at 
the height of its excesses, they also consolidated power in the Prime Minister‘s Office 
(in Canada, ‗the PMO‘) in way which was reminiscent of the consolidation of power 
around the executive branch in the Bush White House. For Berlusconi this meant 
asserting his own judicial immunity in response to a variety of serious civil and criminal 
cases against him. For Harper, a much cleaner and more technocratic politician, whose 
only tentacles into the mass media are ideological, there continues nevertheless to be 
a marked arrogance and tightening of control around the PMO (again, we saw a similar 
tendency take shape in the prior centre left Chrétien Government, indeed that was the 
essence of the case study on the APEC Affair see generally Chapter IV).22  
Strangely, for both Harper‘s Canada and Berlusconi‘s Italy, the legacy of the Bush 
years, at least in terms of ideology, is perhaps felt as much or more than it is in the US.  
However, sometimes what appear to have been relatively recent mutations are in fact 
subterranean tendencies which Hardt and Negri already identified well below the 
surface in the nineties when writing Empire. Some of which, I emphasized, particularly 
on the case study examining the epoch of so called ‗mega-constitutional politics‘ in 
Canada (1982-1998) (Chapter V). It has also been my argument more generally, that 
the blurring of rationalities, political and legal, perhaps as much as private and public, 
                                                                                                                                         
extradited to Syria where he was interrogated and tortured for over a year. He was eventually returned 
to Canada and cleared of any wrongdoing by a special Federal Government Commission of Inquiry 
struck to examine the incident see Commissioner D. O’Connor, Commission Chair, Report of the Events 
Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis & Recommendations (Ottawa: Federal Government Commission of 
Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, 2006) available online at 
http://www.pch.gc.ca/cs-kc/arar/Arar_e.pdf. Amnesty International was first among the major human 
rights groups to follow this case closely and retains a useful archive online at 
http://www.amnesty.ca/human_rights_issues/maher_arar_overview.php. A second notorious case 
revolved around the 2002 battlefield arrest of fifteen year old Canadian citizen, Omar Khadar, for killing 
a US Special Forces soldier in Afghanistan while acting as a child soldier. Khadar found himself in the 
Guantanamo Bay Military Prison shortly thereafter and was subsequently interrogated, tortured and 
tried by a US Military Tribunal rather than being returned to Canada, which did not, under the 
leadership of the Harper Government, seek Mr. Khadar’s repatriation. When Mr. Khadar’s Canadian 
lawyers sought injunctions in Federal Court forcing the Federal Government to seek his repatriation and 
were successful, the Government repeatedly appealed. One January 29, 2010 the Supreme Court of 
Canada ruled that Khadar’s s. 7 Charter rights were violated and ordered the Government to remedy the 
situation (although not explicitly to repatriate him). Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr (2010) 1 SCR 44. 
On October 25, 2010 Khadar reached a plea deal with the US Authorities which will have him to serve an 
additional year in US Custody prior to eligibility for repatriation to Canada. For a general timeline of 
events and collection of relevant legal, political and diplomatic decision see generally 
http://www.law.utoronto.ca/faculty_content.asp?itemPath=1/3/4/0/0&contentId=1617. For the 
Amnesty International Record see 
http://www.amnesty.ca/iwriteforjustice/take_action.php?actionid=367&type=Internal.  
22
 n 8 above. 
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are a hallmark of the form of sovereignty associated with Empire. However, our inquiry 
can still not end here. For example, how are we to explain the fact that in Canada in 
particular, the post 9/11 epoch has been one of immense growth and prosperity (at 
least as compared to the US and Western Europe, who have felt the effects of the 
global recession of 2008 in a much more intense and direction fashion)?23 Does this 
not show a sort of unevenness across the surface of Empire? A combination of growth 
combined with stagnation? 
In Italy, the perfect storm of a wasteful and decadent state combined with the 
corruption of Berlusconi and his allies, brought the implosion of the US housing market 
and the global banking crisis to its shore at the worst of times. Presently, Italy is 
tottering on the brink of bankruptcy alongside its southern European and Adriatic 
neighbours (as much as previously high flying Ireland and Iceland far to the north, but 
equally at the limits of the Western Europe core). 24  Certainly, the fact that Canada has 
largely avoided the explosion of public sector debt and with it the coming catastrophe 
facing ‗the West‘, at least as conservative economists and much of the popular 
commentary would have us believe,25 makes the present era a relatively good one for 
Canada. At least according to the various economic indicators of Empire and the logic 
of neoliberal capital to which it corresponds. If in Italy this is not the case it is because 
Empire is as always home to every possible permutation, to the existence of endless 
interplays of difference and variation.  
C. Of difference and sameness in a post-binaric world: can we now see 
there really is no longer an outside? 
 
It is possible to look at the developing post 2008 era as one which is for most of the 
West (and Canada is clearly somewhat of an outlier here) takes up the position of ‗the 
                                               
23
 For a snapshot of the Canadian national economic situation which is indeed ‘mixed’ even relative to 
economic indicators like GDP, GNP, unemployment, etc., but nevertheless surprisingly resilient as 
compared to the US and its European peers see ‘Canada’s Recent Economic Performance’, Briefing Note 
(Ottawa: Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, 2009) available online at 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/PBO-DPB/documents/Recent_Economic_Performance.pdf; . Earlier in the 
century and on a more comparative footing (including relative to Italy) see D.J. Straw, ‘Canada’s 
Productivity and Standard of Living’ (Ottawa: Government of Canada Economics Division, 2002) 
available on line at http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/prb0223-e.htm. In the global 
financial media see ‘A Survey of Canada: Peace, Order and Rocky Government’ in The Economist, 
December 1, 2005 available online at http://www.economist.com/node/5243159. From the perspective 
of the private sector see the Conference Board of Canada’s economic forecast and analysis online at 
http://www.conferenceboard.ca/hcp/details/economy/income-per-capita.aspx. 
24
 n 15 above. 
25
 See eg L. Ratnovski & R. Huang, ‘Why are Canadian Banks more Resilient?’ (2009) IMF Working Paper 
No. 09/192 available online at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09152.pdf. 
                   214 of 242 
Rest‘. Of Latin America, Asia and the other ‗emerging economies‘ in the nineties.26  
What a strange and marvellous role reversal which the first decade of the new 
millennia brought. Today it is the old core which is finding itself on the periphery, and 
the old periphery which is ascending to the core. In this equation, Canada, for a variety 
of complex economic factors, including massive natural resources caches, a 
comparatively well regulated banking industry and a tame public sector debt, is better 
positioned than other similarly situated western democracies.  Of all its peers, perhaps 
only the smaller Australia thrives in Empire in quite the same way.27 But Canada‘s 
economic hiccup, its comparatively mild recession and slightly below average 
unemployment rates are not predestined. Nor are the cost benefits equations 
associated with more and more expensive resource extraction practices from more and 
more remote and inhospitable locations in the Canadian north and on First Nations 
lands.28 
It is also perhaps worth highlighting the basic fact that Italy‘s immediate problems have 
been Canada‘s in the not so distant past. By the late eighties and early nineties public 
sector deficits and debt were soaring in Canada. This was true not only at the level of 
the Federal Government but at the level of the Provincial Governments. There were 
also in the nineties, particularly in the Province of Ontario, under the government of 
Conservative Premier Mike Harris, immense protest movements directed at the 
aggressive deficit cutting and social spending austerity measures cutting needed 
funding to the provinces‘ schools, universities, and hospitals. Collective action and 
mass mobilization brought public sector unions, students and activists together in 
                                               
26
 Something to which Hardt and Negri have turned their attention toward as a crucial form of the 
circulation of capitalist biopower in Empire see eg A. Negri & M. Hardt, Multitude (London: Penguin, 
2005) 165, 172-176.   
27
 See eg C. Jordan & A. Jain, ‘Diversity and Resilience: Lessons from the Financial Crisis’ (2009) 32 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 416 which  places Australia and Canada, along with other 
major western states, in an post-2008 comparative frame available on line at 
http://cclsr.law.unimelb.edu.au/files/Diversity_and_Resilience__14_September_2009_.pdf.  
28
 Conflicts between Canada’s First Nations Peoples, around oil and natural gas drilling in the Alberta Tar 
Sands abound, along with deep tensions over increase mining and natural gas exploration in Canada’s 
far north are only among the more high profile examples which have drawn a response from Indigenous 
peoples both inside and outside of Canada see eg C. Thomas-Mueller, ‘Tar Sands: Environmental justice, 
treaty rights and Indigenous Peoples’ March/April 2008, Canadian Dimension available online at 
http://canadiandimension.com/articles/1760. For an authoritative gloss of the environmental as much 
as social and cultural dimension of resource extraction in the Alberta Tar sands see A. Nikiforuk, Tar 
Sands (Vancouver: Greystone Books, 2010). For a broad authoritative gloss of the legal and political 
situation in the north in particular see M. Byers, Who Owns the Arctic? (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre: 
2009).  
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regular shows of constituent power at Toronto‘s Queens Park, the iconic Provincial 
Legislature throughout the nineties.29  
If today, Italian students, feminist and activists, protest Berlusconi with the zeal of the 
multitude, Canadian students have proven themselves willing to do the same in 
response to both draconian public sectors cuts not only in Ontario but in all of the 
provinces.30 This cycle of austerity and protest which occurred in Canada during the 
nineties and it is now repeating itself in the US and a variety of European countries in 
the midst of a public sectors debt crisis (chief among them, Italy) is more than just 
interesting. It might plausible be part of the broader and repeating reality of Empire. 
Today, unemployment levels are so high in much of ‗the west‘ as to cause serious 
concerns as to public order in many countries which used to think of themselves at the 
centre of the global order. The signs which were complex and difficult to read in the 
nineties are clarified increasingly in everyday life. During the final months of drafting 
this thesis matters have continued to develop with great intensity. Today the multitude 
is asserting itself everywhere across the surface of the globe and its effects have 
brought about revolutions, some peaceful, some less so, some partial, some only just 
begun, but revolutions nonetheless.  
My hope in this thesis has been only that the more fulsomely developed Canadian 
reading, as well as the occasionally touched upon example of Italy, has been useful. 
Particularly insofar as it might be seen as a template for grasping the type of 
‗problems‘, often very much conceptual and logico-semantic, which present themselves 
in Empire. 
                                               
29
 See D. Rapaport, No Justice No Peace (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1999); J. Turk, ‘Days 
of Action: Challenging the Harris Corporate Agenda’ in D.S. Ralph, A. Régimbald, N. St-Amand (eds) Open 
for Business/Closed to People (Nova Scotia: Fernwood Publishing, 1997) 165.  
30
 For a general overview over several decades across see M. Hammond-Callaghan & M. Haday (eds) 
Mobilizations, Protests and Engagements (Nova Scotia: Fernwood Publishing, 2008).   
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